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The introduction of Google Trends in 2006 has made it possible to perform research with 
a new approach. The general ability to measure the trends of queries and the demand for 
information contains large quantities of new data to be analyzed. Previously that data has 
not been easily in a quantifiable form. According to Alexa (2015) Google has achieved 
large market share in global internet search queries and it provides a unique tool in almost 
real time to measure the global search query amounts the different topics receive from 
public queries.  
The search query studies have begun around 2010 in modern finance. One of the first 
remarkable research papers was Da, Engelberg, Gao (2011) (from now on referenced as 
DEG).  The first version was published in 2009 but was later revised with new data. This 
particular study will replicate such previous studies and tests done by DEG, but with 
different time period, different target group and different search query key words. The 
methods and methodology will have common approaches, making this study in reality 
comparable to previous studies in the same context.  
 “Google is a company that specializes in digital data facilitation; for general common 
issues there is the basic Google service, for academia there is Google Scholar and for 
finance related information there is Google Finance ”(Wuoristo 2012, 1). During the past 
few years Google searches have become the industry standard how to navigate web. In 
Europe, UK and USA Google is the most common way compared to other search engines 
to search the internet for various topics. During the last five years Google has also become 
the most visited site measured by internet traffic (Alexa 2015). 
Google trends provides the aggregated time-series data. It is generally referenced as 
“Search Volume Index”. The commonly used abbreviation for it is SVI. This information 
is publicly available to all Google account holders from a single web page (Google 
Trends). The qualification for the data to appear on Google trends is that there is enough 
search queries made each week. The data is also given out in weekly frequency. “The 
weekly SVI value is the number of searches for that term scaled by the time-series 
average” (Wuoristo 2012, 2). Further filters can be added to sort the time-series data. Few 
different filters can, for example, be: 
  
 Country from which the queries originate 
 Product categories, in example Apple (computers) and apple (food) 
 Start of the time-series period 
 End of the time-series period 
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 Total number of weeks in the sample 
 
The data is generally available dating back to early 2004, and ends in the previous 
week when the query for the CSV Google Trends data is made. For example, executing 
a query for “Nokia” share during week 10 2014, would therefore result in time-series 
from 2004 to query date week 9. Therefore, it can be perceived Google Trends has one 
full week of buffer until a new series is released for public. With longer series this is not 
relevant or statistically significant for this study, but in case of shorter periods, the one 
week duration can have a greater weight. The problem with too short a duration for time 
series can be easily avoided by observing a longer time frame or extrapolating the missing 
values.  
Because Google has a high penetration rate in most markets and it can provide reliable 
results in terms of measuring attention trough different query words (Google 2014). 
Google’s market share has not been always so high. The data further away from current 
situation or time period is not always reliable. The search queries relational proportions 
might have been divided differently between specific search engines. For example, retail 
investors have made their queries on a certain search engine or platform. In such case 
they may have been preferring an alternative engine over Google. Academic research 
does not have many studies or statistics over this. Therefore, this study does not take the 
possible effect into account at all. Such competitors are, for example, Altavista which no 
longer holds any significant part of queries compared to Google or Microsoft’s Bing. 
Over the few last year’s Google’s popularity as the number one search engine has 
remained fairly steady as seen from the figure below (Alexa 2014). Other search engines 
are slowly gaining popularity, but at the same time the size for total market is growing 
rapidly and is estimated to experience double digit growth for years to come (Alexa 2014). 
This further strengthened the hold of Google as the most popular and used engine 
according to surveys and query amount histories published by Google. The very near past 







Figure 1 Google market share compared to other search engines from 2010 to 2014 
(Alexa 2014)  
In the figure one it can be seen Google takes a major part of the internet queries. 
Previous finance studies have taken the distribution of queries (between different search 
engines) as an insignificant factor when modeling behavioral phenomenon. This study 
presumes the differences are also insignificant for validity and reliability. The keyword 
vippi is used as an example because the attention it receives comes almost solely from 
consumers. It can be seen as a reliable proxy for attention as it also has very little if any 
noise in it. The word always infers with borrowing money and does not have any other 
meanings in Finnish language.  
The graph depicts an example of SVI. The keyword is the Finnish word “vippi” which 
means a very short term loan. Commonly the duration of the loan varies from 7-14 days 






Figure 2 The keyword “vippi” indicating weekly fluctuation of SVI (Google 2014) 
There are clear and definite peaks from Thursday to Friday therefore indicating the 
short-term financing needs of individuals seems to be mainly for weekends. Also there is 
a significant spike before New Year’s Eve as can be seen from the graph near the end of 
the 2013. Therefore, it’s safe to conclude SVI captures the attention well in this case. 
There is clear pattern in the fluctuation of SVI for the keyword. The actual level of SVI 
may vary, but the time-series are stationary. This is most likely because of the relative 
nature of the time-series since Google Trends uses normalization. The actual formula for 
this specific action is unknown.  
Google Trends Search Volume Index (SVI) has been shown to have predictive powers 
in forecasting influenza epidemics (Ginbsberg et al, 2009). The predictive powers have 
not been commonly tested in neither corporate finance or in finance research in general 
besides few geographically isolated studies (mainly in the UK and in the US). 
Nevertheless generally its predictive powers have not been tested to full extent, and with 
the on-going development of the tool (Google Trends and Google Insight) it is very likely 
the forecasting powers will significantly increase in future and new fields of study will 
emerge. Also since the release of Google Trends in 2006 the amount of data gathered is 
significantly greater than in the studies previously conducted in 2009.  
1.2 Theoretical framework 
Classic asset pricing models and efficient market hypothesis claim all information to be 
instantaneously available for all investors. Therefore, it will be reflected in the share price 
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immediately, and there are no possibilities of arbitrages or gaining excess returns (or at 
least they would be extremely short term). Kahneman (1973) argues attention being a 
scarce cognitive resource and therefore investors are forced with different alternatives for 
their focus of attention. Thus generally investors are presumed to have a predefined set 
of choices or alternatives for their individual investment decisions. This framework is 
then used to make the said investment decisions without further analysis.  
Based on previous studies investor attention is presumed to be a significant factor in 
defining trading volumes for assets (Barber and Odean 2008). The easiest and most 
practical approach to measure attention is using different proxies. Few examples of these 
(indirect) proxies according to previous studies are: 
 
 References in newspapers or journals (Barber and Odean 2008). 
 Attention in online discussion forums or chat rooms (mouth to mouth 
advertising) (Barber and Odean 2008). 
 Advertising expenses (Chemmanur and Yan 2009). 
 Price limits (Seasholes and Wu 2007). 
 Trading volume (Barber and Odean 2008). 
 Excess positive returns (defined by CAPM/Beta and Fama-French three-factor 
model). 
 Excess negative returns (defined by CAPM/Beta Fama-French and three-factor 
model). 
 
Most of the studies indicate that those shares, stocks or other investment assets grasp 
the general public’s attention are most commonly based on individual preferences. This 
indicates that they are not acquired on grounds of classic financial theory. “In 2011, the 
first study to use a direct measure of investor attention was published (DEG 2009). The 
paper uses Google’s Search Volume Index (SVI) as a proxy for investor attention based 
on the assumption that searching on the internet for a company reflects acute and direct 
interest.” (Wuoristo 2012, 4) The study claims there is a linear dependency between 
Search Volume Index and stock trading volume’s with shares listed in the UK.  
DEG (2011) show in which way and how much attention the SVI captures of retail 
investors. The presumption is that institutional investors turn towards more sophisticated 
tools, for examples, the Reuters or the Bloomberg terminals (DEG 2011; Wuoristo 2012; 
Mondria and Wu 2011). This means the investors that are outside the use of Bloomberg 
or Reuters terminals would be nearly always using Google as their main means to 
acquiring information. This is in line with academic journals and is a likely result of 
Google gaining near monopoly market penetration.  
The study of Mondria and WU (2011) indicates that information asymmetry is also a 
decisive factor in the following way: 
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 Local attention high, non-local low -> SVI can be efficiently used to predict 
future share prices 
 Local attention high, non-local high -> no statistically significant predictive 
powers 
 Local attention low, non-local high -> no statistically significant predictive 
powers 
 
Therefore, SVI predicts only (or at least better) when there is information asymmetry. 
The predictive powers are solely defined by ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in 
all the mentioned previous studies. Any more complex or more thorough analysis 
methods have not been used before. First example of these methods is examining the 
changes in variance with the regression. Another example is using Granger causality to 
determine if another variable Granger causes the other. In these cases there could be 
predictability and possibilities of arbitraging. The lack of use of these methods previously 
can be of several reasons. Firstly because OLS is a very fast method of acquiring reliable 
results from vast sample sizes. Secondly it is unclear if OLS is leaving something out. In 
reality this means more complex methods such as VAR may not provide any information 
that a simple OLS cannot produce. The studies generally do not give results that could 
not be contradicted. In many cases similar studies conducted with different types of stocks 
give the opposite results. This finding is very different from what is stated in DEG (2011) 
study. Nevertheless, some of this can be explained because DEG (2011) used weekly data 
– as will this study also – but Mondria and Wu (2011) used monthly. In many cases the 
autocorrelation or predictive powers can be seen only in shorter frequency. Both the 
studies mentioned use OLS as a method of regression, and do not imply the use of VAR 
or other more complex methods. Also the causality between SVI and share price as also 
with trading volume is not clear, but the statistically significant regression still holds true.  
1.3 The purpose of the study 
The objective is to analyze if Google Trends can predict stock trading volume with 
Finnish OMXH listed shares. This is done by using search volume index as a proxy of 
non-professional investor attention. Furthermore the study is conducted by using the 
company names as the queries. This can be further studied for possibilities of predicting 
trades or prices using Google Trends search results as the proxy on publicly listed 
companies in Finland based on search query results using weekly data from Google 
Trends and index price data from Data Stream. The financial data on individual 
companies and indices is available from Data Stream but also from alternative sources as 
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Yahoo Finance. Therefore, the thesis examines non-professional investor behavior with 
using Google search volume index as a proxy for attention. The following three individual 
research questions are all defining the main question more clearly. The first question is if 
search volume index is a viable proxy to be used for studying. The second question is a 
follow-up to the first. So if search volume index is actually a viable proxy for investor 
attention and quantifies the common attention, does it correlate with trading volumes at a 
statistically significant level? So if investor attention rises do investors buy more shares 
and does it affect the liquidity of stocks and how much? The third question maps if search 
volume index can be used to predict trading volumes in the future. If there are higher than 
normal trading volumes, are they connected to returns? The questions can be stated as 
follows: 
 
1. Does Search Volume Index capture the attention of non-professional investors in 
the Finnish market? 
2. Does Search Volume Index correlate with the stock market trading volume (in a 
statistically significant level)? 
3. Can Search Volume Index be used to predict and forecast an individual company’s 
stock turnover? 
 
The motivation of this study is to test the initial findings of Da, Engelberg and Gao 
(2011) and Wuoristo (2012) and replicate certain parts of their studies with different 
geographical area, target group and stock market index. Both of the studies conclude 
differences in the target groups. They also clearly and specifically indicate they expect 
different results to arise from different areas. By conducting the study in a similar manner 
with the same sources of data, the study can be easily verified and replicated, and is also 
comparable. Also, since this study is made at a later date, Google Trends is offering longer 
time series and it will also probably dilute the effects of the 2008-2009 financial crisis 
better and thus offer a better long term approximation of the predicting powers of SVI. 
This study will solely focus on keywords that are company names, while the previous 
studies generally have been studying queries done with ticker symbols. Examples of this 
are, for example, searching the time-series for Apple computers by just using the ticker 
APPL or NASDAQ:APPL.  
In general, this would indicate this study is one of the first conducted with either 
Nordic or Finnish material.  Only exceptions would be the tickers overlapping the 3 
different market places because of multiple listings (i.e. Helsinki, UK, and US). The 
amount of these companies is very limited. The assumption is that the general public will 
indicate strong home bias –effect. Therefore, a high value in SVI (keywords with share 
ticker or company name) will probably mean higher general public interest in the stock 
and thus have higher trading volumes. This in return results as higher demand for the 
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stock, and depending on the volume of trades would influence the market price of the 
share. If there is clear indication of predictability, such information could be used 
efficiently to arbitrage and gain excess returns (and maybe enhance the phenomena of 
rising trading volumes based on raising search volume index values). It is possible if there 
is evidence of clear predictability. Then, it could be presumed the investors want to utilize 
such an inefficiency by creating more demand, increasing prices and causing more 
volatility.  
The studies conducted by Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011) and Wuoristo (2012) focus 
on a general mean level key figures such as average turnover, average returns and median 
prices for a number of different stocks. There is a definite lack of studies that solely focus 
on individual stocks and shares. This is mainly based on few separate reasons. Firstly, the 
sheer amount of data collection is extremely time consuming especially if the vast 
majority of the companies need to be omitted for various reasons. Until Google or any 
other major source provides easy and fast means of acquiring data, conducting studies 
will be difficult.  Secondly, the sample may end being too small to reliably predict future 
values for variables. In many cases for industry sectors and indices the sample sizes are 
vast and ample. Although, this is not the case for all sectors. For example, the OMXH: 
Helsinki stock index only has few companies that solely work with consumers instead of 
business to business trade. If the remaining sample size for studies would range from only 
2 to 3 different distinct companies, it would be difficult to make generalizations based on 
the sample’s findings (De long et al. 2008). 
1.4 Methodology in comparison to previous studies 
1.4.1 Contribution 
There are not many studies in finance conducted with the use of search volume index yet. 
The most common reason is that the actual tool is rather new and therefore the time-series 
are only few years in length. This forces many of the studies to be focused on short term 
events instead of longer term predictability and analysis. Because of the massive amount 
of data gathering that is needed the analysis is often limited to simple ordinary least 
squares regressions. Nevertheless, as time passes, the series will be more ample and will 
cover different events in the general economy, for example, long bull markets and longer 
periods of recession. As far as the author knows, this study is the first study to focus on 
solely Finnish securities and SVI. The main focus and idea is still to replicate certain 
limited parts of the previous study by DEG (2011). Although, this study will have very 
different focus on certain aspects: 
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 Size of market (the US vs Finland) 
 Type of the markets (US companies have ownership from several different types 
of investors whereas in Finnish companies are mainly owned by institutional 
investors), 
 Nordic markets are more focused on certain industry fields where as US markets 
have various types of companies representing a larger field of economy, 
 Company sizes vary from Finnish small caps (20 M market capitalization) to 
over 200 B USD in US markets). 
 Time horizon from the beginning of the year 2013.  
 The market conditions under which the study is conducted. For example, studies 
from 2008 to 2009 will have different economic background than studies 
conducted after 2010.  
 Both VAR and OLS models are being used in this study while previous studies 
commonly use only ordinary least squares methods. 
 Granger-causality testing for estimating future values. 
 More in depth focus on what influences the SVI from the aspect of behavioral 
finance instead of typical classical Bayesian estimation.  
 
Based on previous studies, it seems that retail investors act differently in different 
markets (Trueman 1988). In this study the presumption is the investors react differently 
in the US markets than they act in the Finnish and the Nordic markets. However, it is not 
clear at all if this has an effect on the results of the study based on any theory. The first 
example for the differences is the home bias in different countries. Some countries may 
be more eager to invest to local markets instead of global (Tay 2009). This varies 
obviously from country to country. The second major difference between markets is the 
population’s attitude towards investing related activities in general (Sornette 2003). In the 
US, people generally invest and act actively in markets following news and reading about 
companies to invest in.  In Finland, people keep their distance to investing or have market 
exposure at best with mutual funds or through pension funds in general. This allows the 
Finnish investors to be exceedingly more passive and the American and people from the 
United Kingdom to be more active and with greater participation in investing activities.  
It is unclear how well SVI can capture the non-professional investor attention. It could be 
questioned if the non-professional investors use Google as a source of information when 
they are interested in investing in companies. Also, if non-professional investors use 
Google for seeking information, is it consistent with all companies or unique to specific 
type of companies? For example, are small caps receiving more queries than large cap 
companies? Is SVI capturing the attention of the public in the first place? 
Therefore, the major sources of contribution in this study are: 
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1. Understanding the Search Volume index in Finnish markets with non-professional 
investors.  
2. Deepening the understanding on non-professional investor behavior in general.  
3. Learning the uses of SVI as a proxy of attention.  
1.4.2 Methods 
The main method is statistical inference. Another data gathering method is to gather 
information from Google Trends by hand individually one company at a time. The 
process starts by going into Google Trends landing page and searching the keywords one 
at a time. It is unclear if Google allows some sort of data mining or web crawling to be 
used in gathering information, but it is not available for public when this study was 
conducted. It is also noted that the previous studies conducted had no data mining tools 
available either, so it can be concluded the amount of companies is limited because of 
work and time limitations. Samples of hundreds of companies would require massive 
amount of manual data extraction, which is prone to errors. Nevertheless, when the data 
is gathered one at a time by hand, the sample size has to be limited because the actual 
process is extremely time consuming. Google Trends provides CSV-files1 which in turn 
have to be processed to be in a format that can be input to EViews2 or similar statistical 
analysis application. From this data the different tests will be conducted.   
1.5 Validity, reliability and limitations with generalization  
The previous studies have also verified most of the keywords and tickers are not 
“noisy” (DEG 2011; Wuoristo 2012, 6; Mondria and Wu 2011; Ginbsberg et al. 2009). 
There does not appear to be this problem with the Finnish data either. There are quite a 
lot of problems with European and US data on the other hand, because many of the brand 
names can have multiple different meanings. As Wuoristo (2012) indicates in his study: 
“Another limitation is that many companies have noisy tickers, such as British American 
Tobacco’s ticker BATS, which cannot be used to measure SVI since it would also pick 
up on searches for the nocturnal animals.” For Finnish companies a similar problem exists 
only to some extent. For example, if you search for the keyword Fortum, you might be 
interested in finding information about electricity contracts or prices. Nevertheless, this 
                                                 
1 CSV-File is a Comma-Separated-Values file with raw numerical data in a standard table form 
defined by RFC 4180 format. 
2 EViews is a Windows based statistical program specifically designed for economic analysis.  
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also is a signal of interest or attention towards the company so it is not grounds for 
omitting the data from the research. Therefore, such coincidences will be left within the 
research data. In many cases the Nordic companies have very specific and straight 
forward names and are not easily confused with anything else. For example, a query for 
the steel company “Rautaruukki” would result only in results related to the steel 
manufacturing company or the products it manufactures. Both of the mentioned options 
would indicate attention towards the company and thus are valid and acceptable choices 
for the study and are also presumed to be reflected in the underlying search volume index 
values for the company (Mondria and Wu 2011; Ginbsberg et al. 2009).  
1.6 Structure of the study 
The structure of the thesis is based on five main chapters. The first chapter is the 
introduction. The second is the theory, the third being the methods, methodology and data 
and the fourth chapter introduces the results. The fifth and final chapter is about the 
conclusions that can be made.  
Chapter two introduces the theoretical part of the study. In general, it introduces the 
relevant theories that are needed to exercise this study and to replicate the tests. The 
chapter is used as theoretical basis for the study. The chapter 2.1 consists of the 
introduction of the attention based theory and different aspects how it can be measured 
and what kind of proxies are viable for further study. It also introduces the notable theory 
called efficient market hypothesis, which is one of the corner stones of current financial 
theories and explains why this study also indirectly tests the efficient market hypothesis. 
Chapter 2.2 examines behavioral finance as an alternative to efficient market 
presumptions. In practice many of the efficient market assumptions must be discarded 
and a more behavioral approach is chosen as a preference. The chapter then carries on 
with noise trading to behavioral heuristics and ends with risk management in finance and 
some aspects related to sociology as an option for approach. Chapter 2.3 includes the 
relevant studies and theories to Google trends as a tool and as a source of data for this 
study. For academic studies Google as a proxy is a new tool with only less than a decade 
of history. The studies are therefore limited and new information surfaces often. Chapter 
2.4 introduces the hypotheses of this study by explaining them one at a time. The 
hypotheses are closely tied to the previous studies but also justified from a theory aspect.  
The third chapter contains the methods, methodology and the data used in this study. 
Chapter 3.1 introduces the regression methods which are used in previous studies such as 
the ordinary least squares regressions. It also compares the different approaches this 




Chapter 3.2 carries with the introduction of the sample data and descriptive statistics. 
Some requirements for the data are introduced in regard to the sample size and the types 
of companies that are viable for further studies.  It carries on with the generation of the 
data series. The sources and also alternative sources for the data are given and listed. The 
major variables in the study are abnormal stock returns, abnormal trading volumes and 
abnormal search volume. The abnormality of the values means their deviation from the 
expected values based on different theories. Later on the chapter the selected data for 
ordinary least squares and multivariate analysis is shown. The reasons for the selected 
companies are also carefully determined and evaluated. The chapter ends with the 
introduction of Granger causality and the presumptions that are required for Granger 
causality’s application with the null hypotheses.  
Chapter four consists of the empirical results. The chapter starts with the given 
regressions and their testing. This is done to both ordinary least squares and to 
multivariate (ARMA-GARCH). Chapter 4.3 contains comparison of the hypotheses. This 
means each of the previous study hypotheses and the hypothesis unique to this study are 
gone through one at a time either accepting or rejecting the hypotheses. There are also 
notes if the results differ greatly from previous studies. After the results there are 
robustness tests which mean the same types of regressions are done with different ways 
to calculate the expected returns. This is to verify that the results hold if the calculated 
returns differ based on the type of theory used.  In this study the expected results are first 
calculated using CAPM-model, and during the robustness tests using Fama-French three-
factor model. If both expected return values produce similar type of results they can be 
considered to be more reliable. 
 The fifth chapter introduces the conclusions of the study and reviews possible 
problems with generalizing the results within a larger context.  
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
This chapter reviews the relevant literatures for this study. There are four subdivisions. 
First two cover the literature specific to attention theory and how it compares the 
differences between behavioral economics and efficient market hypothesis. Generally this 
study will not go to deep analysis with the efficient market hypothesis. As a theory it is 
well known and commonly used within finance. What is not so clear is the relation to 
Search Volume Index and to forecasting in general. The first chapter also briefly explains 
efficient market hypothesis when trying to predict market movements based on proxies 
or historical events.  
 The latter parts of the chapter are about the theory behind Google Trends and SVI in 
general. The SVI subchapters are divided into financial and non-financial literature 
reviews. The chapter ends with the development of the hypotheses.  
2.1 Attention and the efficient markets 
The attention based theories can be divided into two different approaches. Firstly, by 
analyzing them through different proxies and efficient market hypothesis. Secondly, by 
taking the behavioral approach and also using different proxies. The attention itself is 
very difficult to measure without using proxies, which at best only reflect the attention 
but are unlikely to ever be exactly accurate. Attention “theory” is very different from the 
traditional efficient market hypothesis, which assumes a lot of different factors (Merton 
1987). In the past decade finance has had an increasing amount of studies focusing on 
behavioral economics instead of taking the traditional approach. There are few different 
reasons for that. The biggest driving factor is the assumption that information is 
immediately at hand for all investors. In reality it is easy to prove this is not the case. 
Because the traditional finance model requires such approach, information asymmetry 
accounts for many different approaches for pricing. For traditional models it can be said 
that: “These models assume that investors have undivided attention to all assets and their 
corresponding information streams. However that is understandably not the case since 
attention is a scarce Cognitive resource” (Kahneman 1973). This fact forces the investors 
or an individual to focus on only few things at a time. With the flood of information the 
focus and attention of an individual easily becomes very scarce (Kahneman 1973). The 
lack of infinite information required by the market model and frictions like costs are being 
explained by Merton (1987). The paper sheds light to the deficiencies of actual markets 
and focuses on capital market equilibriums under lack of information with transaction 
costs and asymmetrical information in general. The limitations of attention have been 
studied both by economists and psychologists.  
20 
2.1.1 Limited attention and overconfidence 
Behavioral and psychological approach to finance have brought many interesting 
results to attention. The behavioral approach has studied the actors of transactions. For 
example, Corwin and Coughenour (2008) study the attention among specialists in 
finance. The specific study focuses on turnover of their portfolios with NYSE as the data. 
Their main findings are: 
 
 Most active stocks have more allocation during periods of higher 
activity/attention. 
 During times of increased attention and activity the assets which have less 
attention, become also less liquid.  
 The effects of running out of liquidity lead to price improvements and greatly 
increased transaction costs. 
 
A significant paper for this study is the study by Peng and Xiong (2006) which shows 
actor interaction while experiencing limited or asymmetrical information. Firstly, their 
most important findings are that when actors are unable to acquire the relevant 
information or they have to make decisions with adequate background information they 
tend to start focusing on category-level information. Category-level information in this 
case means a more general approach to investing than careful thorough individual asset 
analysis. An example of category-level news is the economic conditions deteriorating 
greatly. Another is, for example, rising unemployment levels within a nation.  Secondly, 
they also conclude that while experiencing lack of information, overconfidence is 
prevalent. Overconfidence often leads to making decisions based on general sentiment 
among other investors instead of company related data or information. In many real world 
cases there is very little if any financial analysis involved when sentiment dictates buying 
decisions.  Since many if not all investors have fairly limited attention it is interesting and 
valid to ask what are the specific driving factors behind their interests and motives.  What 
are the defining factors in grabbing investor’s attention? Wuoristo (2012) refers to the 
study by Odean (1999) which is about the problems of picking up individual stocks from 
extremely large amount of different alternatives. The solution according to the paper is 
the investors limit their common searches to assets that have gained their attention in the 
very near past. In reality this means only days or weeks of timespan.  Therefore it can be 
concluded attention is the framework which offers the options of which to choose the 
investments and make the decisions. The actual investment decisions nevertheless can be 
of different ends. Barber and Odean (2008) offer different strategies such as contrarian or 
momentum investing. “The availability of heuristic is one of the most common 
explanations for attention allocation for uninformed investors (Wuoristo 2012, 15).” 
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The price limits rely on disposition effect. It means when an asset, stock, bond or a 
ticker reaches recent highs or lows in price, it acquires vast attention from general 
investing public. It also is seen to gather more “relative attention” to what the turnover of 
the asset would indicate. “Advertising expenses work as a proxy by assuming that the 
more money a company puts into advertising the more familiar it is with investors and 
the more familiar it is results in higher attention, since investors are more likely to follow 
firms they know compared to unfamiliar ones.” (Wuoristo 2012, 15) The advertising 
expenses spent approach is commonly used in marketing, and many companies try to 
optimize the gain from advertising. Nevertheless, studies are conflicted how advertising 
expenses influence the stock price in the long term. Few studies indicate some advertising 
clearly raises the value of the company compared to a situation where no money is spent 
on advertising. After some marginal value, the value gained from advertising stops and 
excess money spent has no effect on value. Although the topic is very controversial and 
between different industries different results have arisen. Naturally the commercial 
marketing industry pushes on studies heavily that claim investing has clear returns for 
shareholders (Shiller 2009).  
2.1.2 Measuring attention with proxies 
Proxies are the easiest way to measure investor attention but they act indirectly. In reality, 
proxies are the only way to measure something that does not have a quantitative value 
that can be observed by the researcher. This is a common dilemma for many studies. 
Many of the commonly used proxies in finance literature are extreme returns, media 
attention and trading volume (Barber and Odean 2008; Wuoristo 2012, 15). The common 
approach is to consider the information push. If an individual sees or hears from a single 
topic often, he is more prone to pay greater attention to that specific topic. This can also 
trigger interest in the observer and he or she becomes interested in acquiring further 
information.  Wuoristo (2012) mentions a situation where a company exhibits overly 
positive or on the other hand negative returns or return periods. Therefore, it becomes 
exceedingly likely the individual investors will pay more attention to that compared to a 
more stable day in the terms of price fluctuation. Two unique proxies are also mentioned 
in many studies. The first being price limits mentioned by Seasholes and Wu (2007) and 
the second advertising expenses spent (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009). Both of the proxies 
have been found to be trustworthy in modeling and capturing the attention changes 
significantly and reliably.  
One of the most important things about investor attention in this study is how it affects 
the individual’s behavior. Barber and Odean (2008) have clearly confirmed individual 
investors tend to be net buyers of stocks that have high levels of attention. This directly 
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indicates the more attention a share gets the more net buyers it will have. The initial 
thinking behind this hypothesis is when an average investor is choosing a stock for his 
portfolio, he makes the choice based on items he is familiar with or has heard of (Barber 
and Odean 2008). Nevertheless when they choose to sell something out of their portfolio, 
the options are naturally limited to the shares they own. This approach does not take short 
selling into account. This one-sided approach generally means retail investors as a group 
lean towards being net buyers of stocks or assets that experience high attention. Like in 
previous studies, this study also tests this theorem with the hypotheses that are introduced 
later. 
2.1.3 Neoclassical approach and Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
The most central theory within finance is the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). It has 
been tested and studied frequently, and it has remained in a significant focus on financial 
studies. Many of the published research papers either directly or indirectly test the EMH 
theory or test how efficient the markets actually are. A very common topic for studies is 
to try to prove markets to be inefficient or biased in several different ways. Several years 
after the development of EMH a lot new theories have emerged, mainly pointing out facts 
the EMH cannot justify.  
Based on the viewpoint EMH has few different meanings. In economics it often refers 
to the process of price forming. For example, how the changes in demand and supply are 
reflected in a specific utility’s market price. In finance the most common approach is to 
analyze what kind of information is included in the price of an asset. In short, how well 
the price of a security reflects the information in the markets. According to the original 
theory, there are three (or four) distinct levels of market efficiency. Level zero usually 
indicates a clear statement: markets are not efficient at all, and the prices do not reflect 
the information available and this rule is very strict. This is not mentioned often though, 
but the theory is represented with the three levels commonly. The levels are as follows 
(Elton et al. 2011, 396): 
 
 Weak-form efficiency in which all existing information contained in historical 
prices are fully reflected (without delay) in current security prices. 
 Semi-strong-form efficiency in which all public information is immediately and 
thoroughly reflected in current security prices. 
 Strong-form efficiency in which all public and private information is (without 
delay) fully reflected in current prices.  
 
23 
There are many debates on what level the markets operate in a real world situation. 
The strong-form especially is often seen only as a theoretical approach, as no markets are 
able to reach the requirements for it. Although it is also highly debatable what it actually 
means being fully reflected in the prices of securities. Jensen, one of the most notable 
researches of the topic, claims in his study (1986) that, for example, transaction costs to 
be added into the equations. For example, in a real world situation the strong-form in its 
most theoretic form cannot exist. But if one loosens the requirements for the strong-form, 
so transaction costs are omitted (or not taken into account), the strong market efficiency 
can be achieved in markets with very high liquidity. It requires the price changes to be 
differentially small and extremely frequent (Jensen 1986).  
One of the other problems with the theory is forecasting future returns. Fama (1970, 
384) points out the “joint hypothesis problem”. He concludes that the market efficiency 
tests are always tests on the whole market’s equilibrium and also the same time tests on 
the expected return models. So without understanding the expected return models, it is 
extremely difficult to judge on the market equilibrium. This study generally uses CAPM 
to calculate market returns, but for the sake of the robustness tests also applies Fama-
French 3factor models. In final chapters of this thesis the market efficiency will be 
indirectly tested. As a principle there should be no possibilities of arbitrage or reliable 
forecasting possibilities, at least not for extended periods of time according to CAPM 
(Jensen 1986). This thesis will not introduce Capital Asset Pricing Model any further, 
since it is one of the most notable and well known theories within finance at the moment. 
This study utilizes mainly CAPM expected returns. 
2.1.4 The efficiency of the Finnish securities markets 
The Helsinki Stock Exchange was founded in the year 1912. There had been some activity 
before the given date but it was rather unregulated and the required organizations for day 
to day functions were missing (Nyberg & Vaihekoski 2010). After the initial start, for 
over half a century the Finnish stock market was extremely tightly regulated (as in many 
countries in proximity to Soviet Union).  This period ended in the 1980’s, and that point 
the markets were moderately underdeveloped as in many eastern countries, opposite to 
the western markets.  
The process of deliberation of the securities markets started in the 1980’s and resulted 
in an boom, bust cycle forcing Finland first into a recession and then to the depression of 
the 1990’s. Foreign investments and ownership were heavily restricted in the end of the 
1980’s and until the beginning of 1990’s.  After these periods the Finnish legislation was 
unified with the European Union standards. “The Finnish Stock market was harmonized 
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with other Nordic exchanges to create OMX (Ripatti 2010, 12; Vaihekoski 1997; 
Pörssisäätiö 2007). 
The Finnish stock market efficiency has been studied directly and indirectly. Studies 
had begun with Korhonen (1997) and he found the markets at that point to be weak-form 
efficient. Nevertheless, the Finnish markets have differentiated vastly from other western 
markets (Korhonen 1997). In most western markets investing has been a sought after 
activity for non-professional investors for decades. In Finland most of the companies 
were government owned. The original studies by Korhonen (1997) were conducted with 
only 18 companies. In his thesis Ripatti (2010) states as follows: ”Prices did fluctuate in 
a random walk way and no leads or lags were found that could be exploitable.” Yet there 
are studies of exactly the opposite findings. Virtanen and Yli-Olli (1987) had found many 
different anomalies within the Finnish market and questioned the market efficiency and 
the randomness of the price forming process. 
2.2 Behavioral finance 
Behavioral finance plays a significant role in finance research. According to the efficient 
market hypothesis there should be no long term possibilities of excess gains. All assets 
should revert to their estimated future earnings in the long term. Nevertheless, there are 
several studies proving the other way around. This chapter is divided into seven 
subchapters. At first the general market sentiment theory will be glanced through. The 
second subchapter will be about noise trading the possibilities of making money based on 
sentiments and other investor reactions. The third chapter is about the limiting factors to 
trading and how arbitraging works according to literature. The fourth, fifth and sixth 
subchapters introduce psychological aspects and risk management from other than 
efficient market hypothesis approach. The seventh chapter introduces sociological aspects 
instead of the psychological factors that have been prevalent in the first 6 chapters.  
2.2.1 Behavioral finance and market sentiment 
 
The grand idea behind behavioral theories is that the individual investors do not act in a 
rational way. Therefore, most of the decisions they decide to make are influenced heavily 
by biases and also by irrelevant information. As such it can be concluded the actors are 
being bombarded with several mental and psychological factors (Shiller 2003). 
“Behavioral finance provides a broader social science perspective by incorporating 
sociology and psychology in finance” (Nofsinger 2008, 4; Shiller 2003, 83). Generally 
25 
the time period of odd behavior vary a lot. Between different individuals there can be a 
great deal of correlation in decisions. This can be persistent and constant with long periods 
of time. In reality this means market prices can deviate from their innate fundamentals 
for extremely long time, and also because there are no limits to the possibilities of 
arbitrage that deters the informed investors from trying to eliminate the mispricing in 
markets. Therefore, generally betting or taking opposite positions to the said individuals 
acting irrationally (in example noise traders) is not generally lucrative. The mispricing in 
market can stay for a long time and even strengthen over time (Schmeling 2009; Neal & 
Wheatley 1998). Some traders are more interested in mispricing than others. Generally 
many non-professional investors act as the securities prices are “given”. Depending on 
the type of the investor, some are more prone to investor sentiment changes than others. 
Noise traders in specific aggregate the mood of the market more than others (Shleifer 
2008). This is not a problem that exists solely among non-professional investors. Opposite 
to non-professional investors are the professional investors, commonly referenced as 
institutional investors. Often they are considered to be smarter, more aware of prevalent 
information and commonly to be smarter traders. Nevertheless these professional 
investors are still found to be herding in and out of stocks and use momentum-related 
trading strategies, which are directly against the efficient market hypothesis (Shiller 
2003). Since professional investors usually have higher amount of resources, they may 
end up strengthening the market movements and over exaggerating. So when the market 
sentiment is overly positive, they end up buying a lot of securities. When the markets are 
down, or it is a bear-market, they tend to sell in quantities therefore causing and 
strengthening the market movements out of their balance situations. Trying to make 
money out of the movements tends to cause bigger movements in markets. Nevertheless 
the situation may also be the other way around. In some markets professional investors 
may be aware of the underlying psychological biases, and therefore they try to benefit 
from them excessively. So it can be used as a clear arbitrage point, that the prices of 
securities should reflect their underlying value in the long term. According to Schmeling 
(2007) there are professional institutional investors who do this type of arbitrage 
regularly.  
Some other researches have studied arbitraging further. For example, Baker and 
Wurgler (2007) state that investor sentiment thoroughly means the propensity to speculate 
by the marginal investors. In these kind of situations the general market sentiment is the 
driving force behind asset demand with speculative securities.  This demand causes 
ripples and cross-sectional correlation with other assets. Thus increasing market prices 
for all assets, despite there are possibilities of arbitrage. The individual characteristic with 
securities is, it is difficult to determine their true value (Shiller 2003). As an example of 
difficult to assess companies are the ones that possess lots of intangible assets, have great 
growth potential or are debt burdened. Each of the factors may affect the value of the 
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security remarkably. Also as another example smaller companies are generally more 
affected by market sentiment than their larger counterparts. And on a more macro level 
idea, securities or stocks in general can be viewed from optimistic or pessimistic 
prospects. For example, there are periods in history where stocks are generally valued 
with extremely low price/earnings values (P/E<7) within SP500. And then there are times 
such as market bubbles where the P/E-ratios are generally closer to 30 or even higher.  It 
is unknown if institutional investors are as prone as non-professionals to employ 
momentum-based investment strategies without noticing. Nevertheless professionals do 
take part in strong bull markets pushing stock prices over their fundamental values 
(Schmeling 2007). Often it can be noted, that harder the security to value, the easier it is 
for noise traders to cause price shifts. Stocks that are more of speculative investments 
than long term holdings, are generally harder to use with arbitration and have higher 
valuations when sentiment is higher. Therefore, one should be able to find a contrarian-
type of relation between market sentiment and the expected future earnings of securities. 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) have found the demand for stocks varies with time and 
macroeconomic conditions. During better times the demand for stocks is significantly 
higher than during times of recession or depression.  It can be said that “the sentiment 
fluctuations can affect the demand for speculative or stable and profitable stocks when, 
for example, there are flights to quality…” (Baker & Wurgler 2007). The irrational 
exuberance is quite common in the past. The phenomena has occurred with very many 
different types of assets. The recipe for these is similar in most if not all the cases. The 
sentiment starts building up slowly at first but then accelerates rapidly. This is called 
feedback modeling. A stock starts to go up and thus creates success stories and happy 
investors in media. Public attention increases, the news and media repeatedly report of 
individuals getting rich, word-of-mouth enthusiasm grabs non-professional investors and 
therefore bringing more and more investors, creating excessive demand. The circle gets 
repeated and prices tend to keep rising. The longer the process continues the higher the 
prices get, and more investors want to pile in and have a share of the infinite success of 
others. In these bubble situations there are only winners in the market. Nevertheless, the 
boom-bust cycle commonly ends in the bust especially in situations where the prices are 
way bound rational valuations. The following situation has been tested by two 
psychologists. Andreassen and Krauss ran tests on the perceptions how people conceived 
different market situations. In these tests non-professional investors where shown 
historical prices of different stocks. Then they were asked to start trading in a simulated 
but fictive securities market.  The findings where the people tried to find obvious trends 
and patterns in the historical prices and trade according to these. In reality it means they 
tried to extrapolate the price curves and expect the same inclines or declines happen as 
have happened in the past (Shiller 2003, 91-94). This is clear evidence of the general 
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overall atmosphere being a decisive factor for many investors when they are valuating 
future expected returns. 
It is commonly known noise traders influence market prices, and even to some extent 
the 2008 financial crisis was thought to be because of excessive trading (Shiller 2003). 
According to studies this is controversial though. Even though there are several papers 
concerning the issue none of those can clearly prove decisively which is the correct 
amount of effect on noise trading to overall market status or equilibrium. Delong, 
Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990) were the first ones to start studying the subject 
in general. The key finding of their studies was noise trades influencing markets. The 
second important finding was that they create a new risk called noise trader risk. This 
risk was unheard of before and their studies indicated it is something that should be priced 
into asset prices overall. The mentioned risk in reality means that the trader’s personal 
sentiment should be taken into consideration. If they are overly happy or delighted, they 
tend to create asset demand. If they are feeling negatively over the markets they will tend 
to sell assets thus further lowering prices in bear markets. Both of the feelings are 
generally unpredictable for other traders. According to the studies these feelings may 
persevere for extended periods, and on short term the asset prices may not revert back to 
their long term means (Portniaguina 2006). Such behavior will enhance both bull and bear 
markets.  
When comparing the effect of noise traders on different types of assets, also different 
types of results arise. Generally according to Baker and Wurgler (2006) the earlier studies 
indicate the noise trader interest lies within speculative assets. In reality it means assets 
that they are not planning on holding for more than a very limited period. Because of this 
De Long et al. also claim that noise traders are actually the ones causing many of the 
experienced extreme market anomalies. Some noise trader’s do not rely solely on 
financial analysis based on the market prices or estimated future earnings. Instead they 
choose to rely on pure volatility or volatility derivatives. Because of such behavior the 
stocks with extreme high volatilities will face even more difficulty in pricing them 
correctly. Controversially according to Baker and Wurgler (2006) the high volatility 
stocks earned significantly better during low sentiment market conditions, and on the 
other hand, experienced very low returns on high sentiment market conditions. The high 
volatility stocks in their study consisted of high earnings growth securities. This type of 
results have been later verified, for example, by Lemon and Portniaguina (2006), but their 
studies consisted of mainly value stock instead of growth stocks. This on the other hand 
in same cases contradicts the earlier findings because there are same type of behavior but 
it represents itself in a different way. As further findings for studies of this sort are the 
ones conducted by Finter, Niessen & Ruenzi (2010). They found that stocks more 
sensitive to sentiment changes are higher in short term returns, but these returns are 
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reverted in a three month period. With time periods longer than three months the 
sentiment insensitive stocks are deemed to outperform the sensitive stocks.  
As it seems noise trading is a valid and viable strategy in investing in the short term 
(Finter, Niessen & Ruenzi 2010). According to efficient market hypothesis this should 
not be the case, not for a very long time at least. If noise trading would be a long term 
viable option, there should be possibilities to arbitrage that, and with time, revert the noise 
trading gains to zero.  
2.2.2 Noise trading 
In many cases investors are divided to subcategories. One approach is by simply 
categorizing them to professionals and non-professionals. The professional investors are 
also often referred to as institutional investors. There are other options in categorizing 
investors in modern securities markets. Needless to say each of the different ways to 
categorize the investors have their benefits and downfalls. One way to categorize them 
is: 
 
 rational arbitrageurs, 
 smart money investors, 
 noise traders, 
 and the passive investors that buy and hold. 
 
Behind each of these categories there is a different type of group of investors. For 
example, smart money investors are deemed to be often professional, possibly 
institutional investors. They often represent a larger fund or holding or are wealthier 
private investors that are both interested and have the interests to gather explicit 
information about investing and assets (Kelly 1997). On the other hand, noise traders are 
seen to be small-time investors with generally smaller portfolios, also experiencing lower 
income. Noise traders usually do not want to behave as rational investors, but are prone 
to taking more risks to possibly reap greater rewards. In reality this means holding 
possibly only one or two different stocks (Kelly 1997). This means very little 
diversification. Some of the noise traders justify their trades based on “gut feeling” or just 
personal beliefs of gaining profits. The literature refers to pseudo-signals, which in many 
cases mean common investment advice from friends, brokers, possibly technical analysis 
or any other probable information that is not deemed essential or relevant by financial 
theories. Also this information is commonly already included in the current market prices 
(Shleifer & Summers 1990). The changes in stock prices -  especially if the prices go up 
a lot – brings in a lot of new investors to stock markets. Many of these aforementioned 
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investors are not interested in fundamental pricing of stocks or intrinsic values, but more 
the historical price trend that they conclude will keep on going on in the same direction 
(Nofsinger 2008). It is extremely common these type of investors buy when the prices are 
going up, and sell when the prices are going down thus going with the flow (Tokic 2007). 
Also another type of trend appears. The similar type of noise traders tend to focus on 
small cap companies that have a bigger amount of outstanding shares. The more the 
outstanding shares with small caps, the lower the individual share price usually. This leads 
to many non-professional investors believing they can acquire greater gains because of 
low individual share price. Also according to Shleifer (2000) they are usually very 
optimistic about the performance of their portfolio and they tend to systematically 
underestimate the risks. Nofsinger (2008, 89) claims overoptimistic nonprofessional 
investors commonly conduct a lot less analysis on securities and also systematically 
decide to disregard any possible negative news or information about their own portfolio. 
Often it is that the analysis that are not based on pure financials tend to be misjudged. It 
is found that the pseudo-signal based strategies also are correlated with each other. The 
reason behind this is the strategies are originally formed using the same biases affecting 
the process of judgment (Nofsinger 2008). This can be further vilified by observing how 
test subjects in psychological tests and exams tend to make the same mistakes over and 
over again, clearly indicating a pattern. These patterns often lead to demand shifts and 
therefore will influence the prices of different securities (Shleifer & Summers 1990). 
Often noise traders are seen as a problem for the markets, but in reality this may not 
be the case. Instead of detracting the efficiency of the markets, they are providing more 
liquidity and according to Black (1986, 531-532) the noise makes the financial markets 
more possible, but also the same time makes them imperfect. He has argued further that 
the noise trading may make the market seem imperfect but it is in the end very crucial to 
overall financial markets and also providing great liquidity for those in need of it. Since 
many different people have their own beliefs on market movement, a singled out 
individual noise trader may have his own piece of information. This person generally 
understand other similar type of noise traders have their own pieces of information and 
thus is not encouraged to go into trading based on his own beliefs. But as the noise 
increases it becomes feasible for many more investors to start trading with their own 
information (Nofsinger 2008). This means it also becomes more feasible to start gathering 
information and conducting further research and thus deepening the understanding of 
market movements.  
Studies by De long et al. (1990) are inferring that a new risk is born with noise trading. 
This risk is deemed to be called noise trading risk and should be valued into the prices of 
securities. The risk in reality means more volatility of assets and most noise trader stocks 
also experience stronger reversion to their mean prices over the long term. “Noise traders 
can also garner larger returns than rational investors by bearing more of the risk that these 
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assets themselves create” (Ripatti 2010). For the typical arbitrageurs noise traders present 
a possibility. Many of the assets that are strongly connected with noise traders may be 
experiencing chronic undervaluation. Thus for the arbitrageurs and long term investors 
they may represent a possibility of a cheap stock. However, noise traders can also create 
rather a strong price pressure in some cases. These cases usually are in bubble market 
situations where traders keep pushing the prices higher and higher even the valuations 
may be wrong and easily to be noted to be too high. This in turn of course lowers the 
estimated future returns of the asset and makes the single stock purchases worse 
investments. However, market sentiment is not only affecting the non-professional 
investors but also the professionals.  
For the smart money investors market sentiments can also cause problems. Noise 
might be perceived but they do not always make corrections or rebalancing of portfolios 
because of it. Also, the noise in markets may present an opportunity for the fund managers 
to attract new investors. The fund managers may think it is acceptable to do noisy 
investment decisions based on market movements. This is because the general public that 
constitutes mainly of nonprofessional investors has a strong positive feeling and trust in 
the fund managers. They are believed to have superior knowledge about the stock market. 
It may be seem when the fund managers starts trading he or she has superior knowledge 
and a personal interest to get better results. Therefore, it may seem to the outsiders that 
the more trades the fund manager does the better he is and the more information he has. 
He may start trading without any meaningful information (Trueman 1988).  
Investment banking often offers financial advisory services as their line of business 
(Ripatti 2010). These include the possible Initial Public Offerings (also known as IPO’s), 
splits and mergers, various different services related to trading stocks and also investment 
research services. Since the bread and butter of trading business for banks is the sheer 
amount of transactions (and turnover), they try to maximize the trades widely and 
thoroughly (Ripatti 2010). This in return results to giving out significant amount of 
positive reviews and suggestions. The more the people buy shares, the more volume gets 
created and the more profit the bank acquires. Especially since the general public are 
commonly either unfamiliar with short selling or simply dislike it. Another option is for 
the bank to create extremely biased opinion and review about a certain company, if the 
said company is a customer to them. This may strengthen their relationship and ensure 
the business together continues (Michaely & Womack 1999).  
Also personal rewarding may cause some biases. The schemes how banks decide to 
reward their employees may be directly tied to the profit the bank makes. This may prove 
to be an incentive for biased behavior. It is often more safe to give instructions to buy 
securities than it is to sell them, because over the long term prices do get higher (Marttila 
2001, 146-148). Therefore, suggesting to sell off shares is more because declines happen 
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more rarely and also because deviating for the general consensus could end up costing 
the analyst his or her job (Womack 1996, 165).  
Womack (1996) studied the analyst recommendations further and found out that 
instructions to buy securities often led to increases in share prices. This is in accordance 
to financial theories. The price increases were stronger on small cap firms with lower 
liquidity. This finding also confirms findings of other researchers on the same topic. The 
situation leaves the investment banks with vast amount of power to influence share prices 
and also the incentives to abuse these powers on their own benefit.  
2.2.3 Limiting factors to arbitrage trading 
Arbitraging in markets does have very distinct limits. If this was not the case, in theory it 
could be possible to eliminate all noise trading. Commonly investors that arbitrage are 
more risk averse. Their aim is to benefit from market imperfections and at least in theory 
a perfect arbitrage has no risk involved. This in reality is not the case, because of 
transaction costs and other limiting factors (De Lang et al. 1990). Because of these facts 
arbitrageurs commonly do not go against noise traders strategies. For example, the noise 
trader’s beliefs on the market direction may not revert back to their long term means in 
any sensible time. For example, the market can be valuing companies falsely for extended 
periods of time. In some cases the extreme over or undervaluation may even get stronger 
with time, instead of reverting to their intrinsic values. Therefore, if an arbitrageur has to 
start liquidating his or her position before the arbitrage is fully finished or the stock prices 
recovered, there may be possibilities for a significant losses (De Lang et al. 1990).  
As noted before, the rational arbitrageurs mainly consist of professional investors, for 
example, managers from hedge funds. According to De Lang et al. (1990) their 
investment time span for arbitraging may be short. This time span is based on the 
requirements of the customers of the funds. They can come and ask their share of the fund 
to be liquidated almost immediately, or they may be in dire need of quick cash and have 
parts of the fund sold. In these cases the manager is forced to act on these premises. Also 
commonly the customers are not fully aware of the managers long term plans for the fund, 
and even the shorter term plans may be cloudy. They are not familiar of the arbitrage 
positions that need to be kept till the arbitrage is dissolved in a way previously planned.  
Liquidating too early may give unwarranted and unwanted results (De Lang et al. 1990). 
The time span problem is very difficult to indicate for the investors. For example, 
investors can get only monthly reports, while an arbitrage position can take out few 
months to solve. Therefore, the net returns are not realized on the monthly reports and 
investors may jump to easy conclusions on the monthly reports (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). 
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Many nonprofessional investors who invest in hedge funds or generally in funds may 
act in an unforeseen, unpredictable way thus creating problems for the fund’s executive 
manager’s ability to foresee the amount of owners in their particular funds. This can only 
be solved by not taking long term opposite market positions because the rarely if ever are 
entirely risk free (Gemmill & Thomas 2002). The funds needed to create the arbitraging 
positions usually require initial cash that can be acquired by borrowing and therefore 
creating a steady flowing cost that needs to be covered. As these costs and fees keep 
accumulating over time, it can begin to represent a new risk to the portfolio (De Lang et 
al. 1990). However, the lengthier the arbitrage, the bigger the risk the cost of capital 
composes. Purely because of this the fund managers can only create short term arbitraging 
(Sheifer & Summers 1990). Even with shorter periods there are very few riskless arbitrage 
positions, and with added transaction costs, there are close to none. In some cases the 
arbitrageur can see one stock being overvalued and another being clearly undervalued. 
He can short sell the undervalued to buy the overvalued, but considering these positions 
may revert to their long term means during different times, there are plenty of risks to be 
carried. Many different market events may turn the arbitrage sour. For example, sudden 
positive short term news about the overvalued company may push the price further up. 
Or on the other hand, the fundamentally undervalued company may experience a sudden 
selloff, thus causing a loss on the arbitrage if realized (Shleifer & Summers 1990; Malkiel 
2007, 241).  
When considering the risks of selling securities short, the following list can be 
observed: 
 
 bureaucratic risks 
 psychological risks 
 social risks 
 
This chapter will go through each of these risks. Short selling in general can reap 
benefits, but also if things go awry create an almost never-ending infinite loss because of 
rising securities prices (Malkiel 2007). Although short selling is not possible in the first 
place with some countries since it may have been banned permanently by law or regulated 
heavily to an extent where it does not happen. Also in many countries it is someway 
limited or restricted, and during some periods in time it can be banned altogether. Short 
selling is commonly more difficult task than simply buying assets. For example, many 
political parties object to this idea, thus creating a political anti-short selling atmosphere. 
In many financial crisis the short sellers have received the blame for the situation. There 
is a widespread antipathy towards short sellers (Shiller 2005, 182-183).  
The psychological risks on the other hand rely on two unique factors. Firstly the owner 
of the share might want it back so the position must be closed. Secondly the possibility 
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of growing loss because of rising share price. According to behavioral finance individuals 
tend to feel more agitated and scared of losses, than they are happy or enthusiastic about 
gains. Usually trying to avoid the unwanted feelings of loss is countered by making the 
short sales position even bigger, thus increasing the risks. Although on the opposite side 
individual investors generally tend to avoid taking large short selling positions because 
of the innate risks it holds. Shiller (2003, 97-102) also notes that there are times in history 
of finance where there have been no stocks available for short selling which means no 
one is willing to lend securities. The demand for the short selling securities originates 
from few different places. Most notable of these are the hedge funds. Needless to say their 
objectives are not to return the prices to their long term means, but more or less to bend 
the market in direction and take the maximum benefits out of that specific direction 
(Malkiel 2007). Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) studied the funds after the IT-bubble and 
found out hedge funds in general never acted in a manner that would return the security 
prices to their long term mean values. They instead rode the bubble and enforced it as 
much as they could, and as such many of the hedge funds were extremely heavily leaning 
towards portfolios of internet stocks even at times when the price per earnings ratios were 
seen in the hundreds. In a situation where extremely strong growth is needed for the 
foreseeable future or the stock should be considered as overvalued, or will end up with 
very low earnings and thus low earnings potential for investors as such. Brunnermeier 
and Nagel (2004) also found out the outcome of the price race could have been foreseen. 
However, Malkiel (2007, 241) concludes that buying a security worth of mere 15 dollars 
can be bought with 30 dollars if the price of the stock can be seen to go to 60, therefore 
clearly indicating he just follows the market flow and rides the bubbles.  
In many cases long term arbitraging possibilities remain rather thin. Many if not all 
arbitraging positions are taken advantage of in a rather fast manner when they are spotted 
in open market situations. But there are also few known situations where long term 
arbitraging positions have remained in the market and have not been entirely closed. De 
Jong, Rosenthal and Dijk (2008) conducted an extensive study about the topic. They 
calculated intrinsic values for companies – which they thought would be fair values for 
long term investments – and compared there values to current market prices. In this way 
they tried to find out possible mispricing situations or generally any possibilities of 
arbitrage. They found the most obvious possibilities of arbitrage to remain within stocks 
that are publicly listed in more than one market. These are commonly referred as dual 
listed companies. One example of such a case of dual listing is the Shell and Royal Dutch. 
Second example would be Unilever NV and Unilever PLC. The underlying companies 
are same subjects naturally and therefore the quoted prices should be the same in different 
markets (Malkiel 2007). Naturally the currency should be taken into account but the 
underlying intrinsic value remains the same. De Jong et al. (2008) found out there are 
significant pricing differences which do carry consistently over time. Their main 
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conclusion was that mispricing exceeded twelve percent on average and the absolute 
maximum deviations exceeded fifty percent. The second finding was about the standard 
deviations these companies experienced. All in all, the standard deviations were almost 
double compared to companies that were not dual listed. The values of the companies 
were closely tied to the underlying market conditions. In example a stock listed in one 
market often followed the local market fluctuations, therefore having high correlation 
with the dominant index instead of following the stock price on other markets or 
following the underlying valuation (Malkiel 2007).  
The most common possibilities of arbitraging rely on more speculative investments 
than long term buy and hold –type of stocks. The more speculative the nature of the stock 
the more difficult it is generally to price and the higher the possibilities of external factors 
influencing the valuation. In these cases psychological factors step in and begin 
influencing investor decision making. For example, such factors can be the 
representativeness or overconfidence biases.  
2.2.4 Psychological factors influencing markets 
The decision making of individuals is often plagued with psychological factors. This 
applies to both professional investors but also to non-professionals. In both cases the 
results of such behavior are often suboptimal compared to a more analytical approach. 
Under uncertainty people’s decisions rely often on systematic yet misinformed decisions. 
For example, the changes in the sentiment investors are facing have been found to have 
profound implications to asset returns. “The Trading decisions of individuals have been 
recognized to be highly correlated and one possible explanation for this is the same shared 
psychological biases among people” (Barder, Odean & Zhu 2009). 
Most biases originate from two separate factors. The first is trusting other people too 
much and the second is overestimating yourself and trusting your own skills exceedingly 
much. These both factors often lead into over estimating the forecasting possibilities 
about the future. Malkiel (2005) claims people tend to trust their own personal judgment 
heavily and therefore they are considered to be overconfident. One example of 
overconfidence in a common situation is the individual’s driving capability or skill. Over 
60% of people consider themselves to be far superior drivers compared to the other 
drivers. This is an obvious bias and it can be verified to some extent from traffic accidents. 
Overconfidence is often not deterred even after the accidents. The victims of the bias 
often feel a period of disappointment but in the end return back to their old habits, without 
trying to alter their behavior even despite the obvious misconceptions. This often proves 
the biases have extremely strong roots within the human psychology and external factors 
rarely change them unless the investor at hand chooses to reflect their actions thoroughly. 
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Another example of being overconfident – and also the same time extremely over 
optimistic – is when people are asked to predict future stock prices. The tests with 
Kahneman and Riepe (1998) concluded that when people were given a chance to ask 
where the stock prices are going with 1% possibility of statistical error, they concluded 
the prices of securities only could fluctuate less than twenty percent in either direction. 
While in reality this is an extremely narrow possibility the fluctuations are so little, and 
also considering in many cases they can easily exceed 50% in reality.  It can be concluded 
overconfidence and over optimism often lead into too rosy future expectations, while the 
real life is truly more volatile in its nature.  
Overconfidence generally means three different aspects as listed here (Barder, Odean 
& Zhu 2009): 
 
 Over estimating understanding or knowledge about a specific topic at hand. 
 Underestimating and belittling risks about securities and market conditions. 
 Overestimating their possibilities of taking control of complex situations, in 
which both results and variables are reliably unknown.  
 
Being in control is a major driver for overconfidence (Nofsinger 2008, 10). There is a 
specific effect that is named after overconfidence called magical thinking. In these cases 
the victims genuinely feel they are extremely lucky. They feel the next thing will go in 
their favor if they act in a certain illogical fashion, even in many if not in all cases simply 
acting logically would yield better results. As an example of such illogical thinking is 
betting on a flip of a coin in a certain way. Studies show people are more eager to put 
large wagers on the result of a coin flip when the coin has still not been flipped, than when 
it is in the air. Another example of illogical thinking might be relation to lottery numbers 
and already purchased tickets. For example, people tend to believe their picked numbers 
are some way luckier than an average randomly selected set of numbers. This is also 
displayed how they demand compensation if they were offered a chance to exchange their 
current lottery ticket into another one of same financial value, in which the numbers are 
picked by someone else or purely out of random sequence (Nofsinger 2008). 
 Shiller (2005, 152-153) has also studied the effect called hot hands. It is based on the 
idea that previous successful actions on the market are always signs of great astonishing 
personal skill backed with knowledge and profound intuition. This often leads into 
excessive trading in reality. Often overconfidence is tightly knit to the beliefs on 
individual investor’s information level. He or she somehow feels the knowledge at hand 
is somehow superior in some specific way (Nofsinger 2008). In many cases the practical 
behavior of individual investors is not rational in its nature. For example, an investor may 
have a view about a security. If the empirical evidence rejects this view, the facts remain 
ignored and the confidence of the investor receives only a mild bump. If the empirical 
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evidence on the other hand verifies the original view, the investor begins to feel he has 
special knowledge and his trading prospects activity increases (Barder, Odean & Zhu 
2009). Most bad news are ignored or understood as “bad luck”. The reaction to positive 
news leads into momentum in purchases. After that noise traders pile up on the stocks 
with positive news despite their risk levels. And when the sentiment starts rising further 
the noise traders end up buying more and more of the same assets and holding remarkably 
larger portions of their portfolio in those shares than the so called rational investors (Wang 
2001). 
In situations like these it can be concluded that repeated success strengthens the 
investor’s feeling of overconfidence. This type of overconfidence also creates extremely 
high volumes of trading and also at the same time grants more courage to take on bigger 
risks generally. Among non-professional investors there are possibilities of creating a 
vicious cycle. The short term success in trading leads into further trading and even greater 
risks, and if these get verified repeatedly, it may be the course towards market bubbles. 
In case of a bubble many participants in the market need to be excited and joining in for 
the momentum. As unlikely as it seems, these events have happened quite regularly in 
modern markets (Shiller 2005). During booms or bull markets investor feel the success 
of their investments come from their own know-how instead of the market conditions and 
they generally experience overconfidence. During the bull markets trading volumes are 
expected to go higher. “Overconfidence has been seen as a fundamental factor promoting 
the high volume of trade observed in speculative markets.” (Shiller 2005, 152-154) 
Often being overconfident is combined with ignorance and not understanding the risks. 
It is common to believe this is a fairly popular trait among non-professional 
unsophisticated investors, but Dittrich, Guth & Maciejovsky (2005) conclude also 
professional investors act in a similar fashion. It is easiest to observe when any task 
difficulty is either moderate, difficult or even extremely difficult. In such occasions 
overconfidence becomes prevalent. As a symptom of overconfidence excessive trading 
often occurs (Shiller 2005). Instead of analytical careful observations and analytical 
probability assessments, overconfident individuals trust more their own private ideas 
instead of public signals. These private signals and beliefs in turn can turn into market 
direction at least for some periods of time (Wang 2001). Statistically based on sex men 
are more eager to turn overconfident. This applies to both to real life activities and to 
securities trading and investing. Overconfidence has not been a successful trait in the past 
when observing returns on the strategy. In many cases it leads to more risks than 
anticipated, more trading and lower returns (Shiller 2005). 
According to Allen & Evans (2005) the root and source of overconfidence often comes 
from the individual’s capabilities of processing complex information. Having strong 
beliefs and biases distort the decision making process and causes the individual to lean 
towards easier solutions which are often not correct. Nofsinger (2008) also went further 
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with his research and concluded overconfidence to be heavily tied to false beliefs or 
illusions about the future. Since investors cognitive capabilities are limited – as is their 
time span to analyze information also – they jump into conclusions and instead of finding 
better information individuals compensate the uncertainties by simply acquired more 
knowledge. This new vast amount of knowledge may be irrelevant to the task at hand.  
Based on different types of securities, stocks experience the most overconfidence. A 
new aspiring growth company may be seen as an opportunity to get rich quick and easy. 
This type of behavior pushes the stock price ever the higher and with the stock price going 
up, new investors pile up and the original owners feel the emotions of success, and also 
start to feel very confident about their investing skills and understanding of markets. As 
long as the bull market carries the more overconfident the so called winners get. The 
overconfidence bias is also affected by another bias called hindsight. When the bull 
markets keep on going many investors start to feel they were foreseeing this and start to 
judge the past actions differently (Malkiel 2007). In reality the hindsight bias thinks he 
did better in the past than he actually did. The hindsight bias can be seen as a mechanics 
to deceive yourself. As time passes the individual’s judgment on the past changes. Past 
actions present themselves differently and the reasoning becomes clouded. Based on sex 
females are prone to be more careful and risk averse. Observations by Barber and Odean 
(2001) indicate females tend to trade significantly less. In example the average turnover 
of portfolios for female investors was approximately 50%, while the same time men had 
nearly 80% turnover y-o-y. In Barber and Odean’s study (2001) they found men also 
gained less returns because of transaction costs. Therefore, it can be concluded the 
excessive trading does not pay off for the average investor. Although how non-
professional investors reflect their losses and gains do differ based on sex. Men we 
deemed to be more certain of their actions while women questioned the history and their 
decisions more. Despite this men decide to do more trades (Malkiel 2007). 
As a description for overconfident investor literature gives few examples. Grinblatt & 
Keloharju (2009) found out men are more action oriented gamblers and seek experiences 
of thrill and excitement, while women do not show such behavior within non-
professionals or professional investors. Behavioral finance generally uses the term 
sensation seeking. This occurs most often with stocks but also with bonds to some extent. 
Bonds are generally less volatile so they grant lesser thrills and sensations. The higher the 
volatility the higher the excitement, as trading with changing values is exciting per se. 
The sensation oriented trading strategies are in reality text-book examples of non-
profitable noise trading (Malkiel 2007). Often they yield very low or negative results but 
generate thrill and excitement for the traders. The focus of such behavior often is directed 
to more volatile and speculative markets. The same markets are also the easiest to 
manipulate for price changes and bubbles do occur there more often (Malkiel 2007).  
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2.2.5 Heuristics and manners 
The world is exceedingly complex place and the human brain seems not to be capable of 
processing all the information. Individuals are offered an abundance of information and 
data, and they rarely have the time nor the interest to carefully analyze all the important 
aspects to reach proper educated decisions. The human brain as an organ is inclined to 
make decisions and situations easier than they really are. Thus, heuristics are created. To 
quickly analyze and process major flows of information and after that taking a shortcut 
to valid solutions. But in some cases these shortcuts may be misinformed and instead lead 
to systematic failures and biased yet repetitive mistakes (Bazerman 2006, 13). Kahneman 
and Tversky (1974) were the original researchers to introduce the concept of biases. The 
theory they created led into the development of behavioral finance and heavily attacked 
against the Bayesian estimation process, in which operators were believed to be able to 
make near-perfect estimations on the outcome of the future. The heuristics that Kahneman 
and Tversky have used in their studies originally were as the following list will indicate. 
 
 The representativeness bias, 
 the availability bias, 
 and the anchoring bias. 
 
Each of the aforementioned biases can be tested from statistical data to some extent, 
although the representativeness bias often represents itself in few different ways. The 
problems with the biases is how to measure them. This can be commonly done with using 
a proxy, but there are always some problems or possibilities of misinterpretation with 
such an approach. For example, if the proxy measures the correct variables or if it is 
plagued with noise.  
The first mentioned bias, the representativeness bias, means mixing up two different 
subjects that are very alike each other. One example of this could be that a person smiles. 
Smiling is often believed to reflect happiness, but there can be many other reasons for 
smiling too. Still often smiling indeed represents the feeling of happiness. This idea relies 
heavily on stereotypes and stereotypical thinking even at the cost of disregarding the 
surrounding factors. In these cases statistical probabilities can be used or using average 
means of the population. According to Bazerman (2006, 22-23) the largest donator to 
representativeness bias is the lack of intuitive skills on sample sizes. We tend to 
understand intuition with basic information, but when we are asked to intuitively interpret 
anything quantitative about sample size the task is remarkably more difficult to perceive. 
The sample size systematically ends up being ignored on decision making. An example 
given by Kahneman & Tversky (1974) is as follows: A person is quiet and shy by nature, 
he likes staying home and reading books in quiet. He is very meticulous and enjoys 
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keeping his items in order, and shows very little or no interest at all in meeting new people 
and socializing. After the description, test subjects are asked to pick a profession for 
person in question. Options are farmer, a librarian, an airline pilot and a firefighter. The 
test subjects repeatedly chose librarian since it fits the stereotypical description of the 
person, even farmers accounted for ¾ of the entire population in the area. This applies for 
almost all people unless they explicitly choose to work against the representativeness 
bias. It can be generalized the sample size is of great relevance when judging using 
representativeness bias. Unfortunately the heuristics and intuition work against the 
analytical approach.  Even it is very easy and fast to make decisions by using the bias, it 
systematically causes problems. Also because the samples taken from the population may 
not be statistically significant, and also because individuals tend to make generalizations 
on subjects when there is not sufficient data to decide anything at all.  
With investment decisions the situation is very similar than described by the 
Kahneman & Tversky studies. Barber and Odean (2009) later studied the bias among 
investors. They concluded all investors tend to overweight the information and value 
given by past securities returns. It distantly reminds of momentum investing strategy, 
where one expects the future gains or losses to continue happening at the same pace. 
Instead of expecting returns that are most likely, many investors overweight the returns 
that are most representative calculated from previous returns. This is against the efficient 
market hypothesis directly. The representativeness bias is extremely strong when buying 
securities, but not very prevalent when selling (Barber et al. 2009). Another example of 
representativeness is the classic coin flip situation. The test subjects are given three 
different possibilities how flipping the coin five times may end. In the options H 
represents heads and T tails. The subjects understand the possibilities are fifty-fifty by 
nature. 
 
 Option 1: H-T-H-T-H 
 Option 2: H-H-H-H-H 
 Option 3: T-T-T-T-T 
 
In almost all cases test subjects choose option 1 and consider it to be more likely than 
options two or three. Needless to say all the options have similar probabilities. These 
misconceptions of probabilities can be devastating for individual investor portfolios. The 
test and the problem is known as the gamblers fallacy. This type of behavior is fairly 
common among non-professional investors but portfolio manager can experience from 
the same fallacy. In some cases a good company does not sum up as a good investment, 
because the purchasing price needs to be taken into account. For example, a company 
may have launched a once in a lifetime new astonishing product which boosts earnings 
incredibly high on short term basis. This may not be a repetitive situation and it may fade 
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out quickly. Nevertheless individual investors experiencing the bias are prone to start 
discounting the future earnings and cash flows based on the short term historical values, 
even it is clear the short term earnings may only represent future earnings and are not 
guaranteed to happen.  
The same type of behavior can happen for prolonged periods of time. For example, 
some long bull markets keep on going even the earnings of companies have already gone 
down. Investors are discounting historical values into the future without questioning their 
durability. Malkiel (2007) also states individual investors are trying to find hot mutual 
funds that have high past earnings. A company with high past earnings can easily 
represent itself as one where management has “hot hands” and are lucky in picking up 
profitable projects to participate in.  
If an investors chooses willingly or unwillingly to take part in valuation of companies 
with the use of representativeness between different assets, some errors are prone to 
happen. According to finance literature the effect is especially strong during bull markets 
and combined with the rising price level of assets can lead to financial bubbles (Malkiel 
2007, 227-231).  
The second heuristic or a shortcut to be analyzed is the availability. It is similar to 
representativeness but consists of frequency of events. For example, events that occur 
more often are more easily in one’s thoughts and are also easier to recollect from 
memories. For example, when people estimate their chances of getting fatal cancer they 
at first try to remember if there are any patients in their own blood line. After this they 
move into relatives and possibly friends with similar perks. Another very similar example 
to the previous stated is originally by Tversky and Kahmeman (1974) who found similar 
behavior among middle aged men who had fears of heart attacks. They started to recall 
similar cases from past from their friends and neighbors and random encounters that they 
remembered. Generally they concluded that events that are easy to remember are also 
often considered to be more important of nature than the ones that did not leave a 
permanent memory mark. The incidents that are easier to remember also often leave an 
emotional marker. Therefore, the general idea behind availability is that situations that 
are closer to present time and that are easier to recall are commonly considered also to be 
more probable. Hirshleifer (2001) also concluded situations that have emotional ties to be 
easier to imagine and are considered more likely to happen. The roots for the phenomena 
often lie within personal experiences. May it be experience, past memories or simply 
emotionally arousing imagination of the individuals, the mind can create alternative 
versions of reality and thus use these as replacements for decision making (Wärneryd 
2001). Often the reason for strong memories is the media. If an individual sees something 
on television or reads about it from a paper, a certain type of mental image is created. 
This image may not reflect the truth. The individuals have very limited cognitive 
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resources and therefore can be affected rather easily with external messages (Barber & 
Odean 2008).  
With stock markets the availability heuristic is commonly used (Harvey 2006). With 
limited cognitive resources it is easier to pay attention to attention grabbing news or 
broadcasts, thus often leading to investments in well-known companies that advertise a 
lot and also receive positive news coverage on grand scale. This is believed to lead to 
overvaluation and bubble behavior with certain assets. As prices go up new investors pour 
into the same companies and want to participate in the bull market in which everyone is 
winning all the time. The major factors for luring in new investors to these market 
situations are high trading volume periods, extreme past returns and also common news 
that seem enticing.  
The last of the heuristics introduced is the anchoring bias. This means individual 
investors use a certain point in time to anchor their decisions to. For example, they buy a 
stock at a random period in time. Based on that date and price they reflect the return of 
their investment. The problems that arise from this approach are commonly related to the 
information. In many situations individual investors only pick information that are related 
to the initial anchor point instead of estimating the investment in a larger scale. Also it 
forces people to ignore information that is not consistent with the anchor point. “People 
often put too much emphasis on first impressions and fail to adjust their opinions 
appropriately at a later date.” (Bazerman 2006) One of the first proofs of anchoring bias’s 
existence was made by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) where random participants in the 
test were asked for an estimate about the number of African nations in the United Nations. 
The test began with the spin of a wheel. This wheel produced randomly numbers between 
zero and hundred. After the test subjects had seen the result of the wheel they were asked 
to answer the question. In this test the result was significantly dictated by the wheel and 
not by previous information or knowledge about the topic. People were also asked if they 
recognized the wheel had nothing to do with the number of nations, and they concluded 
but still answered in accordance to the wheels random numbers. It  can be concluded that 
many people have the tendency to forecast based on the very recent events by simply 
extrapolating the same results to continue happening. One specific feature to 
extrapolating time series is the single last value of the time series. This point often is not 
revised with time, instead the initial anchoring point works as a fertile ground for future 
decisions. All the news and changes that might affect the company’s future earnings are 
reflected to this specific point (Harvey 2007). If anchoring is compared to noise trading 
that was covered in previous chapters there are many similar perks to be taken note of. 
Like individual non-professional investors also professionals like hedge fund managers 
have been found to be suffering from anchoring bias. According to studies by Marshden, 
Veeraravaghan & Ye (2008) analysts are the most likely victims to fall to anchoring.  
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On general global market level different biases play a role in generating bull and bear 
markets, and have known to be driving forces in specific market crashes. Often it is seen 
that over exaggeration is because of influence of biases (Harvey 2007).  
2.2.6 Risk management in behavioral finance 
Professional and also non-professional investors mainly use two different approaches to 
analyze risks. The modern classic way of approaching the concepts of risk and risk 
awareness relies often on statistical analysis, logical deduction and Bayesian estimation 
of probabilities. The second way is the intuitive approach. There are few typical views to 
assess this approach (Tversky and Kahneman 1974): 
 
 Relies on images, expressions, views, 
 intuition, 
 association to feelings, 
 and a strong emphasis on trusting one’s gut. 
 
If an individual has strong feelings or emotions about an aspect or activity he or she 
believes the risks to be lower if the action seems favorable. On the other case if the 
emotions are of discomfort the risks are perceived to be higher. Often making decisions 
based on gut feeling or intuition is considered unwise and leading to bad outcomes, even 
recent studies show analytical approach combined with intuition can be rather productive 
way of deciding (Ackert, Church & Deaves 2003). How often is intuition then used? 
According to Schwarz (2010) it depends on the popularity of the task. If a task is a routine 
one that is commonly used in everyday life the need for intuition is lesser. On the other 
hand if the task is rather unknown and forces the individual to leave his or her comfort 
zone, the incentive to use intuition and emotions in decision making is greater. In some 
cases although it is possible to use intuition and emotions even they are fairly common 
tasks simply because it is faster to reassess changes in patterns and routines (Schwarz 
2010). 
In recent studies there have been two separate research branches studying emotional 
influences. The first is how different expressions and images influence how an individual 
person as an investor sees securities and how those feelings influence the decisions they 
decide to go through with. Lucey & Dowling (2005) found out investors tend to 
considered popular companies that are in the media as good investments. Simply 
comparing different companies in media one can find out which ones are those that draw 
the most public attention. Public attention according to the studies translates directly into 
demand for the company’s stock. This demand in return will drive up the market prices 
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and possible causes a bull run. However, the study does not indicate specific what the 
probabilities of overvaluation are. One key concept in the studies conducted by Lucey & 
Dowling (2005) is the meaning of bounded rationality.  
Different studies have taken a closer look about emotions, changes in weather and their 
correlation to securities market excess returns. Hirsleifer and Shumway (2003) concluded 
there is strong statistically significant correlation between the US weather and the market 
return. More specifically this study states when it shines and the weather is pleasant the 
correlation is positive to markets. Rainy days did not have such a significant correlation 
so the emotions have more emphasis on positive external factors. The researchers also 
conclude it is exceedingly difficult to create a working arbitrage strategy based on the 
weather conditions because transaction fees will become too high for it to be efficient. 
Another example of external emotional factors influencing securities markets are positive 
sports results. Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2006) claim the trading days after sports team 
wins are positive while if the investor’s team loses there is no negative correlation. This 
effect was found to be statistically significant at 99% level in soccer enthusiastic countries 
such as Brazil, Germany and southern America in general.  The effect was existent but 
not particularly strong in other countries. The tests did not take into account for the 
presence of other sports activities than soccer. These results lead to the fact the general 
public react more eagerly to positive news (Hirsleifer and Shumway 2003). The waiting 
of a positive outcomes from a sports game creates positive charge into the minds of the 
investors and as such pushes risk taking forward and causes individuals to buy more 
stocks. The strength of the positive charge vastly depends on the imagination of the test 
subject. For example, individuals with more vivid imagination are more eager to create 
positive outcome scenarios and generally get more excited about these ideas. This type 
of behavior leads into distorted analysis on risks and rewards and often is combined with 
extrapolating positive realized results or returns from near history. This effect is believed 
to be one of the driving factors behind investor sentiment (Paterson 2002).  
Many of the researches within the field agree emotions, feelings and insights play a 
significant role in assessing risk and in the decision making process in general (Lucey 
and Dowling 2005; Paterson 2002; Mehra and Sah 2002). The two extremes of feelings 
in here are extreme fear and extreme greed. The studies show that valuation factors vary 
over time based on how greedy or fearful investors are. This can be measured with 
different proxies, the most common probably being the VIX volatility index. Also one 
can calculate risk preferences from implied option volatility. As a conclusion for the 
chapter it can be said that emotions and feelings can play a huge part in market booms 
and busts, but that they also influence everyday trading situations. According to several 
studies uneducated and inexperienced investors are more prone in falling victims of 
trading based on emotions. Often the very thing called investor sentiment is simply the 
aggregated emotions of the investors, but especially in extreme situations like end of bull 
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or bear markets the emotions of individuals influence the market the most (Paterson 
2002).  
2.2.7 Sociological factors influencing markets 
Often sociological factors influence the decision making. For example, one can receive 
tips from friends who think the company they have invested in is the greatest thing out 
there. Many people took part in the US housing bubble, simply because individuals do 
not want to be left out in situations where everyone is making money. This was 
recognized one of the driving factors behind the US housing market during the years from 
2000 to 2006. Quoting the famous US investors Warren Buffett: “When your neighbors 
were making big bucks it didn’t make a lot of sense for the common people to stay out. 
They wanted to be a part of it.” Thus often the combination of flock behavior and easy to 
reach information and news from internet will drive the boom cycles higher. 
2.2.7.1 Flock behavior 
Flocking or herding is the phenomena when individuals mimic the actions of other people 
without thinking themselves (Sornette 2003, 94). The effect varies greatly based on the 
market the researchers are observing. In some cases listening to the public opinion or 
following the crowd leads into sentiment extremes as deep bear markets or speculative 
all time high bubbles (Caparrelli, D’Arcangelis & Cassuto 2004). The effect’s strength 
depends how well information is spread in the markets. For example, markets with very 
transparent dissemination of information bubbles and bear markets are rarer. On the other 
situations there are markets where information is scarce and only a handful of individual 
investors have access to it. Herding occurs and investors follow the few that have better 
insight and have access to more quality information. This is known to lead into bubbles 
(Zhou & Lai 2009, 42). 
With flocking there is a distinct difference between what is private and public 
information. When the public information is scarce the private information becomes very 
valuable that only a limited amount of people have access. This is commonly part of the 
bubble creation process. Hwang and Salmon (2004) found out that when private 
information is suppressed in markets, herding or flock behavior becomes very common 
and leads to situations where the market prices of assets no longer reflect their underlying 
value nor the information at market. The effect is called informational cascade according 
to them. In reality this means the individual investors do not act according to their private 
information but instead replace this falsely with public opinion. The individual investors 
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simply mimick the behavior of few other investors. Sornette (2003) also states this 
situation holds for the general public if it holds for individual investors.  
Further studies by Sornette (2003) have shown it is very common for investments to 
be done in open market situations. This means both transactions – selling and buying – 
are known by other people operating also with similar assets. These open markets or 
networks include fellow professional and non-professional investors, friends, family and 
random members of other communities. These networks influence the decision making 
significantly, but there are no further studies how the effect applies for different groups 
of these networks. According to Sornette (2003) the herding effect is because of two 
separate factors. First ones are the networks investors have and the second one is media. 
Under uncertainty individual investors tend to use networks more than the media, but 
under normal market conditions media also plays an significant part. Nofsinger (2008) 
claims that in US fifty percent of the investment decisions for non-professional investors 
are done because they received a tip from someone in their networks. This is an evidence 
that if a major part of the investor population feels it is the time to buy or sell stocks 
generally, this can and will influence the market prices and push the sentiment into one 
direction. Wärneryd (2001, 205) also concludes that in modern times internet has become 
a vessel for disseminating information and is a very relevant part of networks. The ability 
to chat online, share views on forums or bulletin boards and use messaging services 
extends the ability to influence other people’s opinion significantly. Such behavior will 
influence the market prices (Tay 2009, 207).  
When comparing which group is the most prone being under the influence of herding, 
the academic results are conflicting. One might conclude that moving in herds is common 
for the non-professional uneducated investors who are ignorant of their surroundings. 
Academic literature seems to differ with the hypothesis. Herding or flocking is known to 
occur with different types of investors and surprisingly often. Grinblatt, Titman & 
Wermers (1995) have studied the same effect among professional investors such as 
pension and hedge fund managers. During strong bull markets even the professional 
investment officers fall subject of herd type of behavior following the footsteps of others 
in the same direction. Such behavior appears to be surprising considering the background 
of many investors yet they repeat the known mistakes again and again. There reasons for 
this are complex according to literature. The first reason possibly is the investors 
generally tend to use same type of forecasting models and expect certain type of behavior 
from the assets. When the traders or investors start using the same type of models the 
returns for their portfolios become synchronized. This causes all of the portfolios to start 
following their own benchmark index and when they are comparing results, everyone 
appears to have done equally good. This helps them keep their jobs and thus not failing 
in generating subpar results, even the absolutely values for the returns might be 
questionable. For example, if there was a general conception that the stock of Google will 
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go up since the company seems to have good prospects and a working business model. 
One trader or investment advisor begs to differ and tells his or her clients the prospects 
of Google seem dim and they should sell their stocks. In reality, the price of the stock 
would go higher and the investment advisor who recommended to sell is seen as a bad 
unqualified advisor. He or she probably loses the job and status quo remains in the market, 
and the ones advising according to the public opinion get to keep their jobs. According to 
literature there seems to be very few incentives to actually do good instead of remaining 
in the comfort of public opinion (Grinblatt, Titman & Wermers 1995).  
So is flock type of behavior present always even with professional investors? There 
are several studies on the issue and, for example, Zhou and Lhai (2009) found that the 
investing environment is more critical in herding to form than the type of the investor. In 
extreme market situations such as the ending periods of bull and bear markets, flocking 
behavior is almost always recognized. The findings of these studies commonly are that 
speculative stocks and small caps receive larger flocks of people pouring money into 
them. This is also prevalent in securities that have very high price to book ratios. For 
example, because of possible high growth prospects or speculative valuation in general.  
In general, it can be said that individual investors tend to act as a flock and invest in 
companies other people are investing especially during bull markets. Everyone seems to 
be making money and no one wants to be left behind. The information that provides the 
momentum for this effect comes from the public media or internet forums commonly.  
2.2.7.2 Media and internet 
Chat forums in internet have become a common everyday way of disseminating 
information. Individuals use Google as a very important source for information. This new 
source of information has increased the amount of messages we receive every day. 
Google itself provides advertisements mixed in the search query results, as well as the 
landing pages are littered with different types of electronic advertisement. These 
messages obviously alter our perception of reality. Going back in time about two decades, 
the main source of information about investments most likely was only news as in papers 
as partly as in television. These both channels have commonly been plagued by 
sensationalism: selling topics that are quick and easy to read and have profound 
implications to emotions such as fear, love, and curiosity. These emotions in particular 
have extreme effects on our behavior. The more feelings the news arouse the higher the 
revenue of the news companies (Read 2009). This leads into very sensational news 
broadcasting which may either entice or scare investors depending on the market 
conditions.  
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One of the most common topics for today’s news is financial or someway economy 
related topics. For example, changes in unemployment rate, changes in currency or 
politics related to these topics. They often catch the common eye and receive both clicks 
in internet pages and also purchases of papers. Stock markets in general offer very mixed 
feelings for the common public. Some people consider it as a way of investing while 
others can relate to more gambling related approach. During bubbles its common for 
people to be shown on TV who have made significant amount of money and thus creating 
an atmosphere where everyone investing in stock markets are believed to be making 
money. During recessions the channels are filled with disappointed investors who lost 
their life savings. Both of the time periods are very dramatic and offer a lot of revenue 
for media companies to bathe in. According to the studies by Shiller (2005) financial and 
sports related topics count for roughly half of the topics in national news in US. Both of 
the areas are related to fast moving or changing atmosphere, exciting events and 
surprising results. In many cases investing in the media is treated in a similar way to 
gambling instead of careful financial analysis. According to Shiller (2005) the proportion 
how interested the common public are in investing does vary over time. In some periods 
the participation rate is much higher, but after market crashes and in the end of boom-
bust cycles the public steers clear of stocks. Closer to peaks of bull markets the investors 
flock back into stocks because the commonplace is to make money easily. Because the 
public demands scandals and drama to remain entertained, the magazines and television 
broadcasters meet this demand. This is a requirement for the media to survive in 
competition (Shiller 2005, 60-90). 
In the late 1980’s investing was not too common in the States and even rarer in the 
European zone. Nevertheless, after this the investing behavior has steadily been rising 
over the decades, peaking in the last IT-bubble. The bubble made many people 
extraordinary rich but for many others was the ruin of their personal finances. What was 
clearly a bubble afterwards was thought to be a great opportunity for common investors 
at that current time. Afterwards it has become clear it was a bubble and also that simple 
herding and flock type of behavior was exceedingly common in the beginning of the 
2000’s. For media influence, the higher the prices of the stocks the more news to be had, 
the more happy faces in television and the more revenue generated by media and 
advertisement sales. Therefore, it is obvious the media companies have an incentive to 
push individuals towards herding. According to Shiller (2005) the media is actually an 
active participant in markets, creating as speculative environment as possible to create 
more speculative price movements. These movements are then interesting for the general 
public.  
In many cases it seems to be easier to sell negative news and scandals then information 
where nothing is out of the ordinary. Because of investor’s fears this usually leads into 
price dips and excess volatility. This creates more reporting for the news companies. 
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Tetlock (2007) found out small companies are more prone to be influenced by news and 
react easier to positive and negative news. Pessimism and optimist both vary based on the 
time and effect the securities prices significantly in a way that is not justified with their 
underlying values. The other findings of the studies are that small companies are 
commonly owned by the less informed investors and react more strongly to news and 
market optimism or pessimism.  
2.2.7.3 Extreme market conditions 
There are several notable historical events with securities markets. Black Monday is one, 
where the index named Down Jones crashed over 15% in few hours, and for the day over 
20%. The event took place in 1987.  This was mainly blamed on automatic trading with 
computers. In the 19th century there was a bubble with railroads both in the old and new 
lands. The possibility to haul goods with very low costs were believed to create investors 
notable profits. They did, but at a significantly later time than presumed. 1929 had a crash 
where the combination of industrialization, mass production, investment banking and 
mass marketing were believed to create near infinite possibilities for investors. They also 
did, but at a significantly later time and thus the 1929 was rather bad for the investors.  
As general statistics the stock markets do not seem to act like they were normally 
distributed in the long term. Stock market returns are close to normal distributed on short 
term but long term far from it. There are ample amount of examples where the returns 
deviate massively to both directions. The US markets generally are considered to be the 
most efficient markets, and as such the other markets deviate even more. Markets in 
smaller underdeveloped countries are more prone to fluctuations. These are commonly 
caused by macroeconomic factors but also because of lack of buyers for securities. 
Illiquid markets are easier to manipulate and experience higher volatility (Shiller 2002). 
There are few studies how much the liquidity of the markets influence the formation of 
prices. Sornette (2003, 2-8) concluded the same result as many other researchers. If the 
markets experience illiquid behavior the price changes are significantly stronger. 
Currently many of the US markets experience over 80% of the trading done with 
computers, while there are no accurate figures for the Nordic or Finnish data, its presumed 
to be somewhere around 40% from daily trading.  
The strongest bull markets where prices keep on going up despite underlying values 
or macroeconomic conditions have been experienced in the past two decades. The biggest 
bubble most likely was the notorious IT-bubble around year 2000. This great bull market 
lead to at first extreme positive returns on assets, and after the turn of the millennia, to 
extreme negative returns. Neither of the returns can be justified with financial theories 
nor normal distribution expectations. According to Ferguson (2009) the returns seen at 
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those times should not exceed 20% ever and even the 10% returns should be extremely 
rare. With bull and bear markets it is very common for individual investors to change 
their investment horizon. Generally in case of downturns fear grips the minds of investors 
and the horizon become shorter. It is considered that the shorter the investment horizon 
the less the risks experienced. Then the average holding periods for stocks go down during 
bear markets and trading creates more volume. This effect is strengthened if investors are 
in danger of losing money that they would require elsewhere, which is the case with non-
professional investors often. Also based on the market atmosphere investors seem to 
weight in different things. During bull runs the focus lies within the positive news and 
many of the bad events are disregarded. On the case of bear markets, the negative news 
remain in close focus while the positive signals are left unnoticed. The markets are at 
extremities controlled by the feelings of fear and greed (Marttila 2001). Psychologists, 
sociologist and behavioral finance in general have repeatedly tried to tackle why investors 
are so eager to react to fear and greed. The result for this seems to be that individuals are 
controlled and ran by the biases and trends in the markets, while flocking and herding is 
quite common especially in the extreme market situations. The other extreme market 
maker besides feelings is the access to excessive liquidity. This has been evident in many 
of the market crashes during the past century. 1929 crashes before the great wars were at 
least partly influenced because of massive amount of nearly free liquidity in the market. 
Even the crash did not remove the liquidity, even it did become scarce (Ferguson 2009, 
100-105). Although the difference was with the IT-bubble compared to the 1929 crisis in 
the required collateral. In 1929 only five to ten percent of the stock’s current price was 
needed for collateral thus creating extreme leverages. In the latter bubbles the collateral 
from banks and institutions have been significantly higher.  
So what is the decisive factor a bull run turns into a bitter crash? A crash can be caused 
by internal or external factors to market. Initial impulse may come from either but it is 
often followed by sentiment change among investors which turns rapidly to panic and 
flock-like behavior. Sornette (2003) has conducted several studies on the topic and 
concludes just before the crashes markets seem to be fairly stable with good 
macroeconomic situation. After that the situation changes to worse by surprise and 
catches most of the investors without preparation. This leads into panic, herding and mass 
selloffs of securities causing lower prices and thus feeding the cycle. The economic cycles 
ending in bear markets have been a common situation for hundreds of years, although 
with the market activity increasing over the last century they have occurred more often 
(Sornette 2003). The Finnish stock markets have experienced some bubbles same like 
other Nordic markets. The success of Nokia was the initial trigger for some US trusts to 
find their way to Finnish markets. This quite likely acted as a driver for the IT-bubble 
atleast. The markets were steadily gaining momentum prior to year 2000 (Marttila 2001, 
75-85). The last global financial crisis starting between 2007 and 2008 had several factors 
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contributing to the crash. Some of the reasons yet remain the same from the previous 
times. The massive amount of liquidity and debt on markets is a driving factor according 
to several studies (Shiller 2009). Although in the latest crisis there was also new financial 
products that were to change risk management. Nevertheless, the bear markets started in 
a very similar fashion than in 1929 and in many other cases. At first there was a major 
selloff that was followed by panic and mass fear combined with herd-type behavior 
(Shiller 2009).  
2.3 Literature specific to Google Trends 
2.3.1 Non-finance specific literature on Search Volume index and Google Trends 
Google Trends as a product has been released in 2006. After this it has been developed 
actively and is considered an important tool in search data analysis (DEG 2011). Google 
Trends started providing CSV exporting around year 2008. After that point a massive 
amount of statistical data became available to general public. “Google makes public the 
Search Volume Index (SVI) of search terms via its product Google Trends. Weekly SVI 
for a search term is the number of searches for that term scaled by its time-series average 
(DEG, 2009, 2).” The general literature about SVI is rather ample even it has a very short 
history dating back only 6 years during the writing of this study.  
However, the use of internet to predict real world phenomena is a common event also 
in the past. However, it is easy to understand the rise of Google Trends and similar 
products from the competitors of Google. One of the most famous studies is the Johnson 
et al. (2004) which indicated flu influenzas can be predicted with internet web browsing 
history and patterns. “The results were moderately strong and no clear connection could 
be established at the time, however it paved road for future studies (Wuoristo, 2012, 8). 
At this time Google did not provide an easy way of gathering data so the researches had 
to get hold of the web browsing history with other means. The study started a trend of 
health and influenza related scientific studies. One of these is the Cooper et al. (2005) that 
studies cancer and internet search relations. Many other studies were also conducted, but 
many of them did not have statistically significant results. The first study with Google 
trends to show clear and distinct predictive power of internet searches was the Ginsberg 
et al. (2009) which showed flu influenza can be predicted two weeks before Center for 
Disease control and Prevention (CDC) reports. This was a significant finding since it 
proved many of the previously used methods had become obsolete because of SVI. The 
Ginsberg et al. (2009) has become the cornerstone for many of internet search related 
studies and is considered basis for academic research according to DEG (2009). The 
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influenza trends can be now found directly from Google Trends. It is uncertain if Google 
has further plans to incorporate other premade searches into their Trends product. 
In studies conducted by Googles Chief Economist Hal Varian, he suggests SVI can 
describe interest in many different economic activities in real time or with very little 
delay. A study claiming such is by Choi and Varian (2009). The study indicates SVI has 
predictive powers in house sales and tourism trends. The lags of predictive powers differ 
though. The presumptions in the study are straightforward. An increase in SVI is a clear 
indication of plans to travel to a location. The aforementioned study observes the different 
queries for the term “Hong Kong” from specific nine different locations and compares 
the given indices to Hong Kong Tourism Board’s monthly visitor statistics. The HKTB 
includes the location of which the travelers come from. In that study they find very strong 
correlation between the two given parameters, only omitting Japan. Several correlation 
studies have been done within movie industry. Goel et al. (2010) found a strong 
correlation between box office revenue and search volumes. This is to date used as a 
common metrics to analyze cash flows for premier movies. Similar studies have been 
done in music and media industry in general. The correlations vary usually quite 
significantly, but in most cases are still statistically significant at 95% (5% chance of 
being entirely something else) confidence level. Predicting box office revenue for premier 
weekends for movies has been by far the strongest in prediction power, while sales for 
music CD records its fairly low if none existent in many cases. This may however be 
explained with different sales channels and with differences in how the product is 
delivered. For example, music can be consumed using channels such as Spotify or iTunes, 
whereas movies are usually distributed only in movie theaters at first. The channel 
undeniable makes finding correlations harder as observed by Goel et al. (2010) and also 
Lui et al. (2011). Therefore, SVI is not a tool that can be used in every single situation 
but fairs strongly with single channel sales.  
SVI has also been studied among voters by Lui et Al. (2011). Their findings were fairly 
mixed. Conclusion was that there is no real valid correlation with SVI and election results. 
Nevertheless it is obvious search queries are made to find out information about 
candidates and the events that evolve around them. Therefore, even elections have in 
reality only one channel to show the voter activity (vote for candidate, or do not vote at 
all), the study indicates no causality or predictive powers of SVI. Although the higher the 
SVI, the higher the participation rate among voters. So they conclude the more attention 
the elections get, the more information the retail voters want to acquire.  
SVI is being used fairly regularly in every day economics to forecast consumer trends 
but also more common variables such as inflation, unemployment rate and loans demand 
among few things. Central banks use such tools as advisory data for decision making. 
Originally this was mentioned by Ettredge (2005) but many later researches have 
mentioned such variables. In US and UK the SVI for unemployment benefits correlates 
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with economic cycles, and it has modest predictive powers. Such studies are also 
conducted by Baker and Fradkin (2011) and specifically among unemployment by 
Askitas and Zimmerman (2010).  
Inflation has also been a very central topic among correlation research. Guzman (2011) 
had implications with inflation and global SVI. His main findings were: ”Google Inflation 
Search Index (GISI) has the lowest forecast error of all the inflation expectation indicators 
tested.” Journal articles by Goeffrey (2012) show extreme significant predictive powers 
of SVI and volatility in foreign currency markets. Such research have severely questioned 
the efficient market hypothesis since most studies indicate statistical significant predictive 
powers of SVI with 99 percent confidence levels. 
2.3.2 Finance specific literature on Search Volume index 
A common research topic is how SVI occurs with price pressure of stocks. An example 
of this is initial public offering –situations (IPO). In several occasions a direct relation 
can be seen. “A natural context where such price pressure may occur is during a stock’s 
initial public offering (IPO). Since trading-based attention measures are not available 
prior to the IPO, SVI offers a unique opportunity to empirically study the impact of retail 
investor attention on the IPO returns. Ritter and Welch (2002) and Ljungqvist, Nanda and 
Singh (2006) argue that over-enthusiasm among retail investors may explain high first-
day returns and low longer running returns for initial public offer stocks (Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995 and 2002)” (DEG 2009, 4). Many of the following studies find the similar 
outcomes. The higher the attention higher the SVI peaks. Nevertheless in some cases the 
initial spikes in SVI are being reversed within either a few weeks period, or in a one year 
period. “We also document significant long-run return reversals among IPO stocks that 
experience large increases in search pre-IPO and large first day returns post-IPO. These 
patterns are confirmed using cross-sectional regressions” (DEG 2009, 4). 
"In summary, we find that SVI is related to but different from alternative proxies of 
attention proposed in the literature, highlighting the distinct feature of SVI in capturing 
the demand for attention or active attention on a real-time basis” (DEG 2009, 4). To 
summarize the use of SVI in finance it is in most cases about quantifying attention to 
companies, stocks or assets in general (DEG 2011; Modria and Wu 2011; Modria et al., 
2010). The mentioned studies mainly observe the changes in attention towards different 
assets. The sources of attention vary depending on the study but central key terms would 
include how many times an event is mentioned in media, possible higher or lower returns 
than expected or general investment sentiment, for example, with Russell 3000 stocks 
during time period of 2004 to 2008 (Modria et al. 2010; Wuoristo 2012). The most 
important findings of the previously mentioned studies are: 
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 SVI is a leading indicator when compared to any other proxy, 
 SVI captures the attention immediately without any lag terms, 
 There can be no extreme returns among stocks without pre-existing investor 
attention. 
 
This leads to an event study –related approach. Many excess attention peaks evolve 
around earnings announcements or just after profit warnings. One of the important 
assumptions with SVI is that a market center such as a local stock exchange or bank 
services in general are used mainly by retail investors. Therefore, the “more informed” 
investors such as professional investors or fund managers, are more prone to use 
exchanges like NYSE or Bloomberg terminals. Professional investors are believed to 
have an easy access to Bloomberg, while retail investors have easier access to Google and 
rely on the information from the search engine. The study also finds that SVI is fairly 
strongly correlated with a Barber and Odean’s (2008) price pressure hypothesis (Modria 
et al., 2010; Wuoristo 2012). One STDEV increase in given abnormal search volume 
index (ASVI) will lead to a positive price fluctuation among Russell 3000 stocks. 
However, this does not apply to the sample thoroughly. “The positive price pressure is 
only present in the smaller half of the stock sample and is stronger in retail investor driven 
Dash-5 trading volume than total trading volume. Price reversal is evident after the third 
week, and the positive change is completely reversed in under one year” (Wuoristo 2012). 
According to the studies conducted by DEG (2011) abnormal search volume index 
(ASVI) is the only quantifiable attention measurement that has predictive powers and can 
foretell the price reversal also. The later part of the study focuses on product oriented 
correlations and with IPO price changes. The main results are that if there are significant 
changes in SVI within the IPO week, the price usually has an upward trend for two to 
three weeks prior to the IPO event. The price spikes during the IPO week but is shortly 
reverted to pre-IPO levels in the coming few weeks. Interestingly SVI statistically 
predicts first-day IPO (excess) returns, and also that high ASVI IPO’s underperform 
lower ASVI IPO’s because there is significantly lower price pressure (DEG 2011).  
There are also more studies on the topic. The aforementioned Mondria et al., (2010) 
and Mondria and Wu (2012) base their hypotheses mainly from the perspectives of Barber 
and Odean (2008). The price pressure hypotheses are used as grounds for study. SVI is 
used as a direct attention proxy for stocks from S&P 500. These studies also divide the 
searches by using Google Trends location filters by choosing different SVI’s from queries 
originating from different locations. In those studies they also divide the locations by 
states within US.  “In the first study they evaluate the effect of home bias by analyzing 
search queries and show strong support for the anomaly, since local investors 
disproportionately search for local companies. They further expand their analysis to show 
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that when local attention rises without a similar increase in non-local attention it indicates 
that some internal local news has entered the market” (Wuoristo 2012, 11). This local 
versus non-local effect is seen to be strongest in distant, remote areas. The reasoning 
behind this is distance. It is presumed in the study that information spreads slower in 
remote areas. The predictability or estimation of future expected results is also heavily 
based on local attention according to the study (Mondria and Wu, 2011). On the other 
hand, DEG (2011) does not find these results. In their studies, SVI is consistent with both 
local and non-local queries. Apparently there are no other studies that have tried to 
replicate these previous studies exactly, so it is unknown if the situation with opposing 
results is prevalent. Nevertheless, both findings are statistically significant, although they 
are opposing. One possible reason for the results is the data frequency. DEG (2009) and 
later in 2011 uses weekly data. Mondria and Wu (2011) use monthly data. It is possible 
the differences are because of frequency, but this has not been verified or replicated after 
their initial studies.  
The latest more known research according to Wuoristo (2012) is written by Vlastikis 
and Markellos (2012). Unlike the previous studies which evolve around investor 
attention, they used “information demand” instead. The basic idea of the study is the 
investors crave for more information when their risk aversion increases. In reality that 
means the more they want to take risk, the more information they want to acquire. The 
Vlastikis and Markellos (2012) study uses only 30 of the largest market cap companies 
from New York Stock Exchange. They compare information supply – which is the 
amount of news in this study in Reuters – compared to SVI. Their findings are not similar 
to previous studies. According to them information demand is mainly driven by historical 
volatility of the company stock, and more importantly the trading volumes for the asset. 
Supply on the other hand is extremely periodic and systematic. This study is also the first 
study to show that using expected risk premium for S&P 500 as a proxy for time-varying 
risk aversion means that information demand increases with the level of risk aversion.  
According to Wuoristo (2012) the following table will depict the relevant studies with 
their names, dates, data range and frequency, motivation of the study and which is used 




Table 1  A summary of studies analyzing Search Volume Index (DEG 2010; Wuoristo 
2012; Dimpfi & Jank 2012) 
 
 
After 2012 there has not been many new studies that would have different results than 
the original studies had. Many of the studies are replications of the original versions with 
same results. The purpose for these studies has been to replica the original findings and 
test for market efficiency under different market conditions. Nevertheless, some of the 
studies have been replicated by other researchers but mainly with the original data sources 
and longer time-series. Most studies have a distinct focus on generating market-level 
results instead of focusing on forecasting values for single individual companies. 
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2.4 Development of the hypotheses 
This chapter covers the hypotheses. The first subchapter describes the basic hypotheses 
that will be studied and tested later.  The second subchapter compares the hypotheses of 
this study to the ones previously tested by DEG (2011) and Wuoristo (2012). 
2.4.1 Hypotheses in this study 
This chapter introduces the hypotheses concerning SVI and company shares. The 
hypotheses share the same OLS principles as in previous studies conducted by DEG 
(2011) and Wuoristo (2012), with two entirely new hypotheses that are H5 and H6. Also 
hypotheses H1 to H4 are tested with multivariate methods where there are initially 
positive correlation with OLS.  Another difference is that instead of using ticker queries, 
SVI includes the company name as proxy. All of the hypotheses also differ in data 
compared to DEG (2011) and Wuoristo (2012).  The study hypotheses are as follows: 
 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1): Search volume index captures the general attention in the 
Finnish market. 
 
The hypothesis simply means if individuals use Google search to find information about 
companies. For example, if a company name would receive the value of zero with Search 
Volume Index, it would mean individual investors do not use Google for finding 
information about the company. Also if there are no fluctuation with the SVI for the time-
series it can be questioned if it is working as intended. The SVI is presumed to be 
fluctuation based on news, interim reports, profit warnings and macroeconomic factors.  
If SVI and a stock’s trading volume have an apparent link it can be quantified by means 
of statistical analysis. Previous studies indicate there are some differences between US 
and UK retail investors, but there is no prevailing information or data about the Finnish 
investors in this sense. The previous studies assume that increase in SVI results in higher 
demand for the stock.  
“Based on the price pressure hypothesis of retail investors presented by Barber and 
Odean (2008), and previously shown to be accurate in the US market by DEG (2011), 
this paper states the hypothesis that with an increase in company ticker SVI, the company 
share price is more likely to rise than decrease (Wuoristo, 2012).” However, it is utterly 
unknown if there is a complete reverse effect during any price period. Previous studies 
such as DEG (2011) found such phenomena to exist in one year period. There are also 
studies such as Wuoristo (2012) who find different time windows for this effect. 
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Because there are no other known studies in using SVI with Finnish queries it is 
unclear if the variable SVI_FIN has positive values. The variable measures the SVI from 
local sources. For global queries the Google searches are more studied and as a priori 
information the values are known to be positive. If the peaks occur with local queries and 
news, interim reports or profit warnings the SVI captures the attention. Also based on 
DEG (2011) during the SVI peaks there can also be abnormal return peaks.  
 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2): Search volume index correlates with the stock market trading 
volume but the trading volumes revert back to their mean values with some lag.  
 
This hypothesis examines the correlation between the variables and the length of the 
effect period in a more precise manner. The short-run effect in share price has previously 
been stronger near initial public offering (IPO) situations like described in DEG (2011). 
However what is the long term effect is unclear and should be studied case by case. The 
hypothesis will be studied at first with OLS. The companies that experience correlation 
either from Finnish or global sources will be taken into further examination for 
multivariate models.  
 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3): Search volume index can be used to predict and forecast an 
individual company’s stock turnover or abnormal returns. 
 
The third hypothesis is as it has been in the previous studies. “The third hypothesis 
presented in this paper is that the effect of price pressure due to individual buying activity 
should be more present in smaller stocks” (Wuoristo, 2012, 19). The idea behind this 
hypothesis is that smaller market cap stocks usually have lesser liquidity and therefore 
the prices are more easily affected. The smaller the stock in market cap the greater the 
price impact. This has been observed initially in DEG (2011) but also verified by other 
later studies.  
 
 Hypothesis 4 (H4): Companies with high consumer public exposure are more 
affected by retail investor attention than companies that are not visible to 
consumers. 
 
The fourth hypothesis is similar to the initial study by DEG (2011). It examines the 
behavior of individual non-professional investors which are also called retail investors. 
Chemmanur and Yan (2009) found retail investors are more prone to buy into stocks they 
are familiar with. Testing of this hypothesis is easiest done among consumer goods related 
companies. In Finnish market such companies would likely by Kesko, Stockmann, and 
telecompanies such as Elisa and Sonera but also utility companies such as Fortum. The 
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exact companies will be listed in data gathering. The initial proposal is that companies 
with higher consumer affiliation will be more influenced by retail investor attention 
measured by the SVI.  
 
 Hypothesis 5 (H5): The SVI results from Finland are better predictors for Finnish 
based company share price than the SVI results gathered from global queries. 
 
In previous studies such as DEG (2011) the fifth hypothesis has been with the way in 
which data gathering has happened for SVI. It is given the data will have “noise” in it 
because the nature of the queries. However, the Nordic companies company names are in 
almost all cases simple to understand and very difficult to confuse to any other words 
with a similar meaning. At first DEG (2011) and then Wuoristo (2011) have used the 
method of narrowing down the markets to reduce the effects of noise. More importantly 
the effect of home bias also supports the hypothesis. The presumption is that local 
investors are more inclined to invest in local stocks which are familiar to them and they 
have experience of. There are studies like Tesar and Werner (1995) which compare the 
home bias effect in different markets. Their findings suggest that the UK has the least 
effect of home bias compared to the other bigger markets such as Germany, Canada, US 
and Japan.  
 
 Hypothesis 6 (H6): According to Granger causality, SVI has forecasting power 
to trading volume with selected companies. 
 
The sixth hypothesis requires a VAR-model to be created for few selected companies. 
After that these companies will be tested if there is Granger causality. In practice there 
will be 5 lags from VAR-model and Granger causality will test if they are jointly zero. If 
they are not there are predictive powers of SVI to trading volume. 
The following table will list the assorted hypotheses and the most important relevant 
studies that have been conducted with those topics previously. With every hypothesis 
there are no known studies with the data selected for this particular study with Finnish 
companies. The previous studies have been conducted in a different environment with 
companies that are listed in either United States or United Kingdom markets. Many of 
the hypotheses are alterations from previous studies and the correct counterparts are 







Table 2 List of the hypotheses in this study as compared to previous studies 
 
 (H#) Stating Previous studies 
1 Search volume index captures the general attention 
in the Finnish market. 
No previous studies. 
Attention capturing by 
DEG (2011) 
2 Search volume index correlates with the stock 
market trading volume but the trading volumes 
revert back to their mean values with some lag. 
DEG (2011) 
3 Search volume index can be used to predict and 
forecast and individual company’s stock turnover or 
abnormal returns. 
No previous studies. 
Mean level tests by 
DEG (2011) 
4 Companies with high consumer public exposure are 
more affected by retail investor attention than 
companies that are not visible to consumers. 
Wuoristo (2012) 
5 The SVI results from Finland are better predictors for 
Finnish based company share price than the SVI 
results gathered from global queries. 
No previous studies 
6 According to Granger causality, SVI has forecasting 
power to trading volume with selected companies. 
No previous studies 
 
This study replicates the first three hypotheses of the DEG (2011) study, one 
hypothesis from the Wuoristo (2012) study and introduces two new that are 
geographically oriented. The hypothesis 2 and 5 actually contains two types of different 
regressions. The search volume from local sources and the search volume from global 
sources. Both are trying to explain the local trading volume within OMHX.  
2.4.2 Comparison to previous studies 
This study will replicate the testing of hypotheses originally by DEG papers from years 
2009 and 2011. Even the data is significantly different from previous markets it should 
not cause problems with the testing of the hypotheses. Because of the structure of the 
indices (more specific the OMX compared to DJ/NASDAQ/FTSE) the data is assumed 
to be more reflecting the efficient market hypothesis in other indices. The OMXH consist 
of more from industrial originated companies compared to their US or European 
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counterparts. This will allow the study to prevent general noise related issues. One 
example from the previous studies is from Wuoristo (2012) with the company Keller 
(Ticker symbol KLR). When searching for KLR in Google, the query results are mainly 
about a Kawasaki KLR motorbike. This obviously means the ticker and the company 
must be omitted from the research data. There does not seem to be such an issue with 
Nordic companies. The tickers and company names relate closely to the company itself 
with only few exceptions. Nokia phones queries result in phone models manufactured by 
Nokia.   
The original study conducted by DEG (2009) does take note of the noise, but is 
moderately relaxed in the results. In general, the situation can be problematized in a 
following fashion: “A search engine user may search for a stock in Google using either 
its ticker or company name. Identifying search frequencies by company name may be 
problematic for three reasons. First, investors may search the company name for reasons 
unrelated to investing. For example, one may search “Best Buy” in order to do online 
shopping rather than to collect financial information about the firm” (DEG 2009, 6). The 
following aspects may be listed as problems: 
 
 Search queries unrelated to investing (Google, Best Buy, Apple, Amazon etc.) 
 Google Trends does not allow non-alphabetical terms (3M, 7-Eleven etc.) 
 Different investors may search the same firm using several variations of its 
name. For example, American Airlines (AMR corp) with “AMR Corp”, “AMR”, 
“AA”, or “American Airlines”.  
 Investors may use more random words for landing on the company’s webpage, 
and after that navigate to the investor section. Thus not being shown on query 
results even if there would be demand for investor related information from the 
specific individual. 
 
One related topic is not listed in the previous studies. A retail investor could search for 
a global ticker or search word while actually buying the stock from a global market place. 
The problem is more theoretical, and not presumed to be common. However, for example, 
Nokia is listed in few different market places. A retail investor in Finland or Sweden 
could search for “Nokia share” and still end up buying an American ADR from the US 
markets. Based on different markets part of stock price fluctuation could not be explained 
with SVI if the searches originate from different geographical locations. SVI locally 
would see an increase in value, while the demand for the share locally would see no 
change.  
Another viable problem that might cause distortion in the results is the keywords of 
queries. For an investor curious about Nokia investment related information, he could 
Google search a Nokia phone model directly, land on the Nokia website and navigate to 
61 
investor relations and investor information. This would not be shown in this study’s SVI 
results at all, though there is underlying demand for investor information. This study 
considers this of a lesser problem because Nokia is omitted from the study. 
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3 METHODOLOGY, METHODS AND DATA 
3.1 Regression methods and the testing of study hypotheses 
The first hypothesis (H1) is tested as a relation between the trading volume and the 
acquired SVI values. The method of analysis is a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression where the trading volume (variable TV) is used as the depended variable and 
the SVI, stock returns (variable R) and the logarithm of market cap (variable MC) as 
independent variables.  
    (01) 
 
The hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5 are tested with regression. The hypothesis H6 
is tested with Granger causality and Wald test.  The OLS regression method is the similar 
method used originally in DEG (2011) and later in Wuoristo (2012). The method is fairly 
simple as it provides estimates on the marginal effect of the given explanatory variable. 
This is the reason given in DEG (2011) why it is a proper way to analyze and observe the 
predictive powers of ASVI-variable on different stock prices. The Fama-Macbeth method 
is commonly used for very large quantities of panel data that is gathered over time. The 
method also provides standard errors which in turn are corrected for cross-sectional 
correlation in the data.  
The regression is conducted in two specific different stages. First stage is analyzing 
the effect of ASVI in every single asset separately. The results of first stage are that we 
have a table of data indicating how different variables influence the returns of individual 
companies. The second stage of regression is trying to understand the premium that is 
rewarded for each exposure. The second stage is a different kind of regression. The study 
uses different time horizons as previously in DEG (2011). The time horizons are the first 
four weeks, and the fifth horizon is the rest of that year (weeks 5-52 in specific). The 
variables for the second stage are: dependent variable is the future (t+1) abnormal returns. 
The abnormal returns are given in basis points in this study.  
 
   (02) 
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The variables are as follows for all the given formulas: 
 
 AR is the abnormal return on stock I in the given week t, 
 X’s are the potential explanatory variables in cross-sectional expected returns, 
 SVI is the search volume index, 
 ASVI is the abnormal search volume index, 
 TV is the trading volume, 
 ABTV is the abnormal trading volume, 
 MC is the market cap of a given company. 
 
The same logic will follow every step of the study. For example, AR in one place also 
indicates AR in other formula. The letter A in front of a variable indicates the variable’s 
abnormality. For example, SVI is Search Volume Index, while ASVI is abnormal Search 
Volume Index. This is consistent with every formula. 
3.1.1 The use of multivariate models instead of structural 
When studying time series jointly it is possible to find the correlation and the dynamic 
relation each of the series have. For example, two unique time series can be studied jointly 
with ordinary least squares methods or with VAR-models. In studies the individual time 
series in analysis are usually referred to as unique components. Each of the component 
has a correlation which the other components in the analysis as stated by Tsay (2005). In 
financial and economic studies the models used are inherited from long history of 
statistical inference. In many cases they have proved to be reliable source of information 
through proxies. In many cases there are no recognizable economic theories to back up 
the study results, but based on the statistical findings a new theory or hypotheses can be 
put together. Often in history the studies in finance have been built with structural 
equation models and in these cases it is common to examine the methods of intervention 
analysis and transfer function analysis. Both of the methods assume the time series to be 
independent, and the theory tests if independent variables have an effect on the time 
series. The models are often very cumbersome and indeed require a prior information or 
economic theories or equilibrium models to be usable. With any time series an 
independent researcher may find correlation, but it does not necessarily infer causation 
unless there is solid theory to back up the study results. Sims (1980) introduced vector 
autoregressive approach to the multivariate time series methods. This allows the 
researches to have less a prior information about the study at hand. The biggest 
shortcomings of the commonly used OLS models can be overcome with using 
multivariate models. As an example multivariate models allow the dependent variable to 
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affect the values or the time path an independent variable.  This is not common with OLS 
methods.  
The multivariate (VAR) models can be represented in primitive, reduced or structural 
forms (Enders 2004). Starting from the simpler versions there is the standard structural 
form of the multivariate model. It stands as follows:  
 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑏10 − 𝑏12𝑧𝑡 + 𝑦11𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑦12𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑦𝑡 
𝑧𝑡 = 𝑏20 − 𝑏21𝑦𝑡 + 𝑦21𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑦22𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑧𝑡 
(03) 
 
The model is used in a simple way. There are some time shocks happening with 𝑧𝑡 that 
have an impact to  𝑦𝑡 in specific. If the variable b has any other value than zero then the 
error term have simultaneous effects (𝜖𝑦𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜖𝑧𝑡 ). In this formula the error terms 
generally represent shocks that have an effect on 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡 . According to Enders (2004) 
the next stage of the formula is creating the reduced form of the model based on the 
structural form. The structural form itself is commonly and often presented with matrices 






















From this model the reduced form can be created. Since this study does not evolve 
around creating the model but only uses it, only the end result is there presented as it is.  
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎10 + 𝑎11𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑎12𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜖1𝑡 
𝑧𝑡 = 𝑎20 + 𝑎21𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑎22𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜖2𝑡 
(05) 
 
This model has practical uses in this study. The reduced form of the multivariate 
(VAR) model is a method to study the trading volume dependencies between several time 
series. This model also doesn’t require the a priori information about the process. This is 
particularly useful when using another time series as proxies to represent. Nevertheless 
Enders (2004) states VAR models can often acquire too many parameters and thus 
reducing its possibilities of forecasting future values. This is not a problem though if there 
study’s only goal is to understand the relation between SVI and trading volume. Although 
it is obvious the forecasting possibilities are greatly hindered because of the method then. 
In some cases the VAR model cannot be estimated easily. For these situations there is a 
method called Cholesky decomposition method in which the structural form can be 
achieved by applying certain restrictions to the estimated reduced form of the equation. 
This unfortunately leads to lost information of the time series as was the case with 
differentiation of the time series (Enders 2004).  
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The other problem caused by time series is if they are stationary or not. SVI is a 
normalized figure calculated by Google so therefore it is always stationary by nature 
(index from 0 to 100). This study uses logarithms of the trading volumes so thus the series 
become close to normal distributed. The literature by Sims (1980) mentions that when 
using differentiated time series information may be lost. For series that obviously are not 
stationary vector moving averages can be used (VMA). For Vector Moving Averages 





















In cases where both of the time series (y and z) are transformed into average values 





















In which the multipliers 𝜙11(11, 21, 12, 22) are multipliers called the impulse 
response function. In this case the 𝜀𝑧𝑡 presents the total cumulated effect to this date. 
According to Enders (2004) it is the sum that affects to the dependent variable y or z when 
time goes or changes from time zero to time i. This can be used to observe the strength of 
the impulse at various times and examine how strong the impulses are. Since this study 
uses mostly proxies to examine changes in trading volume there are no reasons to go to 
more exact models. The base values for SVI at best contain large uncertainty and thus 
creating more precise estimates of future values is not justified.  
3.1.2 The application of VAR models with SVI and Trading Volume 
VAR analysis can be a better method of studying time series than common OLS 
regression methods. However, VAR models have their negative aspects in the 
presumptions. For example, Enders (2004) brings up the case with Choleski 
decomposition. Often there are no economic theories or interpretations that are backing 
up the results. For example, there is no proven causal effect between SVI and trading 
volumes even there is a theory that suggest attention causes trading. It is not 
mathematically obvious the theory holds true, but this is the case often when using proxies 
(Enders 2004). At best it can be an accurate estimate.  When using the different models 
often the analysis becomes mechanical and straight forward but the actual interpretation 
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of the results is solely based on the individual researcher, and thus the reliability of the 
results are questionable. This study uses the reduced form of the models since there are 
no known causal relation between Search Volume Index and Trading Volume, other than 
the previous statistical inferences. There is no obvious causality between the two that can 
be verified prior to the statistical analysis.  The attention theory presumes there is relation 
but the actual theory does not quantify the strength of the relation. Therefore, statistical 
methods must be used to acquire values. In any case there is no distinct causality between 
SVI and trading volume although previous studies have found correlation that holds true 
for different markets. According to Enders (2004) if the reduced model of the VAR 
models is built with lagged variables, and even if there is no lagged relation between SVI 
and TV, it still remains possible SVI and trading volume (TV) have an contemporaneous 
relationship.  
In the past the studies have focused on OLS because the nature of the research field. 
There are very few studies in finance that study search volume index. Thus when studying 
an entirely new approach OLS provides reliable results. One can compare the differences 
between the structural equations and VAR models. For example, the structural equations 
commonly do require assumptions about the nature of the variables. For this study the 
hypothesis is formulated so that it claims there is a distinct relation between SVI and TV. 
Generally no such assumption is required with VAR models. They are free from 
assumptions. For estimation purposes the structural equations use OLS and maximum 
likelihood –methods. VAR models focus on testing of the lag lengths. When testing the 
hypothesis of studies, the structural equations tend to test the individual coefficients at 
some specific level, while VAR models test for either exogeneity or endogeneity of the 
variables. Both structural and VAR models allow forecasting possibilities, however there 
might be differences in the reliability of the values. The last lackluster problems for both 
models are as follows: structural models generally require assumptions about the nature 
of the variables and specific relevant theories to back up the results. VAR models lack 
the possibility of contemporaneous effect with the variables. In this study the 
contemporaneous effect means that the SVI and TV values are moving to the same 
direction at the same time. Although since this study uses both of the methods, the 
differences can be noticed and possibly examined further and because there are very few 
prior studies to the subject and even scarcer amount of studies with both methods, the 
results must be examined carefully. Unfortunately, since there is very little previous 
research data all the results in this study with VAR models are to be interpreted with care.  
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3.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
This chapter contains some analysis and descriptions about retrieved stock market data 
and the SVI series. This specific study uses data from the Nordic markets. The index 
studied is the OMX Helsinki All Share Index (Ticker OMXH:HEX). The time series start 
from the beginning of 2013 and end in the last day of 2013. The method where the time 
series do start from the start of the year are commonly used by Shiller (2005). Similar 
method is also commonly used by Fama but to study event anomalies. The other option 
would be to begin the series from more randomized time. This would cause the possible 
anomalies to act differently. For example, if January is commonly a period of bull market 
(that is more positive returns than negative), with time series starting from midyear only 
one January anomaly period is taken into the data. Since the time series start from 
1.1.2013 the researcher loses relevant information regarding the event that takes place 
annually.  For example ,the January effect that means a bull market month in most years 
can actually start from the last month of the previous year. A yearly time series has the 
possibility of not taking such occasions into count. On the other hand, the next years 
January effect would be uncovered also, but would only experience the beginning of the 
next effect.  The sample is over 251 trading days, but the regression is run with 250 trading 
day changes. This was a countermeasure if the sample would not have enough non-zero 
trading days during the period. In cases where the non-zero trading days exceeded 5 for 
the entire year, the company was entirely omitted from the study based on lack of 
liquidity.  
The OMX Helsinki All Share Index represents estimated over 120 companies within 
the Finnish industry from healthcare to paper mills. The previous studies like DEG (2011) 
have chosen a similar type of All Share Index, mainly because it covers a vast amount of 
different company and industry types and the also data is more reliable with larger 
samples. Nevertheless, in previous studies the studied data has been from either the US 
or the UK markets solely. The composition of those markets is different both in cap size 
of the companies, but also in the industry distribution. The participation rate in markets 
for general public varies a lot from country to country, but unfortunately there is very 
little reliable data of it. The investing environment is also different. For example, the 
FTSE (UK markets) have very large number of companies representing many fields of 





Table 3 Example: FTSE AllShare Composition (Wuoristo 2012, 24) 
 
 
As seen in the table for comparison to this study, the previous study’s indices cover a 
very large number of different companies. There are several different types of industries 
represented. Financials and Oil & Gas do represent over 35% of the index, it still covers 
also consumer products, basic materials and telecommunications. For this study the 
indices chosen (OMX All Share) represent a smaller number of different industries. Not 
because the chosen index would only represent a small number of industries, but more or 
less because geographically Finland has large quantities of pulp and paper (forestry in 
general), basic industry and steel companies. While FTSE covers vast majority of oil and 
gas, the OMX has equally large share of industrial companies. Neither the industrial 
companies nor the Oil and Gas do not experience high consumer attention. Nor these 
types of industries have been part of the recent hypes and stock bubbles.  
The OMX Helsinki All-Share Index includes all the shares listed on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange at current time. The aim of the index is to reflect the current status and changes 
in the market. The HEX Index is therefore broken down using the ICB Classification as 
of February 1, 2012. The index was developed with a base level of 1,000 as of December 
28, 1990. Outside of tech industry the index has remained fairly stable with the 
companies. The list of companies presented here is exactly the same list that is used to 
retrieve the search volume index data from Google. If a company’s name is, for example, 
Apetit, then the exact search key for Google SVI is “Apetit”. To make it clear and easy 
to verify the results, no additional words are added to queries. It is presumed if an 
individual person wants to acquire information about a company he searches with the 
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company name. This is the presumption in the previous studies also except for those that 
directly accept only the ticker name as the search indicator. The reason for this approach 
with the company that’s name is quite obvious and it is indeed the most likely option and 
therefore is the closest proxy to attention. The problems with the method are when the 
same word is confused with an alternative meaning. For example, Nokia would suggest 
an individual Nokia phone model. Because of this the company is omitted from the study. 
Another example is Apetit which also produces fish servings, filet fish and such of the 
likes, but all of the queries originating from these subdivisions are omitted by default. 
The companies that are not omitted are listed in the appendix 10.  
Each of the companies listed can be found from Google Finance, Yahoo Finance or 
from DataStream with the aforementioned ticker names or simply by searching for the 
company name. The company names are given with exactly the same letters they are 
listed in the index so there is no confusion or possibility of a confusion between two 
individual company names that would be close to each other. The individual time series 
used for these are acquired from the Finnish markets, therefore the HEX company ticker 
names. An individual company can be listed in many different markets, and therefore it 
is vital to indicate the correct ticker name. The prices for the companies are similar in 
different markets but there are differences how the prices change within countries and 
markets. In reality it means that there could be different correlations for SVI and trading 
volume with different market places.  
Ticker symbols are listed mainly for volume, market cap, and price searches from 
DataStream. The same data can be acquired from other sources too. Some examples of 
this could be Yahoo Finance, Kauppalehti online or CNN Money. Many of the companies 
did not experience enough queries from local Finnish locations to qualify into the final 
sample. These are automatically omitted from further study. 
The companies listed here are the ones with sufficient SVI data for further studies. The 
selecting of the time series data is straight forward with the three steps as stated here: 
 
 Select companies with sufficient search volume index values for the company 
name. A series of zeroes is omitted because their absolutely values may be 
positive but after Google’ normalization insufficient to create regression time 
series. The company needs 245 trading days with positive search queries (SVI) 
for 2013.  
 Select companies with daily changes in trading volume. For example, if the time-
series is with static value it would be omitted entirely from the study. The volume 
has to be dynamic. 
 Select companies with nearly everyday trading volume (max 5 days per year 




If a company did not have enough SVI values it is automatically omitted without 
further studies or investigation why the lack of search volume. The SVI value time series 
must be constant throughout from 2013 to 2014. Secondly the companies that are selected 
have every day trading and are therefore considered liquid enough for the prices to reflect 
the current market situation and to price in any possible both external and internal risks 
to the business. The third step is to include additional companies that have had less or 
equal than 5 days without or with extremely low trading volumes throughout the 250 
trading day time window. In some cases a company may have had only one or two trades 
for a day and can be considered a low liquidity small cap. In almost all cases the trading 
is fluent and total amount of trades is at minimum few hundred individual trades per day.  
The results of data collection sum up to following figures. Companies that have both 
weekly global and weekly Finnish local data, add up to 51 companies out of 142. For 
monthly global and monthly weekly data, there are 13 individual companies. Rest of the 
companies have only either of the search origins in weekly form, therefore resulting in 
omitting from the study. In many cases the situation is there is enough or adequate search 
volume globally, but not locally. This is the first set of qualifications for the data. Both 
series have to be at minimum on weekly level to be able to make sufficient time series 
regressions. All the DEG studies have been done with weekly time series. There would 
be possibilities to run monthly regressions if one would start the time series earlier, since 
the beginning of available SVI data. But the previous studies have not been done in this 
manner and as this study tries to replicate them, one week is also chosen to be the time 
period. 
3.3 Generating the time series 
The previous studies used three different derived values from the data. They are listed 
here with the source of raw data: 
 
 Abnormal stock returns (DataStream) 
 Abnormal trading volumes (DataStream) 
 Abnormal search volume (Google Trends) 
 
All the values are abnormal in their nature. The abnormality is defined by a deviation 
from the expected values. It can be concluded that: abnormal stock returns are the returns 
which are derived from comparing realized returns to expected returns. Expected returns 
are calculated in a similar fashion as in previous studies. The method is to calculate from 
the benchmark index using the company specific beta. With this study the betas are 
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calculated from daily data, then multiplied it with a company specific risk measure. This 
is almost exact replication to DEG (2011) and Wuoristo (2012) but with different data. 
This also can be used as verification the results are comparable and acquired the same 
way. For the beta two years of regression is used. In previous studies the beta is 
recalculated every two years to ensure validity. During the examination period the beta 
does not experience variation so therefore both methods as recalculating the beta or using 
a rolling beta do not affect the results.  This 1 year beta approach is the chosen method in 
previous studies to take note of the changing market environment. There are some issues 
with it especially considering the time window. It is obvious the exact choosing of the 
time window can influence the results. Although the same method is used for every asset 
and the start date is the same. This will reduce the effect of the single events during the 
time-series.  
Table 4 Variables used in the study 
 
 
The reason for the weekly variable usage is because of the data limitations. One week 
is currently the shortest data period available in Google Trends, therefore the same 
variables are used for DataStream.  Although DataStream is able to provide day to day 
data, which is downloadable to excel file. The weekly SVI values can be evened out to 
approximate daily values. For example, by using mean average values for the change. In 
some cases this is not absolutely correct but it is a common approach used with proxies. 
Also the changes in values are normal distributed and do not experience skewness or 
kurtosis with daily series. This provides more reliable statistical inference and removes 
many disadvantages that linear returns experience often. The method itself is well known 
and commonly used within finance studies.  
This study consists of 54 selected companies that have the required SVI and trading 
data available. The omitted companies are entirely omitted because of search volume 
index related issues. The list for the companies selected for this study can be found from 
appendix 10. 
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Out of the 124 companies that are listed in the appendix 10 only 51 have the required 
prerequisites. Because of the high frequency data and the use of four different time series, 
abnormal returns, abnormal trading volume, search volume indices from global and local 
sources the total sample size for the study is 50128 individual observations. Less than 0.5 
percent of the observations are zero. This is considerable larger sample size than in any 
of the previous studies conducted with search volume index and stock trading volumes.  
3.3.1 Abnormal and expected returns  
The exact formulas for abnormal returns and expected returns based on capital asset 
pricing model CAPM are as follows: 
      (08)   
  
The first variable is the abnormal returns while the second being the expected returns. 
The variables used in the equations are explained in the table. The same explanations 
apply for the entire study and they are named the same way as they have been in the 
previous studies to avoid confusion. Abnormal returns are calculated for daily values by 
means of iteration. The calculation is simple. From the daily realized returns the expected 
returns are calculated. The result is the abnormal positive or negative returns. The 
expected returns are calculated with CAPM using the calculated industry betas. This 
study uses one year beta as a static method. This means the beta is reliant on the market 
conditions for the year 2013. However, in some other studies by Fama (1998) for market 
returns rolling betas or five year betas are used. The choosing of the beta depends on the 
study at hand and all of the different alternatives have different results. Since the time 
window for SVI is one year it is natural to use the beta for the same time period, but there 
are very few factors that would prevent using any other possible beta. For realized returns 
the logarithm values are used as in the study by DEG (2009), the exact formula is taking 
the logarithm from (current value divided by previous value). The logarithm values can 
be summed as it is to create the return time series.  
Tikkurila Oyj can be used as an example of the abnormal series. There is no specific 
reason to choose the company Tikkurila specifically, but it is used as a general example 
to indicate how the figures can be viewed. The changes are given from -1 to 1. Since the 
values are calculated from logarithm values they can be added as such. So two days of 
0.02 returns together would equal a 4 percent increase to the original base value. Because 
of the logarithmic values the abnormal time series is stationary and does not have an 
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increasing or declining trend. The graph for Tikkurila abnormal daily returns can be 
calculated when compared to the expected values of CAPM. The graph is stationary 




Figure 3 Tikkurila abnormal daily returns for year 2013 
The figure 3 clearly indicates peaks in the abnormal returns. The series is stationary 
around 0 returns as presumed since logarithm is used to calculate returns. The result is to 
be expected and clearly indicates peaks around events. The frequency of the peaks varies 
and is 20 unique abnormal returns that exceed plus or minus 2% daily return. The 
abnormal values have to be verified for the chosen companies to make sure the time series 
is not just zeroes. In this case the regression with search volume index would be rather 
pointless. In all the cases all Finnish companies experience abnormal positive or negative 
returns during year 2013 when CAPM expected returns are used. There is another way of 
calculating abnormal returns also. This is the Fama-French three-factor model. The actual 
model is introduced in chapter 4.3 because it is used for robustness tests. The values from 













Tikkurila abnormal (ABTV) daily returns  (2013)
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study. This is not the same for different indexes and for every different index the expected 
returns should be recalculated. The exact formula for the Fama-French model is as 
follows: 
 
𝑟 = 𝑅f + β(𝐾 − 𝑅f) + b𝐿 ∗ SMB + 𝑏𝑆 ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝛼     (09) 
The Fama-French gives a single value for each asset and it is not recalculated over 
time in this study. For year 2013 there is only one beta for each company according to the 
three-factor model.  
3.3.2 Abnormal trading volume 
The variables are calculated in different ways. Weekly abnormal volume is calculated 
from the specific changes in turnover of the share (variable T). This is calculated by 
relation of trading volume (variable TV) to outstanding shares for the company (variable 
OS). “This is used to normalize data since stocks have different amounts of shares and 
naturally a company with many shares should have more trade volume than a company 
with fewer shares (Wuoristo, 2012, 36).” Some companies in the data might have too low 
trading volumes to reliably generate regression, this can be the case especially with very 
small cap companies. The method for calculating abnormal in a similar fashion to DEG 
(2009) this study uses the same method. ASVI is calculated by comparing the current 
turnover of the stock to the median of the past eight weeks. This is done to find abnormal 
high or low turnovers and examine the peaks in the data.  
 
   (10) 
 
The formula is very straightforward. Outstanding shares are updated from database 
every time there are changes in the free shares. This is the shares that are available for 
public or private trading. The shares owned by the company that cannot be bought or sold 
are not included in the calculations. Often these amounts are very small and do not affect 
the results in any significant way. The logarithm from the median for trades with 8 lags 
is used as method in DEG (2009) originally for SVI studies. As a general method it is 
used commonly to acquire homoscedastic error terms, or to prevent heteroskedastic error 
terms. As an example for the abnormal trading volume the company Tikkurila can be 




Figure 4 Abnormal trading volume for Tikkurila for year 2013 
The common graph for many of the companies in the study is very similar to the one 
presented here. Because the values are also abnormal in nature and not absolute values 
but changes the distribution is close to normal distribution and the time series are 
stationary. There is a very minor linear trend within the ABTV but this is concluded to 
be insignificant. The similar trend can be recognized within most of the companies within 
OMX AllShare index. This is because the trading volumes generally have been rising 
from 2010 to 2013. Removing the trend is possible with statistical methods but does not 
change the results in any significant or even recognizable way. The positive trend with 
ABTV is less than 0.01 percent per year and is disregarded for further analysis. This is 
important for further regressions. There are obvious peaks in the data for abnormal trading 
volume for all the companies which is also to be expected. In many cases it implies there 
are market events to which investors react. The abnormal trading volume as such can be 
used to recognize the peaks that differ from the expected values defined by CAPM. The 
last of the calculated abnormal values is the abnormal search volume index. 
3.3.3 Abnormal Search Volume index ASVI 
The many variables are calculated in different ways. Weekly abnormal volume is 
calculated from the specific changes in turnover of the share (variable T). This is 






















company (variable OS). “This is used to normalize data since stocks have different 
amounts of shares and naturally a company with many shares should have more trade 
volume than a company with fewer shares (Wuoristo 2012, 36).” Some companies in the 
data might have too low trading volumes to reliably generate regression, this can be the 
case especially with very small cap companies. The method for calculating abnormal 
values is a similar fashion to DEG (2009).  This study uses the exact same method.  
It is fairly vital to recognize the abnormal peaks in attention in regard to search volume 
index data. To accomplish this we will use the abnormal search volume variable called 
ASVI as in the previous studies. Visually observing a figure can also reveal if a series has 
significant amount of spikes. The abnormal value is calculated by using LOG of SVI 
during the current week minus the log median SVI during the past eight week period 
given. This method is exactly the same as used originally in DEG. The ASVI variable is 
very important for this study. The peaks are compared to the specific company’s share 
price and trading volume seen in markets. Using logarithms makes the time series 
stationary and therefore easier to use for statistical methods. Some information may be 
lost with the approach but it is commonly used method. The logarithmic time series are 
both stationary and do not experience kurtosis. The exact formula for this is as follows: 
  (11) 
 
In those specific situations where there is no available data for share price, trading 
volumes or search volume from Google the actual current week will be omitted from the 
data. If there are more than 5 of these weeks, the company is entirely omitted from the 
study. As such ASVI can be calculated to be originating from either global queries or 
from local to finish markets. The time series are naturally not identical but in many cases 
experience strong correlation and are contemporaneous. This practically means if an 
article of news is published, both global and local investors react to these news the same 
time. This is to be expected as most news are distributed through electronic sources such 
as television or internet web pages and therefore all investors receive the information the 
same time. Such behavior is common for financial markets. They are connected and the 
information is generally available to all investors almost the same time. Thus the investors 
react to the incoming news in a synchronous manner. For example, the Tikkurila stock 




Figure 5 Abnormal Search Volume Index for Tikkurila for year 2013 
There are systematic spikes in abnormal search volume index that originates from local 
Finnish sources. The overall peaks are happening simultaneously with both the global and 
the local searches. This is according to the attention theory based on that investors react 
to news items and search more information regarding the individual news topics. It also 
refers to herding or crowding effects as the risen levels of attention maintain in the 
markets for some time. It can be concluded there are distinct periods of optimism and 
distinct periods of pessimism. In both of the situations the search volume index levels 
remain abnormal. In pessimistic periods the levels are abnormal low and in more 
optimistic periods the values are abnormally high. What is prominent to local queries is 
the fact ASVI is stronger originating from local compared to global. The peaks are 
occurring simultaneously but FIN is significantly stronger. As the SVI values vary from 
0 to 100 it can be concluded that the Finnish stock market is significantly more important 
for local people than for global investors. In all cases of Finnish stocks the ASVI values 
are close to zero change for the entire period. This can be interpreted in different ways. 
First, the attention the shares experience is rather low, the general public are not extremely 





















interpretation is that there are no interesting or ground breaking news during the period. 
The SVI the shares experience is solely reaction to the news the companies publish.  
3.4 Data for OLS and multivariate analysis 
This chapter contains the characteristics definition and sample size analysis. The OMX 
Helsinki All Share Index has currently 132 companies. These companies are all listed in 
2014. The survivorship bias will be present in the index.  To rule out survivorship bias 
the panel data should consist from data gathered over few decades. Because the fact SVI 
did not exist that far away in time the study will be affected by survivorship bias. This is 
unavoidable at this point of time and the previous studies considering SVI also experience 
the same phenomena. Nevertheless the OMX index has been fairly stable over the years, 
mainly because of lack of listings and also because the lack of corporate buyouts. There 
has not been ample delisting situations nor that many initial public offerings. This is a 
characteristic of Finnish markets.  This has not been the situation with the previous studies 
such as Wuoristo (2012) or DEG (2011), where the UK and the US markets have had 
very significant changes. Wuoristo (2012) states the UK market has had 601 in FTSE All 
Share Index with 57 that had to be added to the initial sample. The DEG (2011) study has 
a far greater number of companies, and significantly more active capital market 
atmosphere in the US.  
The previous studies have had four different unique processes in how to process and 
select the sample size. The basis for those processes is the replication of the previous 
studies as closely as possible to verify the comparability between the unique studies 
generally made during different time periods. As a difference to this study, Wuoristo 
(2012) and DEG (2011) have had their chosen indices (namely FTSE and US markets) 
have investment trusts as a part of the data originally. These investment trusts have been 
omitted from the data because of the belief, that investment trusts as such are not so likely 
to attract retail investor attention. The majority of retail investor attention is therefore 
presumed to be directed to equities in general. Investment trusts are traded in London 
Exchange. The initial string of thought with the Wuoristo (2012) study follows as such: 
“Investment trust funds are reallocated based on the fund manager’s disposition, and are 
therefore fundamentally different types of securities.” This current study does not include 
investment trusts in the data, nor are they part of the OMX All Share Index.  
The second chosen process is how noise is being dealt within the data. In any case, no 
matter how carefully the data is chosen there will be always some amount of noise which 
may possibly distort the results. Noise generally is caused by company names (or tickers 
in Wuoristo (2012) study) that have different alternative meanings. As an example from 
the UK markets within FTSE index, there is a companies called American Tobacco and 
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Glencore. Their aforementioned company tickers are named BATS and GLEN. Therefore 
Wuoristo (2012) concludes these companies cannot be used as such for proxies of investor 
attention. They are more likely to capture something else than the retail investor attention 
for the equities.  
This study replicates the steps of the Wuoristo and (2012) and DEG (2011) in regards 
to data cleaning. In reality this means clearing the obviously noisy tickers out of the data. 
For OMX there are few borderline cases. Second step of the process is checking the SVI 
data. For SVI data Google Trends informs the end-user with two separate values for a 
single search. First is the “Top searches” which is the most common words associated 
with the word. The scaling for the top searches is from 0…100. In this case the highest 
given value does not mean it is associated always with the given word, but that it is 
relatively the most common word to be associated with. Unfortunately and deliberately 
Google provides no absolute values for the searches. The second provided value is the 
“Rising searches” which tries to show the different unique terms that are experiencing a 
rise in popularity during the given time period in comparison with the preceding period. 
There is also a case of “breakout” which means a single term has experienced over or 
equal to 5000% growth during the chosen time period.  
In an approach where each individual company data is manually reviewed, it is 
possible to avoid many of the noisiest company names. Compared to the situation where 
such an approach would not be taken, the quality of data is significantly better. As an 
example of noisy ticker from UK markets Wuoristo (2012, 30) introduces the company 
named Keller. The ticker for Keller is KLR. The aforementioned ticker seems to 
experience seasonality and significant peaks. Such anomalies are usually considered to 
be indications of noise. The reason for noise in this example case is: KLR is also a model 
for the Kawasaki motorcycles. Because it’s obvious a lot of the searches are actually for 
the motorcycle instead of the equity, the ticker has to be omitted from the data. Therefore 
the previous studies take the approach that if a company name or ticker has a clear and 
undeniable alternative that is the probable cause for most of the queries, it should always 
be omitted from the study. If this on the other hand is not the situation, the results are 
accepted as is. The most optimal situation naturally is, where the search word would be 
associated with words such as info, news, share, price, share price, investor and with other 
related words. In these cases it is almost obvious the query is related to the individual 
trying to acquire information about the company. Nevertheless Wuoristo (2012, 30) 
concludes that: “It must be noted that there will be a certain amount of noise in a search 
volume based study, but by monitoring the results the risk can be minimized.” This is the 
situation with the OMX data also. It is possible the data contains significant amount of 
noise in many cases, but unfortunately with company name related searches it is 
impossible to avoid, and as the mere ticker name searches do not provide enough SVI 
data, other approaches are not possible.  
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The Wuoristo (2012, 30) example for the Keller company data shows both the Top 
searches and Rising searches paragraphs very clearly. The ticker (and the company name 
for that matter) are with high noise that cannot be easily cleared from the data. This results 
in the company name and ticker to be omitted from study as such. This example is one of 
the most clear in any data. There are several non-related rising searches in or above the 
breakout limit (5000%) which indicates without doubt the searches are not related to the 
equity but to the motorcycle. Similar cases as this always cause the company at hand to 
be omitted from the study. The clearest example of a company resulting in omitting is 
Nokia. Nokia search queries consist almost solely of mobile hand set related search 
keywords. With closer observation there are very few if any investing related topics in 
the top hundred query keywords. This can be avoided by choosing the queries to be 
originating from investing related pages only such as Google Finance, Yahoo Finance or 
CNN Money for example. After these modifications the query words are majorly 
investment activity related such as queries for the ticker, a graph of the stock’s returns or 
queries related to the upcoming interim reports. This procedure is not used in this study 
at all, simply because to make the SVI values commonly generalized this should be done 
to every single company. Investing related queries as relative search volume index terms 
coming from direct Google queries are significantly lower portion of the total amount of 
searches, than the searches originating from purely financing related services. For 
example, if an individual finds Nokia’s personal page from Yahoo finance and compares 
to Google search volume index values, almost 100 percent of the queries originating from 
Yahoo are investing related. This time-series would not be equivalent to those originating 
from common Google queries. Therefore, any company with the majority of the search 
queries being entirely unrelated to investing related activities must be omitted from the 
study. In previous studies this has resulted in over 80% of the companies to be omitted 
from the study. With OMXH the case is not so severe since 52 out of 124 indeed get 
accepted into the final sample. This relative value difference does not originate from the 
used methods but more because both FTSE and the US markets consist of more consumer 
oriented companies that experience direct product search queries by consumers.  
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Table 5 An example of a noisy ticker search for the Keller resulting in omitting from 
study (Wuoristo 2012, 30) 
 
 
It is very likely – although not clearly stated - none of the given searches in the SVI 
are related to the company the original study wanted to study. Unfortunately in many 
cases the situation is not as clear as this, but there might be underlying noise that is not 
evident even when looking at the top searches and rising searches paragraphs. Still in all 
the cases the approach where each of the SVI queries is handpicked and studied 
individually and verified for noise, the SVI data will contain less noise. There are cases 
where the query does not necessarily mean investor attention at the exact moment the 
query is done through Google, but general attention towards a company. This can 
transform into investor attention with or without lag in line with the theory that investors 
tend to invest in companies they are familiar with. The underlying presumption is if an 
individual is searching for information, he or she wants to know something about the 
query word that is typed into Google search.  
The third step to data analysis in this study is omitting the companies which experience 
the lack of data. There was previously two different dominant reasons for this. Firstly, if 
the company is listed in very near history, there is lack of price history for the share. In 
some cases the company may be result of divestment or fusion. In these cases the 
company is omitted. The second reason for omitting is the lack of sufficient SVI data. 
This can be caused by two different things. Firstly, if the company is very young, and the 
situation is exactly the same as with very little price history. Secondly, if the company 
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has not experienced investor attention at all, or only by such amount that Google Trends 
is not able to generate SVI data for it. Both, the lack of price history or lack of SVI data, 
result in omitting the company.  
The fourth and also same time the final step into sample gathering process is to verify 
that the time period (frequency) is chosen on one week level. This is dictated because the 
previous studies (DEG 2011) and (Wuoristo 2012, 31) have made it in a similar fashion. 
Both studies found price pressure and price reversal being strong in one or two week 
periods.  
Wuoristo (2012, 32) study had consumer-visible companies to be popular and common 
in the sample. The consumer-oriented companies tend in both the US and UK markets to 
generally get more retail investor attention which is what the theory also predicts and 
indicates. With previous studies the global SVI has carried more random noise than local 
SVI. This “makes singular attention peaks more difficult to attain (Wuoristo 2012, 33).” 
After the careful selection process, only a handful of companies remain in the final 
data sample. The list that is in figure 10 has the companies that meet the previously given 
criteria for Search Volume Index. The raw data must be acceptable on SVI and on 
DataStream, meaning it has to be reliable from google and it has to have enough active 
trading days to be accepted into further study. For example, Valmet corporation is 
recently listed into OMXH (it is split from Metso corporation), and therefore lacks the 
daily trading volume to be reliable source of analysis data. In previous studies as DEG 
(2011) and Wuoristo (2012) they have not disqualified companies that have excessive 
amount of zero trading days. This study differs from those. The main reason for omitting 
the companies in this is the following: if companies with half a year of trading days would 
be accepted, the SVI and trading values could be measuring any random phenomena. One 
of these could be the initial changes that occur because of IPO. This study is not capable 
of measuring such events, and therefore accepting them into the data would be 
questionable. Considering all the requirements, only 42 companies are accepted into the 
final sample. The most common reason for omitting is the lack of SVI or the reliability 
of the SVI is not high enough. The second reason for omitting is the lack of active trading 
days. In practice meaning there are no trades at all for several days in the time series. In 
few cases there are stocks which have 2-5 days per year where there is no trade. These 
shares have been kept in the final sample. 
3.5 Granger causality 
One of the aim of the study is to study the possible predictive capabilities of search 
volume index towards a company’s stock’s trading volume. A probable outcome is SVI 
cannot explain the trading volume or vice versa. If either was able to predict the other 
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statistically significantly and consistently the efficient markets hypothesis should be 
rejected. Based on the attention the share’s experience there should be a relation between 
SVI and TV. The theory explains there should be predictive powers that are statistically 
significant and therefore can be replicated for profits. If either have predictive powers 
over the other is not automatically transformed to causality. If SVI predicts trading 
volume the natural outcome is not that SVI is causing the changes in the trading volume. 
There is a testing method called Granger causality that helps the researches understand 
the relation. When using more complex VAR-models more variables can be taken into 
account when studying the causality. The method to test the causality is based on the 
hypothesis of Granger. Enders (2004) suggest the test is run in a way that lags of one 
variable are entering into the equation of some other variable. For Granger causality this 
means that if all the coefficients in a VAR-model equal to zero there is no Granger 
causality. If the coefficients do not equal to zero there is Granger causality. This can be 
explain also as a formula for typical F-testing.   
 
𝐼𝑓 𝑎12  ≠ 0 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 
𝐼𝑓 𝑎21  ≠ 0 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 
(12) 
 
If the coefficients remain zero the variables do not contribute to the forecasting powers 
of the other variables. The same test has to be run for all the valid variables. Commonly 
the test does not conclude contemporaneous effect at all, instead just refers to the past 
values of the variables. By testing for contemporaneous effect the test would also gain 
the ability to study further if the variables are endogenous or exogenous. The tests begin 
with the simple equation. To able to test if search volume index Granger causes the 
trading volume the test is run in a following way: 
 
𝑇𝑉𝑡 = 𝑎10 + 𝑎11𝐿enght(𝑆𝑉𝐼_𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑡) + 𝑎12𝐿enght(𝑆𝑉𝐼_𝐺𝐿𝑂t)
+ 𝑎13𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔ℎ(𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑉𝑡) + 𝜀1𝑡 
(13) 
 
The trading volume is explained with SVI_FIN and SVI_GLO and also by the 
abnormal trading volume itself. The length before the variables means the specific lag 
length for the actual variable used. The different VAR-models are identified differently 
and different number of lag lengths is used based on the model. The VAR-Model used 
here is heteroscedastic and therefore either White’s robust method or Newey’s and West’s 
(1987) standard calculation for standard errors can be used. The interpretation for the 
results can be seen as if the impact on the values is not reversed within the calculation 
period the search volume index contains relevant and statistically significant information 
about trading volumes. The previous information therefore is not calculated in the share 
prices and thus trading volumes should change. The test is run only to the selected few 
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companies that have statistically significant variables with OLS. OLS methods alone 
would not grant predictability simply because the error terms are heteroskedastic. The 
Granger causality can be calculated for each of the companies in the study separately but 
it also could be calculated for the mean values for the entire index. The mean value 
calculation is not performed in this study simply for the fact that only a handful of 
companies had any statistically significant variables with OLS regression. In previous 
studies such as DEG (2011) or Wuoristo (2012) there were mean level linear 
dependencies.  This indicates efficient market hypothesis is valid and accepted with the 
Finnish indices although the requirements for the strong market efficiency are not 
fulfilled. The efficient market hypothesis applies to over 90% of the companies in the 
index which is a greater percent than compared to UK or US markets in the previous 
studies by DEG (2009) and Wuoristo (2012). Both of the previous studies had found 
linear dependencies even those dependencies diminished one or two weeks after they had 
been initially found in the market time-series. The remaining few companies in this study 
that have statistical significant variables with low p-values could be used for arbitrage or 
profiting at the time, but because of the weak nature of the dependencies the deviances 
from the efficient markets is minor at best. According to EMH the market should profit 
out the arbitraging positions or they should be very short lived to begin with.  
The following companies had statistically significant variables. The following list is 
for ASVI_GLO significant at 95% level: Atria, Fortum, Keskisuomalainen and Kone Oyj. 
For ASVI_FIN the only options Kemira and Kone Oyj. The Granger causality testing is 
performed with a method as simple as possible. The estimation is performed as it was 
with ordinary least squares or VAR-models. The dependent variable is ABTV or 
Abnormal returns with lags as variables. The coefficient testing is performed with Wald 
test with lags. The idea is 𝐿enght1 = 𝐿enght2 = 𝐿enght3 = 𝐿enght4 = 𝐿enght5 = 0. 
The testing is therefore quite simple. The error terms are HAC for heteroscedastic 
qualities but, for example, White’s robust heteroscedastic adjusted errors are also viable. 
The results are very similar.  
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter is divided into two subchapters. The first subchapter collects the regression 
results and testing values from ordinary least square methods to multivariate and the final 
part is Granger causality. The second subchapter provides information to Fama-French 
robustness testing. In the robustness checks the regressions are rerun by using Fama-
French three-factor model betas instead of the ones from capital asset pricing model. 
4.1 Regressions and testing 
4.1.1 Ordinary least squares 
The complete list of the companies in the study can be found from the appendix 1 while 
the companies chosen for further analysis can be found from appendix 10. The main focus 
of this study is in the companies that have statistically significant variables with 95% 
confidence level. The aim of the study was to find out the relation between search volume 
index and trading volume of a stock. The results are presented in this chapter with a list 
of companies that have statistically significant companies while omitting all those 
companies that have no statistical significance. Total 17 companies from the sample have 
variables that are statistically significant with the given regression model. In few cases 
the variable C is of statistical significance but there is no interpretation for it. According 
to Enders (2004) if the variable C has statistical significance but theory suggest no 
sensible interpretation for it the factor can be reported but disregarded from further 
studies. Surprisingly only 4 companies in the OMXH had linear dependency between 
abnormal trading volume and search volume index that originates either from local 
Finnish sources or from global queries. In all cases the R2 values are below 2%, so even 
with the few significant variables the model only explains a fraction of the fluctuation. 
This result is not in line with any of the previous studies conducted with SVI and trading 
volumes. Both the DEG (2009) and Wuoristo (2012) found SVI to have predictive powers 
at least for short term and also linear dependency between local SVI and abnormal trading 
volume. As a priori information both of the UK and US markets should be presumed to 
be closer to strong-form market efficiency, while the OMXH is found to be weak-form 
efficient at best in most studies. However, this study does not directly test the efficient 
market hypothesis. If there was to be a clear and decisive statistical significance between 
SVI and trading volume or prices consistently in the data, then the efficient market 
hypothesis could be rejected or noted that the markets are not efficient at all. The appendix 
10 holds the list for all the companies in the study. The summary of the ordinary least 
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square regressions for the selected companies in the final sample can be seen from the 
following table.  
Table 6 Summary of OLS regressions 
 
Summary of OLS regressions  
Sample size 42*252*4=42336 individual observations 
Dependent variable: ABTV (abnormal Trading Volume) 
regr. ABTV = B0 + B1*ASVI_FIN+B2*ASVI_GLO+B3*ABRETURNS+e 
Sample period year 2013. Companies with variables at 95 %  significance level chosen  
Company Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Stat. Prob.   
aktia C 1.798185 0.281252 6.393501 0.0000 
atria ASVI_FIN 0.671978 0.241391 2.783780 0.0058 
basware ABRETURNS 5.085843 1.720657 2.955755 0.0034 
digia ABRETURNS 6.777225 3.345574 2.025729 0.0439 
f-secure ABRETURNS 3.389221 1.112710 3.045916 0.0026 
finnlines C 0.843695 0.144461 5.840300 0.0000 
fortum ASVI_GLO 0.783738 0.286140 2.739001 0.0066 
honkarakenne C 0.811511 0.113780 7.132257 0.0000 
kemira ASVI_FIN 0.450251 0.160747 2.800984 0.0055 
kemira ABRETURNS -3.437501 1.096988 -3.133581 0.0019 
keskisuom. C 0.239236 0.100293 2.385357 0.0179 
keskisuom. ASVI_GLO -7.293762 3.444725 -2.117371 0.0353 
kone ASVI_FIN 0.870357 0.277238 3.139387 0.0019 
kone ASVI_GLO -2.019694 0.531953 -3.796753 0.0002 
kone ABRETURNS -3.153284 0.758561 -4.156927 0.0000 
martela C 0.354358 0.083690 4.234187 0.0000 
nurminen  C 1.049403 0.197308 5.318602 0.0000 
outokumpu ABRETURNS -0.625354 0.302348 -2.068326 0.0397 
outotec ABRETURNS -2.677220 0.654307 -4.091688 0.0001 
87 
ponsse ABRETURNS 5.900366 1.887932 3.125306 0.0020 
rautaruukki ABRETURNS 3.830386 0.460842 8.311704 0.0000 
SRV ABRETURNS 5.236674 1.737124 3.014565 0.0029 
stockmann ABRETURNS 4.769340 1.137114 4.194248 0.0000 
viking line C 0.650049 0.118930 5.465797 0.0000 
 
There are 24 statistically significant variables in this study. The total number of 
variables is 496 for the regressions. The statistical significant variables therefore represent 
4.84 percent of all the variables. This can be considered as a minor value considering the 
attention theory predicts retail investors to be involved in investing related activities based 
on how they show interest in finding information about companies. 11 of the significant 
variables are abnormal returns that are positively correlated with volume. This is the basis 
for momentum investing strategies. In reality this means the higher the stock price goes 
the higher the trading volume it experiences in those cases where the correlation is 
positive. This also an evidence of flock-type of behavior or herding. In most cases the 
abnormal return variable is one of the highest values in the regression. It can be concluded 
that abnormal returns are better predictors of future abnormal trading volume than search 
volume indices. Retail investors buy stocks that go up in price and sell stocks that are 
going down. Based on this notion they are acting with the market changes and even 
enforcing them. Seven variables are the constant C. This also indicates there is abnormal 
trading involved compared to the expected return models. This study does not go into 
great detail about momentum investing, but the behavior can be found and verified from 
the results stated above.  
The exact R2 values are given in the appendices 2 to 7 for OLS regressions. In almost 
all cases the values are below 0.05 which means the chosen variables explain only less 
than five percent of the total fluctuation in trading volume. For further studies the 
companies Atria, Fortum, Kemira, Keskisuomalainen and Kone will be used for 
multivariate models because they have linear regression at 95 percent significance level 
with SVI variables either from local or from global sources. The implication is to use 
multivariate models with both autoregressive and moving average variables to find a 
model that explains the fluctuation best for these five selected companies.  
4.1.2 Multivariate and ARMA-GARCH 
The multivariate and ARMA-GARCH models produce different results for the 
selected companies that had statistically relevant variables. The model chosen is 
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ARMA(2,2). This means two lags of autoregressive and two lags of moving averaging. 
This decision is based on the previous studies how investors react to changes and also 
because of the residuals in the model. In practice the variables in the regression are 
RESID-1, RESID-2 and GARCH-1 and GARCH-2 factors. The model chosen is verified 
on residuals from the analysis. In some cases it proves that only one lag would be needed 
but the model is still ran with 2 lags. For model verification purposes the different lag 
lengths were observed. If there is statistically significant autocorrelation with the 
residuals more lags are added. The best model was iterated this way to be the ARMA(2,2). 
With this model the factors are significant at 99 percent level at times and in all cases the 
p-values are lower than they are with OLS tests. In some cases the first lag is insignificant 
but the second is significant. These results reflect the previous studies. Both DEG (2009) 
and Wuoristo (2012) found the 2 weeks lag also the key part of the results at very high 
significance levels (from 99 to 99.9 percent significance). It is also noted that ARMA 
models are not designed to model the contemporaneous effect of two variables moving 
in the same direction.  
The companies will be reviewed one at a time, starting from Atria. ARMA(2,2) was 
used for studying the company for the period year 2013. The amount of trading day 
changes equals the amount of possible trading in year 2013 through direct market 
operations. Search volume index originating from global sources is statistically 









Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
 
Convergence  after 32 iterations 
 
Presample variance: backcast 
(parameter = 0.7) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.018865 0.018092 -1.042738 0.2971 
SVI_FIN 0.696616 0.244146 2.853279 0.0043 
SVI_GLO -2.140435 0.515857 -4.149283 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.196540 0.001152 -170.5638 0.0000 
MA(2) 0.354740 0.046813 7.577804 0.0000 
Variance Equation 
C 0.002223 0.000813 2.733019 0.0063 
RESID(-1)^2 0.175081 0.083293 2.101988 0.0356 
RESID(-2)^2 -0.225736 0.084519 -2.670840 0.0076 
GARCH(-1) 0.966116 0.157304 6.141721 0.0000 
GARCH(-2) 0.062700 0.158853 0.394701 0.6931 









Using 95 percent significance the GARCH term with two lags is not significant. The 
results for the company are equivalent to the results with OLS in the sense that at least 
one of the variables is statistically significant. With OLS method only the global search 
volume index was significant stating the queries from outside of Finland are linear 
dependent with trading volume. For ARMA-GARCH both sources of queries are relevant 
with global queries being significant at 99.9 percent level. Findings for this company are 
similar that were the findings for DEG (2009) studies with company mean values. 
Abnormal volumes correlate with more abnormal volumes. This is the basis for 
momentum strategy. To make sure there are no relevant and significant lags left out from 
the model the residuals must be observed and examined. The q-statistics are as seen from 
the following table. 
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Table 8 Q-statistic probabilities for ARMA terms 
 
 
The lags beyond the first two are not statistically significant. The third lag would be 
significant at 90 percent level but not at 95 percent. Thus it will be omitted from the 
model. The same two lag length is valid for this company as it was in the previous studies 
at weekly level. Thus it can be concluded that the relevant changes between search 
volume index and trading volume happen one to two weeks after the initial change. This 
driver for change can be either exo- or endogenous. Such events can be market rumors, 
news or interim reports or profit warnings.  
For the normal distribution testing there are different ways. In this case the Jarque-bera 
is also checked. The Jarque-Bera measures the goodness-of-fit. It tests if the sample data 
has excess skewness and kurtosis. If the sample is close to normal distribution the Jarque-
Bera is close to 0. The distribution of the residuals is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 6 Normal distribution testing, skewness and kurtosis 
The testing for normal distribution, skewness and kurtosis can be seen from the figure. 
The distributions have minor skewness and the default value for kurtosis is presumed to 
be 3. This is typical for return distributions since and it is very common. There are very 
few outliers and the distribution has only one single peak. The models can be accepted 
based on the fact the residuals are very close to normal distributed, have only one single 
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peak, and kurtosis value is close to 3. There are tails but they are not considered to be 
problematic in this study.  
The second company for the multivariate analysis is Fortum. Only the factors are noted 
here, the entire regression with the given lags can be found from appendix. The OLS 
results for Fortum were SVI_GLO being the only statistically significant variable with 
the factor of 0.78. So if there is a 1 unit change with global SVI value for Fortum the 
abnormal trading volume rises 0.78. The change is positive and there is no reversing of 
the effect according to OLS. For multivariate the results are as follows: 
Table 9 Fortum ARMA  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.028377 0.008284 -3.425567 0.0006 
SVI_FIN -0.273801 0.154363 -1.773749 0.0761 
SVI_GLO 0.829859 0.223463 3.713623 0.0002 
 
The ARMA(2,2) finds SVI_GLO also to be the relevant variable, thus indicating the 
non-professional investor attention is more meaningful originating from global sources 
outside Finland. The entire regression can be found from appendix 4.The SVI_FIN is also 
significant at 90 percent level but not at 95 percent. Interestingly the SVI_FIN value is 
negative, but the absolute value is very minor. If Finnish investors use Google trends to 
find information about Fortum it causes abnormal trading volumes to sink. However, the 
factor is very minor and therefore the result should be questioned or disregarded entirely. 
The R2 for Fortum’s ARMA model is 0.0117 and R2 adjusted only 0.0033 which can 
directly be translated the search volume index changes have extremely little effect on the 
trading volumes. The efficient market hypothesis is valid for the company, there are no 
weak-form efficiency deficiencies that could be used for any arbitraging positions and the 
markets experience strong efficiency in this regard. 
The third company is Kemira. The OLS regression was that SVI_FIN factor value was 
0.45 and significant at 99 percent level. For ARMA model the results are as follows: 
Table 10 Kemira ARMA 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.014482 0.017756 -0.815615 0.4147 
SVI_FIN 0.340225 0.165106 2.060638 0.0393 
SVI_GLO 0.144046 0.303848 0.474073 0.6354 
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The results are similar in the table. The entire regression can be found from appendix 
5. ASVI_FIN stands at 0.34 with 95 percent significance level. So if queries originating 
from Finland increase 1 the abnormal trading volume gains 0.34. The global queries are 
clearly irrelevant for trading volume. So one unit change in Finnish SVI creates a 0.34 
change in abnormal trading volume. The more individual investors seek information the 
more demand for the share it creates. The entire regression can be found from appendix 
with the lags also. The R2 stands at 0.048 so the model explains roughly 4.8 percent of 
the total fluctuation in trading volume. The lags prove to be statistically insignificant.  
Fourth company is Keskisuomalainen with only global queries as the relevant variable 
for explaining abnormal trading volumes in this model. The OLS value was -0.729. This 
can be interpreted as global queries being very important for the trading volume. As a 
company that operates and is owned mainly by Finnish investors the results are surprising. 
The following table shows the values for the ARMA-GARCH. 
Table 11 Keskisuomalainen ARMA 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.169215 0.068568 2.467843 0.0136 
SVI_FIN 5.265797 3.405495 1.546265 0.1220 
SVI_GLO -8.105870 2.959078 -2.739323 0.0062 
 
The results can be found in the appendix 6 also. The entire regression can be found 
from appendix 6 which also show the lags prove to be insignificant for this company. For 
efficient market hypothesis the Keskisuomalainen share does not indicate any arbitrary 
positions based on Google queries. Either the stock does not experience enough investor’s 
attention or the purchasing of the shares is not influenced with attention.  
The fifth and last company is Kone Oyj. The entire regression can also be found in the 
appendix. Kone was the only company in OLS studies to have both the Finnish and global 
queries significant at 95 percent level. This result is also surprising because Kone stock 
is one of the most liquid stocks in the local markets. It experiences also very high investor 
attention according to Google trends. Abnormal search volume index from Finland was 
0.87 and abnormal search volume index from global sources stands at -2.01. The variables 
having different directions is conflicting information. Reason for this can be that global 
investors use other sources of information more than Google, but this study cannot 
reliable answer the question. The ARMA-GARCH results are as the following table 
indicates. The entire regression with the variables and lags can be found from appendix 7 
for Kone Oyj. 
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Table 12 Kone ARMA 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.011535 0.011854 0.973086 0.3305 
SVI_FIN 0.808568 0.281566 2.871685 0.0041 
SVI_GLO -2.070548 0.542033 -3.819968 0.0001 
 
If global queries increase by change of 1 unit then the abnormal trading volume goes 
down by approximately 2 units. This is in direct conflict with attention based behavior 
which states increased attention causes more purchases than sells. Increased attention 
results in less trading according to this regression. Instead for Finnish sources the results 
are the opposite. Finnish non-professional investors that are searching for information 
about the company end up with higher trading volumes. This would indicate flock or 
herding behavior and a behavioral bias very similar to what has been found in the previous 
studies. The R2 stands at 0.068 so the model explains 6.8% of the abnormal trading 
volume fluctuation. Approximately 93% of the fluctuation is explained with other 
variables that are not included in the current regression model. Kone oyj has the strongest 
linear dependency between SVI and trading volume in this study and the absolute 
amounts state that SVI does not explain any meaningful amount of the trading volume, 
precisely less than 90 percent. Other reasons and variables are behind excess trading than 
information demand of non-professional investors. This finding is similar to the findings 
of previous studies. Compared to the DEG (2009) this studies R2 values are lower so for 
the chosen companies the regression model explains less while other factors that are left 
outside the regression contribute a more significate proportion of the total fluctuations.  
After the multivariate models the results can be examined further if there are 
possibilities of finding causality. For this specific use there is the Granger causality. 
Granger causality is not causality per se but studies the lags.  
4.2 Granger causality 
Granger causality can be used to assess the possibilities if another variable causes the 
depended variable as explained in chapter 3.5. To understand the behavior of Finnish non-
professional investors this test can be used to see if SVI causes the ABTV. For this 
purpose only three companies are chosen because of their positive OLS variables. The 
companies are Atria, Kemira and Kone. Each of them had ASVI_FIN significant at 95 
percent level. The test is conducted as in 3.7 but the values for statistically non-significant 
variables is set to 0. If there is Granger causality with abnormal search volume index then 
the abnormal returns are also tested. The abnormal returns testing could be performed for 
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all companies that have positive results. Mechanically the testing can be done for global 
SVI values that are negative too but the interpretation is problematic since it is against 
the theory behind the expectations. The theory claimed that the more people have 
attention with the assets the more eager they are to acquiring them, while the reasons for 
selling are usually not related to individual companies but to macroeconomic signals. In 
both cases the increased attention to search volumes is presumed to be positively 
correlated with trading volume – the higher the query amounts the higher the trading 
volume.  The testing will be done only for few selected companies. The following list is 
for SVI_GLO significant at 95% level: Atria, Fortum, Keskisuomalainen and Kone Oyj. 
For SVI_FIN the only options remaining are Kemira and Kone Oyj. By adjusting the 
significance level of the VAR and OLS models from 95 percent to 90 percent or less 
would increase the amount of acceptable companies but in many studies the 95 percent 
level is the most commonly used level. 
The results for the SVI_GLO Granger Causality testing can be seen from appendix 8. 
For all companies the results are clear, the null hypothesis is accepted in all occasions. 
The null hypothesis states the search volume index does not have forecasting power to 
trading volumes. The five lags chosen are clearly jointly zero with over 99.99 percent 
confidence level. The global search query index values cannot be used to forecast the 
trading volumes happening in the OMXH. Granger causality is not the same as the 
generally understood causality between variables but it can be said there is very little 
evidence search volumes would have an causal relation with trading volumes even the 
theory suggest this. Statistical inference does not find Granger causality. This is not tested 
with the previous studies such as DEG (2011) or Wuoristo (2012) so it is difficult to find 
comparison to verify the test results from other sources.  
The results for the SVI_FIN Granger Causality testing can be seen from appendix 9. 
The results are very similar to the results with the SVI_GLO as they also indicate the null 
hypothesis should be accepted. The null hypothesis states there is no forecasting power 
with SVI to trading volume. In comparison to previous studies such as DEG (2011) or 
Wuoristo (2012) this study provides new information even though the evidence points 
out SVI is unviable for forecasting. However, the results are clear for this study.  
4.3 Results of the hypothesis testing 
This study replicated some parts of the DEG (2011) study but also methods from 
Wuoristo (2012). This chapter will go through the comparison and answer as many of the 
hypotheses as possible in those cases where the sample or the methods allow it. In some 
hypotheses this study proves to be inconclusive because of sample size or the types of the 
companies. There are results for all the regressions but in some cases the sample size is 
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too small to accept the results reliably.  The comparison process will carry on one 
hypothesis at a time either accepting, rejecting or stating it cannot be answered with the 
current study.  
 
Hypothesis 1. Search volume index captures the general attention in the Finnish 
market. 
 
The previous studies such as DEG (2011) and Wuoristo (2012) found SVI to be 
statistically significant for the mean values of share volumes and SVI in general even the 
effects were reversed in one or two weeks after. This study finds SVI and trading volumes 
move together and experience correlation. Peaks in global SVI or local SVI both happen 
close to peaks with trading volume. Therefore, it can be concluded SVI can capture the 
attention of the public investors and non-professional investors indeed use Google to 
search investing information on companies. This is a result of either Google Finance as a 
service or news bulletins giving incentives for investors to do queries about the companies 
they follow. In both cases SVI and attention are tied together close to interim reports and 
financial statements in general. The absolute query amounts are unknown and the 
financial queries in general experience low interest from investors. This is likely because 
of non-professional investor base being significantly smaller than it is in the counterparty 
countries from previous studies such as US or UK markets. This study cannot answer to 
the absolute values of the query numbers or how well the SVI captures the attention. 
Hypothesis 1 is rejected conditionally.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Search volume index correlates with the stock market trading 
volume but the trading volumes revert back to their mean values with some lag. 
 
This study found only 17 companies out of 124 to have statistically significant 
variables such as global SVI, local SVI, variable C which is a constant for individual 
company and abnormal returns in relation to trading volume. In those selected companies 
the F-tests proved to be statistically insignificant and resulted in accepting the null 
hypothesis: SVI cannot explain abnormal trading volume. The result is surprising since 
markets such as UK FTSE and the US markets are considered to be closer to efficient 
markets according to efficient market hypothesis. Yet those markets have strong 
indication SVI can be used to forecast trading volumes. In Finnish markets SVI proved 
to be less of a usable tool. This can be because of two different factors. Firstly the Finnish 
markets are more efficient than US or UK markets and arbitrage trading in here happens 
faster. The possible excess returns gained from market are taken advantage of faster in 
the Finnish markets. The second possible option is that Google finance or search volume 
index in general plays a lesser role as a tool for searching information. The non-
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professional investors acquire their news from other sources. The answer to the 
hypothesis remains as: SVI has a positive correlation with trading volume on few selected 
companies (6 out of 124). The trading volumes do not revert back to their means, but 
instead act according to moving averages. That means higher trading volume periods are 
followed by higher trading volumes. On the other hand lower liquidity periods are 
followed by lower liquidity periods.  Hypothesis 2 is rejected conditionally.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Search volume index can be used to predict and forecast and 
individual company’s stock turnover or abnormal returns. 
 
In previous studies SVI could be used for predicting short term abnormal returns on 
both US and UK markets, but it was reversed under two weeks. This study finds no such 
predictability. Since only 10 companies out of 124 had significant variables at 95% 
significance level using the mean values to generalize the market are meaningless and 
unusable for reliable forecasting purposes. According to this study SVI either from global 
or local sources cannot be used to forecast future trading volumes or abnormal returns 
with OMX AllShare index. Considering the index contains the companies used in many 
of the smaller indices such as OMXH25 it can be concluded the SVI is not a possibility 
to arbitrage in the Finnish markets.  The possibility to forecast remains only for a handful 
of companies and this study cannot answer if there is a causality or Granger causality 
between search volumes and abnormal returns. Also the liquidity of companies for the 
Finnish markets is questionable at times, therefore resulting in questioning if there are 
enough free shares for an investor to fully arbitrage the positions if they should occur in 
some specific situations. The global and local SVI’s are positively correlated with every 
company in the sample. Based on the regressions the SVI is not a usable tool for Finnish 
markets either because of strong market efficiency or the lack of Google queries 
performed by investors. The year 2013 has not been special for Google queries in other 
locations. Neither, the Google Finance or the common queries have experienced very low 
periods of query amounts. Instead the number of queries have been steadily growing for 
nearly a decade without any strong decreases in any field. The relational proportion of 
the investor queries has diminished over time, but not because investing related queries 
would be more rare but because Google is receiving ample amount of other queries. So it 
can be concluded that the relational values have been declining (investing related queries 
divided by total queries) because the number of individual non-investing related queries 
have arisen. Google is used for more information queries now than it was back in 2005. 
Hypothesis 3 is rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Companies with high consumer public exposure are more affected 
by retail investor attention than companies that are not visible to consumers. 
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The hypothesis cannot be directly answered based on the OMXH. The size of the index 
presents problems that cannot be overcome. The companies in the index that experience 
high consumer vicinity and exposure are omitted from the study based on either queries 
that are not related to the company or lack of trading volume. One example of such 
companies would be Nokia. Unfortunately Nokia as a query word results in results that 
have nothing to do with investing related activities. The majority of the search results 
imply to the mobile phones unit’s products such as handsets. The phones are no way 
related to the investing activity.  Therefore using such search volume index results in 
creating the regressions would result in obvious false results or spurious regression. The 
possible correlations would not be relevant because there is no foreseeable connection 
between buying consumer electronics and overwhelmingly investing in the stock just 
based on this. Based on the final sample there is no direct approach to accept or reject the 
hypothesis. Hypothesis 4 is not accepted or rejected. This study finds the hypothesis 
inconclusive because of lack of data. 
 
Hypothesis 5. The SVI results from Finland are better predictors for Finnish based 
company share price than the SVI results gathered from globally. 
 
Based on this study neither source of search volume index are viable predictors for either 
trading volume or prices as SVI_FIN and SVI_GLO prove to be indecisive.  The markets 
function in an efficient way in which search volume index presents very little possibilities 
to forecast future returns. The reason for this according to previous studies can be because 
of the following reasons: 
 
 The forecasting possibilities are quickly taken advantage of and vanish in 
intraday trading and therefore cannot be verified from either daily or weekly 
frequency data.  
 SVI does not capture the public’s attention to investing activities. 
 Search volume index, trading volume and asset returns are not statistically 
significantly correlated because of efficient markets.  
 
This study does not have the required information to accept or reject any of the 
possibilities listed above. At the moment in 2014 Google does not provide intraday SVI 
data and therefore further conclusions about the possibilities of SVI forecasting remain 
unknown. The values acquired for intraday data are through iteration and linear regression 
and therefore can be questionable at times. The average changes remain correct but the 
individual values from forecast models are of course only iterations. The intraday 
variance is different than the variance calculated from the aggregated data. All though 
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this dilemma has been persistent in the previous studies also and has been left mainly 
ignored. The data for intraday SVI is available to Google internal use only. It can be 
perceived it is extremely difficult for the general public to take advantage of the possible 
trends within stock market attention. Hypothesis 5 is rejected. Global queries are better 
predictors of future values than local queries.  
 
Hypothesis 6. According to Granger causality there is forecasting power with SVI 
regards to trading volume with selected companies. 
 
With any of the selected companies there is no Granger causality. In all tests for both 
global and local SVI the five lags are jointly zero, and thus the null hypothesis is accepted 
as is. SVI does not cause trading volume and trading volume does not cause search 
volume index. For all the companies tested the search volume index does not have any 
predicting power on either trading volume or abnormal trading volume. This hypothesis 
has been accepted in other studies such as DEG (2011). In the mentioned study the search 
volume index did have forecasting power based on ordinary least squares regressions but 
the trading volumes reverted back to their means in one or two weeks. In this study there 
is no predicting powers even though there are occasional correlation in one or two week 
frequency with search volume index and trading volume. Hypothesis 6 must therefore be 
rejected.  
There relation between ABTV and abnormal returns was not directly studied, but the 
OLS regressions had the returns as a variable. The results for Granger causality for SVI 
and returns are similar to SVI and trading volume. The lags are jointly zero and therefore 
based on the theory behind Granger causality there is no forecasting power with any of 
the selected companies (Enders 2007). This hypothesis has not been verified with the 
previous studies and therefore there are very little grounds for comparison. Enders (2007) 
also points out Granger causality itself is not a causality based on pure theory so even the 
possible positive findings should be taken into further studies.  However, based on 
efficient market hypothesis the markets function in in this study an efficient way. 
Hypothesis 6 must also be rejected. As the previous studies did not test Granger causality 
nor any positive results of any Granger causality tests there are no comparable data to 
different markets at current time.  






Table 13 Conclusions of the hypotheses 
In this table you will find the hypotheses and the conclusions.  
 (H#) Stating Conclusion 
1 Search volume index captures the general attention 
in the Finnish market 
Rejected 
conditionally. 
2 Search volume index correlates with the stock 
market trading volume (one or more variables 
statistically significant at 95% confidence level). 
Rejected conditionally 
(6 out of 124 
companies have 
statistical correlation 
with trading volume). 
3 Search volume index can be used to predict and 
forecast and individual company’s stock turnover or 
abnormal returns 
Rejected.  
4 Companies with high consumer recognizability are 
more affected by retail investor attention than 
companies that are not visible to consumers. 
Unable to conclude. 
Lack of data.  
5 The SVI results from Finland are better predictors for 
Finnish based company share price than the SVI 
results gathered from globally. 
Rejected. The global 
queries are better 
predictors. 
6 According to Granger causality, there is forecasting 
power with SVI regards to trading volume with 
selected companies. 
Rejected. The lags are 
jointly zero. No 
predicting power.  
 
The table summarizes the hypotheses in the study. None of the hypotheses are 
accepted. This study did not specifically test for mean level values like in the DEG (2011) 
studies, but considering the low mount of statistically significant variables in this study 
all of the hypotheses can be rejected also on mean-value level. 
4.4  Fama-French three-factor model and robustness checks 
For robustness tests purposes the expected returns can be calculated by using Fama-
French 3-factor model. Currently for the original OLS regressions the expected returns 
were calculated using CAPM-model as indicated previously. This was the chosen method 
for the previous studies such as DEG and as this study is a replication of the selected few 
hypotheses the same method must be applied here also. The Fama-French 3-factor model 
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is considered a better approach for expected returns by some researchers. It is known to 
have better forecasting properties because of the lack of information for CAPM. CAPM 
varies depending on for what the values are calculated for. The Fama-French 3-factor 
model is reported to be more accurate for asset return calculations. For example, the 
commonly used traditional capital asset pricing model is bound to using a single variable 
in describing the aggregated returns and considers the markets as a very large but 
practically immeasurable. There are different versions to CAPM that do take different 
factors to note. The Fama-French three-factor model divides the markets into different 
sections as there are three different betas. The exact formula for the model is as follows: 
 
𝑟 = 𝑅f + β(𝐾 − 𝑅f) + b𝐿 ∗ SMB + 𝑏𝑆 ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝛼     (14) 
 
In which 𝑅f is the risk free return of the assets and K is the return of the market 
portfolio. The variable bL stands for small market capitalization minus big market 
capitalization and HML for high book-to-market-ratio minus low book-to-market ratio. 
In these analysis the market returns for small caps are measured generally long term and 
there are differences between small and large cap company returns. The values can be 
calculated daily or with any chosen frequency but the results are always close to the 
normal beta. If an investor chooses to create a diverse portfolio where there are different 
portions of small cap and large cap companies combined with a different ratio for so 
called growth stocks compared to blue chips the beta may deviate from the standard beta 
significantly. In the case of this study the beta is almost identical because the portfolio 
that is being examined is exactly the index itself. However, the values for the Fama-
French three-factor models are similar to the values from the capital asset pricing model. 
The robustness tests are therefore verified and the results are reliable after this 
observation. In the cases of the previous studies such as DEG (2011) and Wuoristo (2012) 
the robustness tests differ more from the standard values because the sample is different. 
Nevertheless the robustness tests are ran and they provide same statistics. Generally the 
Fama-French three-factor model provides more time-varying betas for markets that have 
larger number of growth stocks or either are more prone to using innovation with 
accounting. There are studies such as Foye, Mramor and Pahor (2013) that add factors to 
the classic three-factor model because of accounting manipulation and target seeking 
behavior. This is also considered to be more specific for Indian and Asian markets. The 
European and Nordic markets have experienced significantly less account manipulation 
compared to the eastern and southern counterparts. This study does not presume the 
OMXH All Share index is under pressure from account manipulation or deliberate 
manufacturing of false accounting information and therefore the classic Fama-French 
three-factor model is used as it is presented in the given formula, without any additional 
variables or modifications. The single biggest problem with reliable robustness testing is 
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the Fama-French three-factor model beta. Because the sample size is limited since many 
companies had to be omitted from the study the betas do not differ significantly. The 
reason for omitting the small companies commonly was because they lacked sufficient 
trading or search volume index data. The companies that could deviate the Fama-French 
three-factor model beta greatly from the CAPM beta are commonly omitted. This could 
be avoided by still calculating the three factor model for the index without omitting the 
companies that lack the required information. In this case the beta would not reflect the 
expected returns of the sample at all and would render the results unacceptable and also 
incomparable. This results in the Fama-French three-factor model robustness testing to 
produce same results as the CAPM models, and therefore the robustness testing itself may 
be compromised and not reliable.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 The purpose of the study and conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to analyze if Google Trends can be used to predict stock 
trading volumes with Finnish OMXH listed shares. This was done by using Google 
Trend’s Search Volume Index (SVI) as a proxy for investor attention. In practice if 
individual investors are interested in acquiring information about companies, they go to 
Google search landing page and type the company name to find information. This type of 
behavior in turn is used as a proxy for general attention towards investing in companies. 
The search and trading volumes are available in quantifiable form. That data is then used 
to create regressions and to study the results.  
The conclusions for this study are different compared to the studies that were 
replicated, but the results in this study represent no surprises if reflected to the underlying 
theories. In previous studies there were clear indication of trading volume predictability 
and correlation. This correlation occurred between abnormal trading volume (ABTV) and  
abnormal search volume index. This study finds the efficient market hypothesis theory 
applies for the Finnish market. There are indications of behavioral biases and 
psychological factors influencing trading in Finnish markets. This finding has been 
common for previous studies. The findings are tied to the theories introduced in this study 
in chapter 2.2. There were three different biases commonly tied to investing activities. 
The representativeness, the availability and the anchoring. This study only finds 
anchoring bias within search volume index based on that the absolute values indicate both 
longer term bull and bear periods. This type of results are also found previously by Zhou 
(2009).  High abnormal trading volumes are followed by high abnormal trading volumes, 
and also if the trading volumes are lower than expected, they are followed with lower 
than expected values. For trading volumes in almost all cases there is no reverse-to-mean 
effect.  
According to the OLS regressions the OMXH index has significantly lower amount of 
companies that have abnormal trading volume correlated with abnormal search volume 
index compared to either the US markets or the UK stocks. This result is surprising when 
compared to the findings of DEG (2011) and Wuoristo (2012). In most other finance 
studies the US and the UK markets are considered to be more efficient based on financial 
theory and efficient markets (Wuoristo 2012). The reasons for higher efficiency 
expectations are because of higher liquidity and transparent company policies (Fama 
1991). According to classical finance theory those markets have less possibilities of 
arbitrage than the markets in peripheral areas such as the Nordic countries where 
arbitrages are considered to be risky and more inefficient thus causing mispricing and 
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behavioral bias influences (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). The reason for such results are either 
because the Finnish markets are closer to strong-form efficient than the counterparts or 
because Google’s search volume index does not experience active enough use to be a 
reliable proxy for investor attention for the chosen market. As there are no public absolute 
values for the query amounts this study is unable to provide reliable results. The search 
volume originating from global queries resulted to be better predictor of trading volume 
than the search volume from local sources.  Previous studies such as DEG (2011) and 
Wuoristo (2012) found SVI from both local and global sources to be a reliable proxy for 
investor attention. This study found global sources are more reliable than the local 
queries, and the vast majority of both sources to be inaccurate in explaining trading 
volume behavior. This can be seen as an indirect test for market efficiency. For Finnish 
stocks the markets operate in an efficient way and SVI cannot be used as a tool to arbitrage 
at least not with the used frequencies such as a weekly or daily data. As stated in the 
beginning of this study the major contributions this study can have are: 
 
1. Does Search Volume Index capture the general attention in the Finnish market? 
 
As seen from results or data SVI does fluctuate over time and there are positive search 
volume index values for all of the companies within the OMX index. The positive values 
indicate the public uses Google as a tool to acquire information about the companies. This 
provides the ground to run analysis and create regressions. In the study many of the 
companies had to be omitted because of several different reasons. These reasons are not 
enough searches or that the searches did not represent financial related queries. In 
comparable studies Google proved to be a more reliable tool with US or UK markets than 
with Finnish markets. This study cannot answer what are the reasons for having less 
investor related queries from Finland then there are from global sources for other markets. 
This is not because of low Google penetration since it is reported by different traffic 
observation web pages to be one of the most popular sites in Finland.  
 
2. Does Search Volume Index correlate with the stock market trading volume (in a 
statistically significant level)? 
 
The SVI can be used as proxy for only a few companies in the Finnish market.  The results 
occur with lower absolute values than in the comparable studies such as DEG (2011) and 
Wuoristo (2012) where there were findings of reliable correlation with mean values.  
 
3. Can Search Volume Index be used to predict and forecast an individual company’s 
stock turnover? 
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Forecasting trading volumes in some cases provide possibilities for arbitraging. 
According to the efficient markets these situations should not prevail for extended periods 
of time. According to the study by Mondria and WU (2011) information asymmetry is 
also a decisive factor. The different combinations are indicated here: 
 
 Local attention high, non-local low -> SVI can be efficiently used to predict 
future share prices 
 Local attention high, non-local high -> no statistically significant predictive 
powers 
 Local attention low, non-local high -> no statistically significant predictive 
powers 
 
This study finds exactly the same results as Mondria and Wu (2011). The SVI focus 
comes from non-local sources and therefore the findings indicate there is no significant 
predictive powers with SVI. The predictive powers represent themselves according to 
Mondria and Wu only when there is information asymmetry and only when the local 
attention is higher than the global. In this study the global attention is higher compared to 
the local attention. The results are therefore according to the theory for predictability. SVI 
cannot be used to predict the abnormal turnover unlike in the studies by DEG (2009) or 
Wuoristo (2012). Interestingly, this study finds abnormal returns to be correlated with 
abnormal trading volume. This can be seen as the basis for momentum investing within 
Finnish markets. Abnormally high returns calculated by capital asset pricing models 
expected returns are correlated with abnormally high trading volume calculated by 
moving averages. This is a clear contradiction to the efficient market hypothesis.  
5.2 Future studies and limitations 
The possibilities for Google Trends are immense. Using the search volume index as a 
proxy for investor attention is only one option among the many other possibilities. Almost 
all of the studies that are conducted have been made with data from either the United 
States or from the UK. This leaves many possibilities to conduct studies with more local 
data. As it is seem from this study there are differences between the different countries.  
Another more complex way to study the topic would be to start using combinations of 
words. For example, using set of query strings such as name+ticker. Another option 
would be to use the strings with omitting a keyword from them. For example, an option 
could be name+ticker-buy. The word buy could be replaced with the words purchase, 
acquire and with many others. This could reduce the noise within the data significantly 
and would in turn increase the sample size. In many cases the queries result in individuals 
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trying to find information about the company’s products instead of wanting to invest in 
the company. From the financial study perspective this is the reason many of the 
companies were omitted from the data sample. This study as the also the previous studies 
by DEG (2011) and Wuoristo (2012) had to omit a large portion of the companies that 
were initially in the index. In this study over 50 percent of the companies had to be 
omitted, and the study by Wuoristo (2012) over 80 percent of the companies were 
omitted.  
This study also suffered from survivorship bias. This means the sample consists of 
companies that are currently listed in the chosen index. The companies that have failed in 
the past are not represented at all. To overcome this the time-period must be chosen 
differently. But with longer periods of time there can be situations where a company does 
not experience enough trading. This can result in omitting the company from the study. 
Another option is to change the frequency of the data. Instead of using interpolated daily 
data or weekly data, a month or even a quarter’s length could be utilized. These results 
are not comparable because of different variance values naturally, but the new regressions 
may produce different results than cannot be observed in different frequencies. The 
limitations of the study are clear. Based on the available frequencies there can be a lot of 
correlation or forecasting possibilities that remain unfound. For example, SVI could 
correlate with trading volumes in intraday data because of automated trading. With 
OMXH the automated machine trading has grown both in size and in relative portion to 
other trading activities every year. The machines react to trends far faster than individuals 
who search information manually from Google queries. Unfortunately Google does not 
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APPENDIX 1 ALL LISTED COMPANIES 
 
OMX Helsinki All Share Index Constituents 
Company name Ticker symbol 
Affecto PLC   AFE1V:HEX 
Ahlstrom Oyj   AHL1V:HEX 
Aktia Bank PLC   AKTRV:HEX 
Alma Media Oyj   ALN1V:HEX 
Amer Sports Oyj   AMEAS:HEX 
Apetit Oyj   APETI:HEX 
Aspo Oyj   ASU1V:HEX 
Atria Oyj   ATRAV:HEX 
Basware Oyj   BAS1V:HEX 
Biohit Oyj   BIOBV:HEX 
Citycon Oyj   CTY1S:HEX 
Componenta Oyj   CTH1V:HEX 
Comptel Oyj   CTL1V:HEX 
Cramo Oyj   CRA1V:HEX 
Digia Oyj   DIG1V:HEX 
Dovre Group Oyj   DOV1V:HEX 
Efore PLC   EFO1V:HEX 
Elisa Oyj   ELI1V:HEX 
Etteplan Oyj   ETT1V:HEX 
F-Secure Oyj   FSC1V:HEX 
Finnair  FIA1S:HEX 
Finnlines Oyj   FLG1S:HEX 
Fiskars Oyj   FIS1V:HEX 
Fortum  FUM1V:HEX 
Honkarakenne Oyj   HONBS:HEX 
Huhtamaki Oyj   HUH1V:HEX 
Incap Oyj   ICP1V:HEX 
Ixonos Oyj   XNS1V:HEX 
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Kemira Oyj   KRA1V:HEX 
Keskisuomalainen Oyj   KSLAV:HEX 
Kesko Oyj   KESAV:HEX 
Kesla Oyj   KELAS:HEX 
Kone Oyj   KNEBV:HEX 
Konecranes Abp   KCR1V:HEX 
Lemminkainen Oyj   LEM1S:HEX 
M-real Oyj   MRLAV:HEX 
Marimekko Oyj   MMO1V:HEX 
Martela Oyj   MARAS:HEX 
Metso Oyj   MEO1V:HEX 
Neo Industrial Oyj   NEO1V:HEX 
Neste Oil Corporation  NES1V:HEX 
NOKIA  NOK1V:HEX 
Nokian Tyres PLC   NRE1V:HEX 
Nordea Bank AB  NDA1V:HEX 
Nurminen Logistics Oyj   NLG1V:HEX 
Olvi Oyj   OLVAS:HEX 
Oriola KD Oyj  OKDAV:HEX 
Outokumpu  OUT1V:HEX 
Outotec Oyj   OTE1V:HEX 
Ponsse Oyj   PON1V:HEX 
Poyry Oyj   POY1V:HEX 
Ramirent Oyj   RMR1V:HEX 
Rapala VMC Corp  RAP1V:HEX 
Rautaruukki Oyj   RTRKS:HEX 
Raute Oyj   RUTAV:HEX 
Revenio Group Oyj   REG1V:HEX 
Sampo Oyj   SAMAS:HEX 
Soprano Oyj   SOPRA:HEX 
Sponda Oyj   SDA1V:HEX 
SRV Yhtiot Oyj   SRV1V:HEX 
Stockmann Oyj   STCAS:HEX 
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Stora Enso  STERV:HEX 
Takoma Oyj   TAM1V:HEX 
Talvivaaran Kaivososakeyhtio Oyj   TLV1V:HEX 
Technopolis Oyj   TPS1V:HEX 
Tecnotree Oyj   TEM1V:HEX 
Teleste Oyj   TLT1V:HEX 
TeliaSonera  TLS1V:HEX 
Tieto Oyj   TIE1V:HEX 
Tikkurila Oyj   TIK1V:HEX 
Trainers' House Oyj   TRH1V:HEX 
Tulikivi Oyj   TULAV:HEX 
Turvatiimi Oyj   TUT1V:HEX 
UPM Kymmene Oyj   UPM1V:HEX 
Uponor Oyj   UNR1V:HEX 
Vacon Oyj   VAC1V:HEX 
Vaisala Oyj   VAIAS:HEX 
Valmet Corp  VALMT:HEX 
Viking Line Abp   VIK1V:HEX 
Wartsila Oyj   WRT1V:HEX 
Yit Oyj   YTY1V:HEX 
Yleiselektroniikka Oyj   YLEPS:HEX 










APPENDIX 2 SUMMARY OF OLS REGRESSIONS 
 Summary of OLS regressions 
 Dependent variable: ABTV (abnormal Trading Volume) 
regr. ABTV = B0 + B1*ASVI_FIN+B2*ASVI_GLO+B3*ABRETURNS+e 
 Company Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   R-squared 
1 aktia C 1.798185 0.281252 6.393501 0.0000 0.016002 
  ASVI_FIN 20.19162 11.96650 1.687345 0.0929  
  ASVI_GLO -16.61221 11.42394 -1.454157 0.1472  
  ABRETURNS -15.33881 15.36756 -0.998129 0.3192  
2 apetit C 0.040927 0.027491 1.488728 0.1379 0.013225 
  ASVI_FIN 0.133857 0.109420 1.223328 0.2224  
  ASVI_GLO -0.207724 0.849436 -0.244544 0.8070  
  ABRETURNS -3.031556 2.294215 -1.321392 0.1877  
3 atria C -0.002924 0.020073 -0.145650 0.8843 0.034978 
  ASVI_FIN 0.671978 0.241391 2.783780 0.0058  
  ASVI_GLO -0.759360 0.625660 -1.213695 0.2261  
  ABRETURNS -1.367055 1.388824 -0.984326 0.3260  
4 basware C 0.017197 0.038228 0.449844 0.6532 0.038182 
  ASVI_FIN 0.180325 0.361642 0.498629 0.6185  
  ASVI_GLO 0.026422 0.451209 0.058557 0.9534  
  ABRETURNS 5.085843 1.720657 2.955755 0.0034  
5 cramo C 0.009063 0.021523 0.421094 0.6741 0.009435 
  ASVI_FIN 0.038336 0.199597 0.192069 0.8479  
  ASVI_GLO -0.038196 0.265426 -0.143904 0.8857  
  ABRETURNS 1.536265 1.048900 1.464644 0.1444  
6 digia C 0.075475 0.052926 1.426064 0.1552 0.021780 
  ASVI_FIN 0.207873 0.200127 1.038702 0.3000  
  ASVI_GLO 0.056706 0.533130 0.106365 0.9154  
  ABRETURNS 6.777225 3.345574 2.025729 0.0439  
123 
7 elisa C 0.001430 0.011698 0.122272 0.9028 0.015151 
  ASVI_FIN -0.689054 0.597046 -1.154104 0.2496  
  ASVI_GLO 0.357341 0.324990 1.099546 0.2727  
  ABRETURNS 1.153099 0.982233 1.173957 0.2416  
8 f-secure C 0.046163 0.028399 1.625529 0.1054 0.050237 
  ASVI_FIN -0.715093 0.418923 -1.706978 0.0891  
  ASVI_GLO 0.768244 0.572727 1.341380 0.1811  
  ABRETURNS 3.389221 1.112710 3.045916 0.0026  
9 finnlines C 0.843695 0.144461 5.840300 0.0000 0.030146 
  ASVI_FIN -0.871542 1.871568 -0.465675 0.6419  
  ASVI_GLO -4.292896 2.309901 -1.858476 0.0644  
  ABRETURNS -1.320157 6.806816 -0.193946 0.8464  
10 fiskars C 0.018089 0.026632 0.679212 0.4977 0.015448 
  ASVI_FIN -0.068418 0.304262 -0.224864 0.8223  
  ASVI_GLO 0.419543 0.471014 0.890724 0.3740  
  ABRETURNS 4.023129 2.349741 1.712159 0.0882  
11 fortum C 0.002438 0.011214 0.217396 0.8281 0.046962 
  ASVI_FIN -0.305794 0.185467 -1.648778 0.1005  
  ASVI_GLO 0.783738 0.286140 2.739001 0.0066  
  ABRETURNS -1.000498 0.954023 -1.048714 0.2954  
12 honkarakenne C 0.811511 0.113780 7.132257 0.0000 0.029611 
  ASVI_FIN 0.123509 1.424762 0.086688 0.9310  
  ASVI_GLO -2.576838 1.557597 -1.654367 0.0994  
  ABRETURNS 4.328182 5.684565 0.761392 0.4472  
13 kemira C -0.018244 0.016472 -1.107576 0.2692 0.091782 
  ASVI_FIN 0.450251 0.160747 2.800984 0.0055  
  ASVI_GLO 0.226140 0.234343 0.964995 0.3355  
  ABRETURNS -3.437501 1.096988 -3.133581 0.0019  
14 keskisuomalainen C 0.239236 0.100293 2.385357 0.0179 0.027682 
124 
  ASVI_FIN 5.184984 3.266613 1.587266 0.1138  
  ASVI_GLO -7.293762 3.444725 -2.117371 0.0353  
  ABRETURNS 6.897241 5.241048 1.316004 0.1895  
15 kesko C 0.010504 0.013661 0.768892 0.4427 0.006310 
  ASVI_FIN 0.126180 0.278044 0.453815 0.6504  
  ASVI_GLO -0.208201 0.265146 -0.785231 0.4331  
  ABRETURNS 0.711735 0.875169 0.813255 0.4169  
16 kone C 0.016035 0.010837 1.479633 0.1403 0.134683 
  ASVI_FIN 0.870357 0.277238 3.139387 0.0019  
  ASVI_GLO -2.019694 0.531953 -3.796753 0.0002  
  ABRETURNS -3.153284 0.758561 -4.156927 0.0000  
17 lemminkainen C -0.014543 0.041628 -0.349361 0.7271 0.009415 
  ASVI_FIN 0.778654 0.945068 0.823913 0.4108  
  ASVI_GLO -0.595458 0.900901 -0.660958 0.5093  
  ABRETURNS 3.504889 2.807487 1.248408 0.2131  
18 martela C 0.354358 0.083690 4.234187 0.0000 0.007474 
  ASVI_FIN 1.272433 0.966483 1.316559 0.1893  
  ASVI_GLO -1.604074 1.484040 -1.080883 0.2809  
  ABRETURNS 0.990600 5.256394 0.188456 0.8507  
19 metso C 0.005940 0.014114 0.420835 0.6743 0.002014 
  ASVI_FIN 0.085100 0.196183 0.433778 0.6648  
  ASVI_GLO -0.206616 0.321782 -0.642099 0.5214  
  ABRETURNS -0.070755 0.546979 -0.129356 0.8972  
20 neste oil C 0.014356 0.013664 1.050686 0.2945 0.057664 
  ASVI_FIN 0.328625 0.219287 1.498604 0.1353  
  ASVI_GLO -0.030076 0.287873 -0.104475 0.9169  
  ABRETURNS 0.288898 0.570594 0.506312 0.6131  
21 nordea bank C 0.006863 0.012001 0.571896 0.5679 0.016771 
  ASVI_FIN -0.076500 0.432301 -0.176959 0.8597  
125 
  ASVI_GLO 0.501507 0.434710 1.153659 0.2498  
  ABRETURNS -1.397947 0.969422 -1.442042 0.1506  
22 nurminen logistics C 1.049403 0.197308 5.318602 0.0000 0.023860 
  ASVI_FIN 3.798469 2.504241 1.516815 0.1307  
  ASVI_GLO -3.556233 2.347133 -1.515139 0.1311  
  ABRETURNS 13.30221 8.319410 1.598937 0.1112  
23 olvi C 0.017021 0.029070 0.585538 0.5587 0.024864 
  ASVI_FIN -0.330645 0.264215 -1.251424 0.2120  
  ASVI_GLO 0.357942 0.295338 1.211977 0.2267  
  ABRETURNS 4.967984 2.608520 1.904522 0.0581  
24 oriola C 0.034203 0.025475 1.342591 0.1807 0.005940 
  ASVI_FIN -0.084904 0.245487 -0.345861 0.7298  
  ASVI_GLO -0.313024 0.390232 -0.802150 0.4233  
  ABRETURNS 0.171102 1.718932 0.099540 0.9208  
25 outokumpu C 0.029854 0.022361 1.335077 0.1831 0.019640 
  ASVI_FIN 0.283635 0.421195 0.673406 0.5014  
  ASVI_GLO -0.326750 0.460158 -0.710082 0.4784  
  ABRETURNS -0.625354 0.302348 -2.068326 0.0397  
26 outotec C -0.004847 0.015304 -0.316689 0.7518 0.081047 
  ASVI_FIN 0.275480 0.146596 1.879177 0.0615  
  ASVI_GLO -0.275188 0.194648 -1.413769 0.1588  
  ABRETURNS -2.677220 0.654307 -4.091688 0.0001  
27 ponsse C 0.045546 0.033482 1.360314 0.1750 0.043597 
  ASVI_FIN 0.225261 0.356440 0.631975 0.5280  
  ASVI_GLO 0.003736 0.537068 0.006956 0.9945  
  ABRETURNS 5.900366 1.887932 3.125306 0.0020  
28 ramirent C 0.018316 0.020450 0.895683 0.3713 0.018970 
  ASVI_FIN -0.295991 0.281343 -1.052066 0.2938  
  ASVI_GLO 0.084778 0.383769 0.220908 0.8254  
126 
  ABRETURNS 1.401979 1.076747 1.302050 0.1942  
29 rapala C 0.072515 0.056406 1.285603 0.1998 0.006141 
  ASVI_FIN 0.307181 0.457915 0.670827 0.5030  
  ASVI_GLO -0.331039 2.110347 -0.156865 0.8755  
  ABRETURNS 5.310349 5.161695 1.028799 0.3046  
30 rautaruukki C 0.001665 0.013110 0.126983 0.8991 0.232262 
  ASVI_FIN -0.043576 0.132674 -0.328442 0.7429  
  ASVI_GLO -0.041951 0.126122 -0.332625 0.7397  
  ABRETURNS 3.830386 0.460842 8.311704 0.0000  
31 sampo C 0.013084 0.011545 1.133254 0.2583 0.010266 
  ASVI_FIN 0.209566 0.216579 0.967621 0.3342  
  ASVI_GLO -0.173195 0.333616 -0.519146 0.6041  
  ABRETURNS -1.203667 1.019790 -1.180309 0.2391  
32 SRV C 0.001562 0.037528 0.041623 0.9668 0.064197 
  ASVI_FIN 0.143816 0.075200 1.912457 0.0570  
  ASVI_GLO 0.370061 0.268276 1.379403 0.1691  
  ABRETURNS 5.236674 1.737124 3.014565 0.0029  
33 stockmann C 0.033016 0.020198 1.634658 0.1035 0.077042 
  ASVI_FIN -0.951295 0.811530 -1.172225 0.2423  
  ASVI_GLO 1.091887 0.875770 1.246774 0.2137  
  ABRETURNS 4.769340 1.137114 4.194248 0.0000  
34 stora enso C 0.010633 0.011306 0.940475 0.3479 0.018088 
  ASVI_FIN 0.212751 0.136333 1.560526 0.1200  
  ASVI_GLO -0.242664 0.171244 -1.417066 0.1578  
  ABRETURNS 0.840008 0.671831 1.250327 0.2124  
35 talvivaara C 0.017076 0.021727 0.785922 0.4327 0.016959 
  ASVI_FIN -0.489496 0.344653 -1.420258 0.1569  
  ASVI_GLO 0.577244 0.337096 1.712401 0.0881  
  ABRETURNS 0.058469 0.198998 0.293818 0.7692  
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36 technopolis C 0.015154 0.014349 1.056084 0.2920 0.012931 
  ASVI_FIN 0.232143 0.185386 1.252214 0.2117  
  ASVI_GLO -0.037915 0.246707 -0.153685 0.8780  
  ABRETURNS -1.370379 1.252402 -1.094200 0.2750  
37 teliasonera C 0.015154 0.014349 1.056084 0.2920 0.012931 
  ASVI_FIN 0.232143 0.185386 1.252214 0.2117  
  ASVI_GLO -0.037915 0.246707 -0.153685 0.8780  
  ABRETURNS -1.370379 1.252402 -1.094200 0.2750  
38 tikkurila C 0.028451 0.028655 0.992871 0.3218 0.015050 
  ASVI_FIN -0.417975 1.004315 -0.416179 0.6777  
  ASVI_GLO 0.423979 1.052839 0.402701 0.6875  
  ABRETURNS 3.558497 1.971092 1.805343 0.0723  
39 tulikivi C 0.083539 0.054005 1.546879 0.1232 0.015083 
  ASVI_FIN -0.730367 0.556170 -1.313208 0.1904  
  ASVI_GLO 0.246463 0.618347 0.398583 0.6906  
  ABRETURNS 2.675196 2.148932 1.244895 0.2144  
40 uponor C 0.014915 0.023806 0.626527 0.5316 0.016104 
  ASVI_FIN -0.439869 0.290983 -1.511666 0.1320  
  ASVI_GLO -0.055210 0.408699 -0.135088 0.8927  
  ABRETURNS 0.736383 1.391995 0.529013 0.5973  
41 viking line C 0.650049 0.118930 5.465797 0.0000 0.002526 
  ASVI_FIN -1.359494 4.206646 -0.323178 0.7468  
  ASVI_GLO 2.498863 4.312746 0.579413 0.5629  
  ABRETURNS -1.432167 7.320243 -0.195645 0.8451  
42 tikkurila C 0.028451 0.028655 0.992871 0.3218 0.015050 
  ASVI_FIN -0.417975 1.004315 -0.416179 0.6777  
  ASVI_GLO 0.423979 1.052839 0.402701 0.6875  
  ABRETURNS 3.558497 1.971092 1.805343 0.0723  
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APPENDIX 3 ATRIA 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-
Statistic 
Prob.   
C -0.018865 0.018092 -
1.042738 
0.2971 
SVI_FIN 0.696616 0.244146 2.853279 0.0043 
SVI_GLO -2.140435 0.515857 -
4.149283 
0.0000 
AR(2) -0.196540 0.001152 -
170.5638 
0.0000 
MA(2) 0.354740 0.046813 7.577804 0.0000 
Variance Equation 
C 0.002223 0.000813 2.733019 0.0063 
RESID(-1)^2 0.175081 0.083293 2.101988 0.0356 
RESID(-2)^2 -0.225736 0.084519 -
2.670840 
0.0076 
GARCH(-1) 0.966116 0.157304 6.141721 0.0000 
GARCH(-2) 0.062700 0.158853 0.394701 0.6931 











APPENDIX 4 FORTUM 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.028377 0.008284 -3.425567 0.0006 
SVI_FIN -0.273801 0.154363 -1.773749 0.0761 
SVI_GLO 0.829859 0.223463 3.713623 0.0002 
Variance Equation 
C 0.004288 0.000341 12.57874 0.0000 
RESID(-1)^2 0.013934 0.012826 1.086323 0.2773 
RESID(-2)^2 -0.009595 0.012141 -0.790304 0.4294 
GARCH(-1) 1.847543 0.016781 110.0966 0.0000 
GARCH(-2) -0.998506 0.014926 -66.89840 0.0000 
R-squared 0.011761     Mean dependent var 0.006270 
Adjusted R-
squared 






APPENDIX 5 KEMIRA 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. 
Error 
z-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.014482 0.017756 -0.815615 0.4147 
SVI_FIN 0.340225 0.165106 2.060638 0.0393 
SVI_GLO 0.144046 0.303848 0.474073 0.6354 
Variance Equation 
C 0.016947 0.175031 0.096823 0.9229 
RESID(-1)^2 0.112466 0.085015 1.322905 0.1859 
RESID(-2)^2 -0.050870 0.609772 -0.083424 0.9335 
GARCH(-1) 0.788571 5.654597 0.139457 0.8891 
GARCH(-2) -0.127730 2.192214 -0.058265 0.9535 
     











APPENDIX 6 KESKISUOMALAINEN 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. 
Error 
z-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.169215 0.068568 2.467843 0.0136 
SVI_FIN 5.265797 3.405495 1.546265 0.1220 
SVI_GLO -8.105870 2.959078 -2.739323 0.0062 
Variance Equation 
C 0.169762 0.026685 6.361714 0.0000 
RESID(-1)^2 0.043760 0.007599 5.758726 0.0000 
RESID(-2)^2 -0.047359 0.008030 -5.897755 0.0000 
GARCH(-1) -0.057844 0.015954 -3.625588 0.0003 








APPENDIX 7 KONE 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.011535 0.011854 0.973086 0.3305 
SVI_FIN 0.808568 0.281566 2.871685 0.0041 
SVI_GLO -2.070548 0.542033 -3.819968 0.0001 
Variance Equation 
C 0.020191 0.012172 1.658778 0.0972 
RESID(-1)^2 0.230219 0.109887 2.095046 0.0362 
RESID(-2)^2 0.162940 0.121006 1.346546 0.1781 
GARCH(-1) -0.544600 0.275543 -1.976458 0.0481 
GARCH(-2) 0.435430 0.259939 1.675125 0.0939 
R-squared 0.068630  Mean dependent var 0.009925 
Adjusted R-
squared 






APPENDIX 8 GRANGER SVI_GLO 
 
Wald Test Atria: White’s robust heteroscedastic adjusted standard 
errors. 
Null Hypothesis: SVI_GLO(-1)= SVI_GLO(-2)= SVI_GLO(-3)= 
SVI_GLO(-4)= SVI_GLO(-5) 
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
SVI_GLO(-1) - SVI_GLO(-5) -0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_GLO(-2) - SVI_GLO(-5) -0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_GLO(-3) - SVI_GLO(-5)  0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_GLO(-4) - SVI_GLO(-5)  0.11E+93  0.000000 
 
 
Wald Test Fortum, TV   
Null Hypothesis: SVI_GLO(-1)= SVI_GLO(-2)= SVI_GLO(-3)= 
SVI_GLO(-4)= SVI_GLO(-5) 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
SVI_GLO(-1) - SVI_GLO(-5) -0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_GLO(-2) - SVI_GLO(-5) -0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_GLO(-3) - SVI_GLO(-5)  0.000000  0.000000 










Wald Test: Keskisuomalainen, TV 
Null Hypothesis: SVI_GLO(-1)= SVI_GLO(-2)= SVI_GLO(-3)= 
SVI_GLO(-4)= SVI_GLO(-5) 
Normalized Restriction (= 0).  
SVI_GLO(-1) - SVI_GLO(-5) -0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_GLO(-2) - SVI_GLO(-5) -0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_GLO(-3) - SVI_GLO(-5)  0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_GLO(-4) - SVI_GLO(-5)  1.12E+93  0.000000 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. F>15 
 
 
Wald Test: Kone, TV 
Null Hyp: SVI_GLO(-1)= SVI_GLO(-2)= SVI_GLO(-3)= SVI_GLO(-
4)=VI_GLO(-5) 
Null Hypothesis Summary: Value Std. Err. 
SVI_GLO(-1) - SVI_GLO(-5) -0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_GLO(-2) - SVI_GLO(-5) -0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_GLO(-3) - SVI_GLO(-5)  0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_GLO(-4) - SVI_GLO(-5)  0.11E+93  0.000000 







APPENDIX 9 GRANGER SVI_FIN 
Kemira Dependent Variable: TV  
Variable Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob.   
SVI_FIN 0.310798 0.264230 1.176240 0.2407 
SVI_FIN(-1) 0.352955 0.337319 1.046354 0.2965 
SVI_FIN(-2) 0.038682 0.332928 0.116188 0.9076 
SVI_FIN(-3) -0.182358 0.332928 -0.547740 0.5844 
SVI_FIN(-4) -0.158535 0.332928 -0.476185 0.6344 
SVI_FIN(-5) 0.135993 0.258610 0.525862 0.5995 
















15.13255     Schwarz criterion 0.215746 
















Wald Test: Kemira, TV null hyp. 
accepted 
F>15 
Null Hypothesis: SVI_FIN(-1)= SVI_FIN(-2)= SVI_FIN(-3)= 
SVI_FIN(-4)= SVI_FIN(-5) 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
SVI_FIN(-1) - SVI_FIN(-5) -0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_FIN(-2) - SVI_FIN(-5) -0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_FIN(-3) - SVI_FIN(-5)  0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_FIN(-4) - SVI_FIN(-5) 0.000001  0.000000 
 
 
Kone Oyj Prob.   





-0.028070 0.501017 -0.056026 0.3883 
SVI_FIN(-2) - 
SVI_FIN(-5) 
0.447699 0.647091 0.691864 0.7501 
SVI_FIN(-3) - 
SVI_FIN(-5) 
0.553731 0.640665 0.864305 0.6712 
SVI_FIN(-4) - 
SVI_FIN(-5) 
-0.204309 0.640665 -0.318902 0.6717 
R-squared 0.025780     Mean dependent  0.009925 
Adjusted R-squared 0.004873     S.D. dependent  0.172653 




Sum squared resid 6.911650     Schwarz criterion -
0.567894 




Durbin-Watson stat 1.227864  
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Null Hypothesis Summary:  
Wald Test:Kone TV null hyp. accepted 
F>15 
Null Hypothesis: SVI_FIN(-1)= SVI_FIN(-2)= SVI_FIN(-3)= 
SVI_FIN(-4)= SVI_FIN(-5) 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
SVI_FIN(-1) - SVI_FIN(-5) -0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_FIN(-2) - SVI_FIN(-5) -0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_FIN(-3) - SVI_FIN(-5)  0.000000  0.000000 
SVI_FIN(-4) - SVI_FIN(-5)  .12E+92  0.000000 
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APPENDIX 10 OMXH ALL SHARE CONSTITUENTS FOR 
THIS STUDY 
OMX Helsinki All Share Index approved Constituents for this study 
Company name Ticker symbol 
1 Aktia Bank PLC   AKTRV:HEX 
2 Apetit Oyj   APETI:HEX 
3 Atria Oyj   ATRAV:HEX 
4 Basware Oyj   BAS1V:HEX 
5 Cramo Oyj   CRA1V:HEX 
6 Digia Oyj   DIG1V:HEX 
7 Elisa Oyj   ELI1V:HEX 
8 F-Secure Oyj   FSC1V:HEX 
9 Finnair FIA1S:HEX 
10 Finnlines Oyj   FLG1S:HEX 
11 Fiskars Oyj   FIS1V:HEX 
12 Fortum FUM1V:HEX 
13 Honkarakenne Oyj   HONBS:HEX 
14 Kemira Oyj   KRA1V:HEX 
15 Keskisuomalainen Oyj   KSLAV:HEX 
16 Kesko Oyj   KESAV:HEX 
17 Kone Oyj   KNEBV:HEX 
18 Konecranes Abp   KCR1V:HEX 
19 Lemminkainen Oyj   LEM1S:HEX 
20 M-real Oyj   MRLAV:HEX 
21 Marimekko Oyj   MMO1V:HEX 
22 Martela Oyj   MARAS:HEX 
23 Metso Oyj   MEO1V:HEX 
24 Neste Oil Corporation NES1V:HEX 
25 NOKIA NOK1V:HEX 
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26 Nordea Bank AB NDA1V:HEX 
27 Nurminen Logistics Oyj   NLG1V:HEX 
28 Olvi Oyj   OLVAS:HEX 
29 Oriola KD Oyj  OKDAV:HEX 
30 Outokumpu OUT1V:HEX 
31 Outotec Oyj   OTE1V:HEX 
32 Ponsse Oyj   PON1V:HEX 
33 Ramirent Oyj   RMR1V:HEX 
34 Rapala VMC Corp RAP1V:HEX 
35 Rautaruukki Oyj   RTRKS:HEX 
36 Sampo Oyj   SAMAS:HEX 
37 SRV Yhtiot Oyj   SRV1V:HEX 
38 Stockmann Oyj   STCAS:HEX 
39 Stora Enso STERV:HEX 
40 Talvivaaran Kaivososakeyhtio 
Oyj  
 TLV1V:HEX 
41 Technopolis Oyj   TPS1V:HEX 
42 TeliaSonera TLS1V:HEX 
43 Tieto Oyj   TIE1V:HEX 
44 Tikkurila Oyj   TIK1V:HEX 
45 Tulikivi Oyj   TULAV:HEX 
46 Uponor Oyj   UNR1V:HEX 
47 Vacon Oyj   VAC1V:HEX 
48 Vaisala Oyj   VAIAS:HEX 
49 Valmet Corp VALMT:HEX 
50 Viking Line Abp   VIK1V:HEX 
51 Yit Oyj   YTY1V:HEX 
 
